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ABSTRACT

Castro, Mauricio F. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2015. Casablanca of the Caribbean: Cuban
Refugees, Local Power, and Cold War Policy in Miami, 1959-1995. Major Professor: Jon Teaford.
This dissertation chronicles the history of the city of Miami, Florida in the aftermath of
the Cuban Revolution. A heavy influx of Cuban exiles following the rise to power of Fidel Castro
fundamentally changed the economic, social, and political landscape of the city. This work
examines the relationship between the Cuban exile community, the United States government,
and local government, civic, and social groups in the city. The federal government extended a
welcome to the Cuban exiles that was motivated by Cold War concerns, identifying them as
potential assets in the fight against Marxism in Latin America. While the benefits provided to
the Cuban refugees were meant to be transitory, as their stay in the United States was expected
to be, the federal government provided the exiles with access to structures of privilege that
were parallel to those associated with middle class whiteness in the postwar period. This
transfer of funds and the ideological moorings that drove it ties Miami more directly to the
Sunbelt pattern of economic and social development than has been previously acknowledged.
This work argues that the presence of the large Cuban community in Miami does not make the
city an outlier to the larger American urban experience, but instead makes it central to that
experience. The city of Miami in the decades after the Cuban Revolution is also central to
expanding our understanding of race relations in the United States. The interactions between
the Cuban community, the non-Hispanic white community, and the African American
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community in Miami complicate our understanding of race relations in this time period. Finally,
this dissertation tracks the growth in power, wealth, and influence of the Cuban community in
the United States and illustrates the permeability of the divides between local, national, and
transnational. The history of Miami shows how local events can be influenced by and, in turn,
influence transnational trends and international events.

1

INTRODUCTION—CASABLANCA OF THE CARIBBEAN
On Saturday, August 7, 1976 The Miami Herald featured a report in its local news
section about a delay in the installation of four domino tables in a recently renovated mini-park.
The park, now a well-known Little Havana landmark called Maximo Gomez Park, had been a
vacant lot owned by the city and a gathering spot for the area’s Cuban domino aficionados. The
city had planned to construct an official park with domino tables and had informed the public
that the project would take three weeks. The domino players had been welcomed by Miguel
Galiano, the owner of an auto repair shop across the street from the lot, who provided them
with wooden shacks and electric lights. Much to the dismay of the players, and of Galiano, the
three-week wait turned into a six-month ordeal. The city had spent $56,248 on the renovations
and had continually postponed the park’s opening. The final straw had been a delay in the
installation of the last four domino tables planned for the park. While city officials stated the
tables and their corresponding chairs were on order, the frustrated players issued an ultimatum
that if the tables were not installed by Monday they would move their old tables from the auto
shop’s land to the park. The Herald’s reporter, Miguel Perez, conveyed the frustrations of the
players and the city planners in a local-color piece about a minor oversight.1
The story, innocuous as it was, prompted one reader to craft an enraged letter to Perez
and the Herald. “My heart bleeds for the poor Cuban Refugee who has to sit on his big ass and
play dominos all day long at the expense of the American Tax Dollar and the Cuban Refugee

1

Miguel Perez, “Domino Players Want Their Spot Back Now,” Miami Herald, August 7, 1976.
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Give-Away Program,” Irving H. Miller wrote.2 Miller was referring to the Cuban Refugee
Program, a federal initiative established in 1961 under the direction of President John F.
Kennedy to deal with the influx of Cuban exiles fleeing Fidel Castro’s revolution. Perez’s article
made no mention of the program, but its continued presence in South Florida was still
problematic to Miamians like Miller. He saw the impatience of the players as a symptom of
something created by federal entities like the CRP: an unwarranted sense of entitlement. Miller
had watched the Cuban exiles receive government resources in the name of national security
and had seen them change the face of Miami in what he considered uncomfortably permanent
ways. He did not credit Miami’s Cuban Americans with the positive aspects of these changes—
the rejuvenation of downtown Miami for instance—but instead asked Perez just how far he
expected “the American Tax Payer to go on the free ride for the ‘poor Cuban’ who is going to
win back his homeland playing dominos at the expense of the United States?”3 In Miller’s mind,
the Cubans had been nothing but a drain on his city, his state, and his country for seventeen
years.
Miller’s message to Perez reflects not only the political tension that surrounded the
Cuban community in Cold War Miami, but also the intrinsic connections between transnational
trends and local events in the city. The Cuban Revolution sparked a migration that brought an
estimated 828,577 Cuban exiles to the United States by 2000.4 The majority of these exiles
either settled in South Florida immediately or returned to the area after a period of
resettlement elsewhere in the United States. Washington granted these exiles special entry and
tenure in the United States based on Cold War concerns regarding the spread of communism in
2

Irving H. Miller, letter to Miguel Perez, Miami Herald reporter, August 7 1976, Bernardo Benes Papers,
Box 1, Folder 7, Cuban Heritage Collection, Coral Gables, FL (Hereafter cited as CHC).
3
Ibid.
4
Information gathered by the 2000 U.S. Census, see Silvia Pedraza, Political Disaffection in Cuba’s
Revolution and Exodus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5.
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Latin America. Federal officials expected that the Cuban refugees they were giving asylum to
would only stay in the United States for a short period of time. Early in the Cuban diaspora,
policymakers believed that the Castro regime would collapse within a few months or years,
either through the machinations of the American intelligence community, through diplomatic
pressure, or through internal discontent. The U.S. government publicly embraced the Cuban
exiles as living proof of the failures of international communism and committed to aiding them
as part of the ideological struggle of the Cold War. What American policymakers, as well as the
exiles that came to the United States with phrases like “next year in Cuba” and “we’ll be back in
Cuba in six months” on their lips, did not expect was that the revolution was not transitory. The
exile, in the minds of both the Cuban exiles and American federal officials, was meant to be a
brief interlude in the history of the Cuban people.
The exiles presented a potential opportunity for the U.S. government to lay the
foundation for a post-Castro Cuba that would better fit American interests in Latin America.
While the Eisenhower administration sought to exploit the paramilitary potential of the Cuban
exiles for a violent overthrow of Castro’s regime, the Bay of Pigs invasion made officials in the
Kennedy administration embrace the importance of maintaining a vibrant and active civilian
community. By providing assistance that helped the Cuban exile community retain its
professional and entrepreneurial skills, the U.S. government sought to maintain the core of a
democratic, capitalistic civil society in a near-future Cuba. The welcome offered to the Cuban
exile community by the federal government was accordingly unprecedented. No previous
refugee or immigrant group had ever been provided with an open door immigration policy
compounded a massive economic investment aimed at ensuring their prosperity. The Cuban
exile community embraced the opportunities provided by the federal government and
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expanded on them through their educational, social, and entrepreneurial experience, adapting it
to a business environment that was at once foreign and familiar.
Rather than becoming a new underclass in South Florida, the Cuban community
received a massive investment in direct aid, training programs, and small business loans that
helped empower them. By funneling defense funds into the Cuban refugee community, the
federal government inadvertently created a powerful social and political group that would
demand and gain access to certain Cold War economic privileges that white, middle-class
citizens sought for themselves. The emerging Cuban American community took full advantage of
these benefits and through organization and entrepreneurship came to challenge the power of
entrenched local elites who, as Miller’s letter shows, felt threatened and resented this
advancement. As the years and decades went on and the Cuban revolution solidified its hold on
the island, the American federal government found itself unintentionally partnered with the
exiles in fundamentally changing the social, economic, and political landscape of South Florida.
While Miami had served as a gateway to Latin America and the Caribbean for the United
States before the Cuban revolution, the turmoil in the area fundamentally tied the city to the
region. Miami became a transit point for refugees, exiles, revolutionaries, and mercenaries as
multiple conflicts raged on. At least twice, in two different decades, the city’s largest
newspaper, the Miami Herald, described Miami as the “Casablanca of the Caribbean.”5 The
Moroccan city was a symbol of refugee migrations in a time of war and of intrigue in the
American popular imagination. The term likely resonated with the Herald’s readership,
especially those readers whose romanticized view of a thriving, cosmopolitan, dynamic

5

Please see James Buchanan, “Miami the Casablanca of Caribbean,” Miami Herald, July 20, 1959 and John
Dorschner, “Miami: Casablanca Of The Caribbean,” Miami Herald Tropic Magazine, April 4, 1976.
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Moroccan metropolis came via the wartime film Casablanca, staring Humphrey Bogart and
Ingrid Bergman. Readers were likely to remember a city that served as the meeting point of
different cultures in a time of conflict and political upheaval, a city that served as a clearing
house for refugees, exiles, patriots, and freedom fighters, and a city in which a struggle between
light and darkness finally roused a figure of American complacency into action. While the
realities of the international situations affecting Miami were far more complex than any
Hollywood film, the reference allowed Miamians to understand that the clashes playing out on
their streets were extensions of foreign conflicts. Likewise, the changes to Miami in the wake of
the Cuban revolution gave the city its own aura and identity in the American popular
imagination, one which has created the erroneous impression that Miami’s story is
fundamentally alien to the larger experience of U.S. history at the time. The history of Miami,
however, is essential to our understanding of Cold War American cities as sites shaped by the
convergence of local and global forces.
Miami’s residents found their everyday experiences directly affected by Cold War
strategies. As such, their lives in the city are crucial to our understanding of the effects of policy
as lived in American environments. This dissertation argues that the Cuban presence in Miami
does not fundamentally remove the city’s history from the patterns that shaped postwar urban
development. While several excellent historical studies have been written on the Cuban
refugee experience and the creation of the Cuban American community, these trends are often
studied in isolation.6 The events surrounding and initiated by this group tend to be considered
unique and distinctive in the larger scheme of U.S. history. On the surface, this perception of
6

These works include Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees During
the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) and María Cristina García, Havana USA:
Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1996).
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the Cuban story in Miami and elsewhere in the United States appears accurate. This work
pierces through the obfuscation created by this view in order to lay bare the underlying
structures that provide continuities between Miami’s history and that of other American cities.
Miami’s story is not that of a curious outlier because of the Cuban presence. This history,
rather, is essential to our understanding of the development of racial, political, and economic
hierarchies created by the confluence of the welfare and national security states in the postwar
United States. The Cuban presence makes Miami an essential site of inquiry for scholars of the
American experience in the latter half of the twentieth century.
Historians have, in recent years, engaged cities like Miami by combining the
methodologies of social and political history. Scholars have brought urban case studies to the
vanguard of the discipline, making manifestations of the local essential to national discussions of
race, politics, and the structures of privilege. 7 These historians have yet to account, however,
for the ways in which individual towns and cities have been affected by transnational trends or
how local events can shape the international stage. They are still bound by the artificial
divisions between the studies of foreign and domestic policy and between policy and social
history that obfuscate the complexities of the relationships between the local and the
transnational, the personal and the institutional. These artificial distinctions must be jettisoned
by blending local and national sources into a textured historical account of Miami’s post-1959
ascent that has profound implications for the study of postwar urban history in the United
States. This approach positions broader trends in relation to the experiences of the individuals
7

See for example: Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of
American Politics (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight:
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005);
Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2006); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Thomas J. Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race
and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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and groups who were forced to construct lives and communities in the midst of local, national,
and international turmoil. Miami provides the perfect backdrop for a much-needed study of the
interaction between national governments, local authorities, religious and civic groups, Cuban
exile and Cuban American organizations, and the individuals who made the city their home.
These historical actors changed Miami, but in time they would also have a significant effect
upon national politics and upon American foreign relations. The history of Miami lays bare the
structural links that tie American cities to larger global developments. It shows how, in effect,
the local and the transnational are one and the same.
Connecting social and political history is essential when presenting a broader
perspective on American foreign relations and the consequences of foreign policy. Foreign
policy is not an isolated concern disconnected from other areas of study in American history,
just as the history of Miami is not isolated from that of the rest of the country. The decisions of
policymakers charged with engaging the United States with the rest of the world initiate ripple
effects with long term implications for all aspects of American society. Historians of the South
and West have begun to investigate the consequences of these policymakers’ actions by
focusing on the increasing importance of the Sunbelt in post-1945 U.S history. They have
demonstrated how federal defense spending constituted a massive influx of wealth that
transformed communities throughout the Sunbelt but did not fundamentally challenge the
social and racial structures already in place in these regions. These foreign policy based
decisions, however, had far more varied effects than previously understood. The flow of close
to two billion dollars in federal funds to aid the Cuban exiles, most of who settled or had a
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temporary stay in Miami was an investment in a Cold War asset.8 The federal funds spent in
the city following the arrival of the Cuban exiles were analogous those expended in opening of
defense plants and research centers in other strategic locations. Instead of purchasing weapons
and technological advancements, the federal government sought to purchase human assets that
would further the fight against Marxism abroad. In this way, the growth of the Cuban
community and its positive impact on South Florida’s economy makes the city fit into the
structures that drove the growth of Sunbelt cities in the postwar.
The work of several scholars has shown that in many Sunbelt cities the federal
government’s expenditures improved general economic fortunes while reinforcing entrenched
social and racial power structures. The effects of the Cuban Refugee Program and related
expenditures, however, fundamentally challenged the racial order and power relations in
Miami. By bolstering the economic fortunes of the Cuban community instead of those of
existing elites, the federal government profoundly altered power relations in Miami. The Cuban
exile community was given access to economic privileges that are parallel to those associated
with middle-class whiteness in the postwar United States. The early waves of the Cuban exiles
seized on these opportunities to make use of their educational and business backgrounds and
set about establishing a new power base in their host city. This elicited the ire of established
class and racial elites in the area and the discontent of the city’s African American community
which saw a new exile group being granted access to benefits denied them for centuries.
Historians have produced important works on the links between race and American
political development, but few have accounted for how transnational population movements
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fundamentally altered the racial composition of American cities.9 Even the best of these studies
remain fixated on the relationships between black and white Americans, presenting Latinos and
other groups as afterthoughts, if at all. The transnational approach of this dissertation is
necessary to understand the complex racial landscape of the creation of multicultural America.
This approach demands that historians move past the idea that the color line extends only in
two directions in American history and that they seek to fully integrate other groups that have
been previously treated as outliers and have not had their voices heard. While these groups
were more visible in Miami than in other places, the more fluid, multilateral power relations
that undergird Miami’s history serve to correct a long standing oversight in our historical
perspective. The interactions between the Cuban community, the white and African American
communities, and other groups in Miami challenge the black/white racial binary that obscures
our understanding of the multicultural metropolitan experience.
The Cuban exile community’s tenure and the establishment of a Cuban American
identity in Miami also serve to show that the divisions between history at the transnational scale
and the local scale are far more porous than has been acknowledged. The conflict between the
United States and Cuba and the larger Cold War had an immediate and visible effect on the
streets of Miami. Events occurring in downtown Miami or Hialeah had the same urgency to the
conflict as those taking place in Havana or Washington. The effects and changes to the city led
to new social structures and new sources of local economic and political power. These local
developments, in turn, would affect the very foreign policy that had set them in motion. Events
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occurring at a larger scale have long been understood to affect those taking place at a smaller
scale. It is important to recognize that local events can have a significant effect on national and
international trends. While this is particularly visible in the history of Miami, it is by no means
unique. American urban history is in dire need of greater integration into the transnational
history that has long shaped it, but which has rarely been acknowledged. These connections
were made all the stronger in Miami by the Cuban revolution, but the city’s connection to larger
trends long precedes it. Trends in the city’s development and on the island of Cuba set the
stage for an increasing embrace of Miami’s identity as both an American city and a world city.

Miami’s location, on the shores of Biscayne Bay in South Florida, served to give the city a
unique character due to its proximity to the Caribbean Sea and to Cuba. In the decades after
the city’s founding in 1896, national and international tourism proved extremely important to
Miami’s boosters, who sought to make it a gateway to the Caribbean. There was, in the early
twentieth century, a significant American infatuation with the island nation of Cuba. This desire
for a connection with a foreign land that seemed both exotic and promising would play a
significant part in determining the city’s character and appearance. One scholar has gone as far
as to suggest that Miami “was a product of the North American infatuation with Cuba in the
1920s,” and bears the distinctive markings of these origins. Developers would often visit the
island for ideas on architectural design, street names often mirrored locations in Cuba, and
construction materials—including weathered roof tiles and fixtures previously used in Cuban
buildings—were imported from Havana.10 Miami, then, was not only a way station on the way
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to Cuba, but a reproduction of the island’s charms and promises on American soil. The
connection to Cuba fueled the imagination of investors and vacationers and helped drive the
real estate explosion in Dade County throughout the first half of the 1920s.
This proximity to the Caribbean also had a profound effect on the racial dynamics in the
city. In some respects, these dynamics developed in a similar pattern to those in much of the
American South. Throughout much of the twentieth century, African Americans in Miami lived
in the city’s congested Central Negro District, also known as Colored Town (and, in time, as
Overtown), located “blocks from downtown but a world away from the beachfront where so
many blacks worked.”11 African Americans in Miami were politically and economically exploited,
and were often excluded from a significant share of public services. The city differed from the
traditional model of American cities in the Jim Crow South through the significant presence of
Bahamian blacks in the city. While this immigrant population helped the city’s early economic
development by providing a labor pool for domestic service, tourism, and agriculture, it did so
within a tourist based economy that facilitated the emergence of a white power structure that
directly benefited from and controlled this labor force. The Bahamians, however, were not
accustomed to the racial bigotry of the American South and were seen by white elites as a
liability in relation to African Americans in the city. Some of the immigrants defended
themselves far more vigorously than did native born blacks and used their British citizenship as
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protection against racial attacks. Ultimately, the inclusion of English-speaking Caribbean blacks
“intensified Miami’s hostile climate and hardened racial lines.”12
By the early 1950s, the evolution of Greater Miami was following a pattern that would
benefit the exiles that started arriving by the end of the decade. The Miami metropolitan area
consisted of the city of Miami and twenty-five suburban municipalities. The central city was
growing at a much slower rate than the periphery as, despite the best efforts of the city’s
boosters, a pattern of economic decentralization followed when the surrounding suburban
municipalities sought to entice commercial and industrial establishments away from the city.13
By the time the Cuban migration to South Florida began, the loss of jobs in the central city had
led to a recession and an economic environment that undermined the previous diversification of
the city’s economy. The Cuban exiles were moving into an environment in which 62% of the
city’s population was dependent on seasonal tourism for part or all of their income.14
The depopulation of Miami proper was further exacerbated by the embrace of urban
renewal schemes by liberal politicians in South Florida. Self-styled racial progressives sought to
tackle the symbolic and material ills of Jim Crow segregation in the decades after the Second
World War through slum clearance and urban renewal. They sought to unmake Jim Crow at the
spatial level by democratizing Americans’ access to suburban real estate and weakening the
12
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property rights of urban landlords.15 This course of action was supported by the Miami Herald,
which described slums and blighted areas as “Florida’s Shame,” and declared that “Urban
Renewal should be an article of hope and faith” in the state’s future.16 In effect, however, the
practice of utilizing eminent domain legislation to carry out slum clearing and urban renewal
projects served to raze black rental housing and to liquidate black homes.17 In spatial terms, the
elimination of black housing in the Central Negro District led to an African American migration
from the central city to unincorporated areas that would come to be known as Liberty City, a
more suburban environment north of Allapattah.18 Just as many of the city’s white inhabitants
were following the migration of jobs to the suburban municipalities, African Americans were
also moving out of the central city, creating a space for the incoming waves of Cuban
immigrants.
Circumstances in Miami would have mattered little if there were not pre-existing links
between Cubans and the state of Florida. Well before the 1959 revolution, before the SpanishAmerican War in 1898, and before Miami’s incorporation in 1896, émigrés and tourists from the
island of Cuba had already established relationships with towns and cities in Florida. The
proximity to Florida made it a convenient destination for both business and leisure, establishing
a pattern of Cuban business interests in the area that preceded the expanded American
presence in Cuba following their independence from Spain. The U.S. involvement in Cuba would
be significant in establishing a business community whose members were prepared for an
American business environment based on their interactions with American businessmen,
missionaries, and corporations in their home country.
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The development of this business class was directly tied to the circumstances through
which an independent Cuba came to be. Much has been written on the Cuban independence
movement, the Spanish American War, and the weakening of the new Cuban nation’s
sovereignty by the United States through legal machinations like the Platt Amendment and
other political, military, and economic pressures brought to bear on a long line of Cuban
governments.19 These events were crucial to Cuba’s development throughout the twentieth
century and to the circumstances that brought about the Cuban revolution in the late 1950s, but
they were particularly important to the story of Miami after the revolution as far as they explain
the adaptability of the exiles to their new circumstances. While there are clear continuities
between the political traditions of Cuba in the first half of the twentieth century and the political
affiliations of different exile groups after the revolution, the disruptive nature of revolution and
the Cuban diaspora served to re-shape Cuban politics. In this new, transnational political
landscape, the history of American intervention remained crucial to the mythology of the Cuban
revolution, but became muted to those exiles who constructed idealized Cubas, both of the past
and of a post-Castro future, in their minds. Their outlooks were informed by the more recent
past and their conflict with the Castro regime.
The American presence in Cuba following the War of Independence was significant in
creating an environment that shaped the professional classes that formed a significant portion
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of the early waves of migration. Decades of conflict with the Spanish had already taken a heavy
human and economic toll on the island of Cuba. The US entered this devastation in the wake of
the war, and using the vast resources at its disposal, learned early “to exact Cuban acquiescence
to their needs. Even the distribution of food to the hungry served as a means of social
control.”20 The Americans saw themselves as civilizers who had fought a war on behalf of Cuba,
a war whose very name robbed the Cuban’s of any participation or agency, and whose victory
gave them the moral authority to remake Cuba in their own image and for their own interests.21
As Louis Pérez Jr points out, however, the larger significance of the American
intervention and their consequences had less to do with political relationships than with social
realignments. The material impoverishment of the Cubans in 1898 facilitated the introduction
of the Americans’ “accumulated technical knowledge, advance industrial systems, new
machinery, capital flows, new business organizations, and modern building innovations, all of
which came loaded with meanings and metaphors as well as models of identity and modes of
self-representation.”22 U.S. business models were ingrained in the post-colonial landscape as a
new system flooded all levels of Cuban enterprise and commerce as with American
entrepreneurs and corporations serving as agents, suppliers, supervisors, and investors.
American business concerns established deep roots in Cuba by taking advantage of the
devastation of the postwar and they helped establish new economic and social systems that
helped to set the stage for both early exile adaptability and the familiarity of many Cubans with
the city of Miami by the start of the Cuban diaspora.
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In the decades following the end of the colonial period, the development of the Cuban
market—and the American presence in that market—was significant in shaping a new Cuban
identity. Cubans sought to establish a clear standard for what it meant to be a modern Cuban,
but these definitions developed in an environment that embraced American business models
and connections. The sophistication of Havana’s finance community, for example, was often
held well above its counterparts in other Latin American countries and, at times, their
counterparts in certain parts of the United States. Carlos Arboleya, a prominent exile who
would eventually become vice-chairman of South Florida Barnett Bank, remembers that the
experience he had gained working for Citibank and the Banco Continental Cubano made him
more experienced than many in Miami’s established banking communities. He recalled that
upon finding his first banking job in Miami, the bank he was employed at “did not even know
how to issue a letter of credit. I was the one who showed that bank how to issue letters of
credit.”23 Arboleya was effusive about the state of Cuba’s banking industry before the
revolution, stating that it was not on the same level as New York’s banking enclave, but was on a
corresponding level with the rest of the United States. While these recollections were certainly
tinged by the trauma of revolution and exile, and by a nostalgia for a Cuba that no longer exists,
they suggest that Havana’s exposure to international business and the heavy investment of
American corporations prepared many Cubans to operate in a much more vibrant business
environment than that which already existed in Miami—one that they would have to help build.
By the 1950s, Miami held special significance for both exiles and well-to-do Cubans.
While Miami would be cemented as a city of exiles in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution,
throughout the 1930s, the 1940s, and especially the 1950s, South Florida served as a haven for
23
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former office holders and political radicals seeking to bring change to Cuba. The city attracted
more Cubans than those who actively sought revolution or to avoid the political upheavals at
home; it also served as a natural tourist destination for many in the upper and middle classes of
Cuban society. Miami “entered the Cuban consciousness as a place of refuge and residence: it
was readily accessible, the cost of living was reasonable, and most of all it was vaguely
familiar.”24 The proximity to Cuba and low cost of living were clearly important, but the
familiarity with Miami stemmed from more than the Spanish and Cuban affectations of the city’s
street names and architecture. This familiarity also stemmed from the way in which the
American presence in Cuba had transmitted certain cultural forms. Pérez suggests that the
influence of American cultural forms in post-colonial Cuba created a self-definition of a CubanAmerican identity which predated the Cuban diaspora. The cultural impact of the American
presence created in many Cubans a significant pro-American feeling, and the United States in
general—and Miami in particular—came to represent a temporary haven for Cuban tourists as
violence once again took hold of their country in the late 1950s.25
The city’s image as a welcoming refuge for Latin American visitors and business was also
enhanced by certain conscious decisions made by Miami’s government and civic organizations.
Miami’s boosters had long envisioned the city as a Pan-American metropolis, but in the years
following the Second World War organizations like the Miami Chamber of Commerce sought to
promote the city as the “Gateway to the Americas.”26 These efforts included promotional tours
throughout Latin America, Spanish language tourist literature on Miami and Miami Beach, and a
radio program entitled “Saludos de Miami,” which sought to educate Latin American and
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Caribbean audiences on the public services available in Miami for Spanish speakers.27 This
welcoming attitude toward Latin American visitors was intended to bolster Miami’s already
significant tourist industry. In doing so, however, Miami’s business elites challenged the existing
system of Jim Crow segregation present in the city as it was throughout the South. In a city that
still had separate accommodations for whites and blacks both in public spaces and in
businesses, Latin American visitors were not as clearly racialized as they might have been
elsewhere. Latin American visitors, even very dark skinned visitors, were provided with
exceptions to the prevalent structures of race in the city. As Channelle N. Rose points out, this
not only demonstrates a greater complexity in the racial politics of American cities than has
been allowed by the traditional white/black binary, but it also set Miami apart from other places
through the “‘honorary’ white status afforded to some Spanish-speakers, particularly Cubans.”28
This acceptance was significant not only because it further identified Miami as a refuge in dark
times for those Cubans affluent enough to visit the city as tourists, but because of its long-term
implications. While the “honorary whiteness” Rose describes was intended to affect individuals
and groups who were only visiting Miami, this transient access to racial privilege set an
important precedent that would later be tested as droves of Cubans arrived at the city’s
international airport not for week-long vacations, but for periods of exile without a guaranteed
end.
The effects of the conflict in Cuba would test the patience of Miami’s government and
its citizens even before the defeat of the Batista regime. With a small, but impassioned, Cuban
community in the city, it was only a matter of time until the conflict and violence gripping the
island followed Cuban tourists and exiles onto the streets of Miami. Pro and anti-Batista
27
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factions existed in South Florida and often clashed on the streets of Miami. As Miami Herald
reporter James Buchanan would later recall, “during the two years of Castro’s revolution[…]gunrunners opened fire on would-be hijackers; street attacks were frequent, and Cuban officials in
Miami were beaten.”29 This last trend caused particular consternation for Batista’s government
and headaches for the Miami officials and boosters who sought to sell their city internationally.
Rodolfo Masferrer, a member of the Cuban House of Representatives, was beaten by antiBatista Cubans at the Miami airport. This incident and the earlier beating of his son in the city
caused the Mayor of Havana to denunciate the city of Miami and threaten its economic viability
by announcing that Cubans had spent $400 million in Miami in 1957, but in the future they
would spend that money elsewhere. 30 The furor surrounding these incidents forced Florida
Governor Leroy Collins to apologize for the Masferrer incident and to pledge to detain those
responsible.31
Despite the best effort of state and local officials to dispel an image of lawlessness and
violence, Miami was now fully engrossed in Cuba’s conflict. The Cuban House of
Representatives criticized the city’s government for being unable or unwilling to stop pro-Castro
exiles that were operating “without difficulty in Miami, a center of the violent internal struggle
[in Cuba].”32 The Batista government identified Miami as a destination for those seeking to
instigate conflict on the island. The violence in Miami was not only an extension of a homeland
conflict carried out by exiles and émigrés in a foreign city, but also an appropriation of an
American city as a central location for the violence in Cuba. As arms shipments, smugglers, and
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expeditionary forces continued to be seized and arrested in and around Miami, local officials
grew increasingly worried about the escalating violence.33 They were rightfully concerned.
Their ability to deal with the encroachment of a transnational conflict into South Florida
depended on the limited powers of city, county, and state government. Local law enforcement
could crack down on street conflicts and coordinate with federal authorities to seize arms
shipments, but its reach was limited. Cuban citizens often avoided prosecution by leaving the
country. In July of 1959, for example, Cuban Consul Alonso Hidalgo boarded a plane headed for
Havana in order to avoid being tried for inciting a riot.34 The government in Cuba had changed,
but the conflict persisted both on the island and in Miami. While violent clashes and plotting
would continue to tax the power and reach of law enforcement in South Florida after Castro’s
victory in Cuba, a greater challenge to state and local government would come as the size of the
exile population grew. Miami’s government and its citizens would soon face the impact of a
massive transnational migration into an area unprepared to face the challenge alone.

The three and a half decades following the Cuban Revolution brought about wide
ranging changes to Miami and created a powerful new group in South Florida and in American
politics. Neither this evolution nor the unprecedented welcome from the federal government
that drove it were inevitable. Significant work has been done on the Cuban American
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community by sociologists, political scientists, and scholars in other disciplines.35 Some of these
works, however, take the privileged position of the Cuban refugees in relation to the federal
government as a given, without fully exploring the historical circumstances that determined this
relationship. In the chapters that follow, the origins, processes, and consequences of this
evolution are chronicled from the revolutions immediate aftermath in 1959 to the formal end of
the rafter crisis in 1995. Chapter 1 chronicles the first two years of the Cuban refugee crisis, the
reaction by local government officials and civic leaders, how these officials and leaders framed
the refugee influx in terms of the international Cold War, and the early reaction by the
Eisenhower administration. Chapter 2 describes the implementation of and motivations for a
large-scale federal response to the exile influx headed by the Cuban Refugee Program and
analyses its effects on Miami’s economy. Chapter 3 follows the evolution of Cuban exile politics,
from the relationship of exile organizations with the federal government to the reactions by
Miami’s black and white communities to their presence in South Florida.
The period following the end of the direct flights from Cuba to the United States in 1973
and before the start of the Mariel boatlift of 1980 serves as the setting for Chapter 4. The
Cuban American community worked to consolidate the economic and political gains they had
accrued in South Florida, while they wrestled with internal conflicts over whether to open a
dialogue with Castro’s regime. The Mariel boatlift is the central event of Chapter 5. Mariel
presented a fundamental challenge to federal authorities, to other groups in Miami, and to the
Cuban American community as some 125,000 Cuban refugees came to the United State in the
35
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span of a few months. The political problems associated with Mariel drove the creation of a
powerful Cuban American lobby. Chapter 6 describes the rise of this lobby, the extent of the
Cuban American community’s political power, and the limits of that power in the waning years
of the Cold War.
For decades, Miami has been treated as an outlier to the larger American urban
experience. Miami’s Cuban community makes its differences from other cities quite clear.
These differences also serve to obfuscate our understanding of Miami as a city whose
underlying structures fit well within the Sunbelt synthesis. An analysis of Miami’s history in the
wake of the Cuban revolution serves to reveal the structures that shape the multicultural cities
of the United States in the postwar period. It is simply a matter of correctly identifying the
multicultural trends present not only in obvious urban environments like Miami, but far and
wide throughout the United States.
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CHAPTER 1—“OUR UNNOTICED NEIGHBORS”: CUBAN EXILES, COMMUNITY ACTION, AND THE
PUSH FOR A FEDERAL RESPONSE

On July 4, 1959, a group of Cubans sympathetic to Fidel Castro’s revolution gathered
near Bayfront Park in downtown Miami to participate in a “Cuba-U.S. friendship parade.”
Members of this group, including Cuban Consul Alonso Hidalgo, later reported that the parade
was interrupted by a small group loyal to Fulgencio Batista, which erupted onto the scene in a
car and proceeded to snatch a Cuban flag from the hands of a young girl. This provocation
enraged many of the parade’s participants, making them give chase to the provocateurs. The
pursuit ended at the home of Batista-era Senator Rolando Masferrer at 1105 SW 2nd Ave, where
over fifty anti-Castro Cubans were gathered. 1 Another report, signed by more than a dozen
Miami police officers, suggested the fault of what transpired lay with Hidalgo. “Disheveled and
almost incoherent with rage,” Hidalgo arrived on the scene of a minor clash between a proCastro group and the anti-Castro group gathered for what they called a “Catholic AntiCommunist” rally, and started shouting encouragement at the pro-Castro crowd.2 Hidalgo’s
actions caused the anti-Castro group to surge out of Masferrer’s home intending to trounce the
consul. Regardless of how the disturbance actually started, the end result was the same—a
force of 45 police officers on motorcycles, radio cars and paddy wagons were called to the scene
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to stop an estimated 200 Cubans engaged in a street brawl on the intersection of SW Second
Avenue and 11th St.3
This clash was just the latest in a series of incidents occurring in and around the city of
Miami. In the months preceding the incident, the Miami Herald had published reports of verbal
and physical confrontations between Cuban groups, of the international intrigue related to the
agents of several Caribbean nations in South Florida, and of the arms trade flowing through the
city. This mounting strife finally led Herald staff writer James Buchanan to declare in the weeks
following the near-riot that his city would become a destination for exiles fleeing for their lives
and a hub for their political activities. When Buchanan considered the possibility of the violence
and intrigue of the Caribbean spilling onto the streets of the city, he compared the situation to
similar occurrences in recent memory asking, “is Miami to be more of a Latin American
battleground than it was during Castro’s Cuban revolution?”4 His readers had already lived
through a period of clashes between Cuban factions when the city had served as a staging
ground for pro-Castro groups. Buchanan expected that this current round of strife would be
worse as the number of exiles in the city continued to grow. He noted that during the three
weeks between June 22 and July 13, 103 new exiles had arrived in South Florida. This number
would be dwarfed by the scale of the refugee arrivals in later years, but the article suggested
that a few hundred agitators on either side would propagandize the estimated mass of 25,00030,000 “neutral” Cubans in the city, threatening further unrest. The question was whether or
not the violence that had largely abated in Cuba would become the new reality for South
Florida.
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The Cuban migration to South Florida in the first two years after Castro’s victory and its
effects spurred local individuals and institutions to action as they sought help to alleviate the
migratory crisis affecting their city. While Miami’s established Cuban community was extremely
successful in incorporating the first arrivals with the aid of local charitable organizations, the
scope of the humanitarian crisis created by the Cuban refugee presence proved too taxing for
the city’s local resources in these early years and drove the calls for federal involvement. The
first encounters between the refugees, local civic and religious groups, and federal authorities
set the stage for a larger federal intervention and had long term effects in shaping this effort.

Father Bryan O. Walsh often thought back to New Year’s Day, 1959 and recalled how it
changed his life. On that day, the tall, redheaded Irish priest saw multiple displays of jubilation
on the streets of Miami as the news of the fall of Fulgencio Batista swept through the city. He
watched as car-loads of Cuban exiles drove around Dupont Plaza and Biscayne Boulevard,
excitedly celebrating the news from Cuba.5 The jubilation felt by those Miami Cubans who had
long sought an end to Batista’s regime was palpable, but their numbers were still relatively small
in relation to the total population of Miami. The day would pass without incident for Walsh, but
it would mark the beginning of a pattern of Cuban immigration to South Florida that would
fundamentally change the face of the area. Like other residents of Miami, Walsh observed the
festivities unaware of the massive changes that were to come for the city and of the
humanitarian crisis that would involve him, as director of Catholic Charities, in the affairs of the
city’s Cuban population for the rest of his life.
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The 28 year-old Walsh had immigrated to the United States from Ireland less than ten
years before. He had been ordained to the priesthood in St. Augustine, FL on May 23rd, 1954
and had been appointed Diocesan Director of Catholic Charities for the Diocese of St. Augustine
and Executive Director of the Miami Catholic Welfare Bureau in February of 1958.6 In August of
that same year, Walsh, along with the rest of South Florida’s Catholic community, had witnessed
the creation of a new diocese with Miami as its See city and headed by Coleman F. Carroll, the
former Auxiliary Bishop of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. As the first new diocese in Florida in 88
years, it represented a significant change for Catholicism in the state.7 While this new diocese
was being constructed around a city with well-established Hispanic populations, the Catholic
Church in South Florida was for the most part middle class, suburban, and at least 95% English
speaking and white.8 Bishop Carroll sought to embrace those Catholics in the area being
underserved by the church’s focus on white suburbanites. Under Carroll’s leadership, Spanish
speaking priests were brought to South Florida and, in November of 1958, the church opened
the Centro Hispanic Catolico, a new agency under the Catholic Welfare Bureau tasked with
dealing with the needs of Spanish speaking new arrivals in the city.9 The creation of the Centro
was fortuitously timed, as a slow but steady stream of Cuban exiles had begun to pour into
Miami.
The appearance of these exiles in Miami led to the publication of a several
sensationalistic newspaper articles highlighting the individual stories of formerly high ranking
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members of the regime now hiding from Castro in South Florida.10 The permanence of these
refugees in the United States was not assured early on. When Rolando Masferrer and several of
his associates fled Havana in his private yacht on January 1 and set sail for Key West, they were
detained upon arrival. Some of the passengers were granted asylum by immigration officials,
others flew back to Havana, and a group including Masferrer was transferred to a detention
center in McAllen, Texas, where they were held until they were released on parole on January
27.11 Within a day, Masferrer had made his way to Miami with his brothers Rodolfo and
Raimundo and was joking to reporters that he might return to Cuba within a year or two, once
Castro cleaned up and had a shave.12 The former senator and newspaper editor would go into
hiding in the weeks that followed, living in a “shabby rented house on the fringe of a Negro
section of Miami,” all the while issuing denials to the press regarding the Cuban government’s
charge that he had stolen $17,000,000 when he fled the country.13 Fulgencio’s brother,
Francisco Batista, was also reported to live in Hialeah and to have opened a business with his
son Juan.14 The presence of Batista associates like Masferrer and Francisco Batista made some
speculate on whether the ousted despot would leave the Dominican Republic and seek refuge in
the United States. This led the Herald to pose the question of whether or not Batista and other
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Latin American strongmen should be allowed into the country: “Should the U.S. grant political
asylum to deposed dictators?”15
Miami was not an obvious destination for many Batista supporters. Many members of
the Batista regime or those closely associated with it avoided entering the United States through
Miami because of the strong support Castro had in the city.16 The pro-Castro tendency in the
city was weakened by the arrival of each new flight from Cuba. The very planes which brought
Batista supporters would often return to the island filled with Cubans who had been exiled by
the former dictator and now returned home with the expectation of a fresh start.17 The early
exiles made their presence known through their activism and their involvement in their new
community. By March of 1959, the first newspaper with an anti-Castro perspective, Tribuna,
was established by exiles suspected of being financed by “Batista sources.”18 Upon settling in
the city, these early exiles began to organize and meet at anti-Castro events, such as the one
held in Masferer’s home. The activism of these first exiles served to foster political unrest and
clashes like the July 4th riot. Observers were concerned about the exile presence because of the
clashes between anti- and pro-Castro groups and because of the exile influence on the
established Cuban community in Miami, not because of their numbers and their extended
presence in the city.
The exact number of refugees that sought to make their home in South Florida during
this time period is difficult to ascertain. By the end of June, 1959 District Immigration Director
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Edward P. Ahrens estimated that the number of exiles in the city had reached 500.19 This
number, however, was obscured by the lack of consistency in federal policy regarding Cuban
entry and registration in the United States. The federal government, under Dwight D.
Eisenhower, established an open-door policy for Cubans migrating to the United States. As
relations with the Castro government deteriorated, a heavy flow of temporary refugees would
serve to discredit the new regime in the eyes of the world.20 What immigration officials failed to
establish, believing the situation to be transient, was a system by which the entry of these
Cubans could be accurately monitored and quantified. Without such a system, the traditional
flow of tourists and visitors between Florida and Cuba obscured the precise scope of the
migration as very few of the Cubans entering the United States at this time sought the
designation of political refugee.21
A majority of those who made their new home in South Florida entered the country on
B-2 tourist visas. The relative ease with which Cubans could exit their own country and enter
the United States served to increase the number of exiles as the months went by and Castro
consolidated his power on the island. This consolidation made many Cubans even more
adamant about using a tourist visa to enter the United States. As one local resident observed in
a letter to South Florida congressman Dante B. Fascell, many Cubans reasoned—rightly or not—
that upon becoming officially designated as exiles, their remaining family in Cuba would be put
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in jeopardy and any possessions left behind would immediately be seized by the Castro
government. He also reported that by August of 1960, there were about 4,000 Cubans that had
adopted official political refugee status in Miami, but that this number was dwarfed by the illdefined mass of Cubans that remained in South Florida on tourist visas. 22
By the end of October 1960, the number of “visitors” who had entered the United
States using tourist visas and resided in the Miami area as exiles was estimated in an official
report as 30,000. The estimate would grow to 33,000 by the end of the year.23 At the end of
October, the number of Cubans who had specifically requested political asylum or who had
stayed in the United States for over a year on a tourist visa and were now requesting work
permits, numbered about 7,500. By December 31, the growing figure had more than doubled to
15,600.24 Concerns about conflict among the different groups of Cubans in South Florida did not
disappear, but their prominence in the minds of Miamians gave way to growing concerns over
what, by the fall of 1960, was a full-blown humanitarian crisis.
Several factors served to mask or ameliorate the effects of the developing migratory
crisis prior to the fall of 1960. The wealth of many of the early exiles, the more relaxed
restrictions by the Cuban government regarding the funds that could be removed from the
island, the support of the local Cuban community, and the aid provided by local civic and
religious organizations prevented the city from being overwhelmed with the needs of the
growing exile community. The city’s history of hosting Cuban exiles and the significant number
22
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of Latin American tourists that visited the city each year, made the growing presence of the
Cubans less disruptive to everyday life than it might have been in other areas. As the months
went by, however, the economic and social needs of the refugees began to tax existing support
structures. The sheer number of Cubans became disruptive even for residents of an “interAmerican” city. State and local governments managed the crisis as best they could with the aid
of civic and religious groups, but the growing problem forced them to call on the federal
government for help.
While some exiles had to flee Cuba with little or no money, and others, like Masferrer,
were accused of stealing large sums from the country, a portion of the early exiles were able to
bring significant resources with them. Federal Housing Administration officials estimated that
10,000 of the 30,000 exiles had been able to leave Cuba with significant funds and had
reportedly been using those resources to purchase homes in the Miami area, paying for these
dwellings in cash.25 These Cubans with resources also made their presence known through the
actions of South Florida law firms acting on their behalf. In late 1960, for example, a rumor
spread among Miami’s Cubans that an outbreak of hostilities was imminent and that it would
lead to the assets of Cuban nationals being frozen by the U.S. government. Consequently, an
attorney by the name of Nestor Morales informed Congressman Dante Fascell about this rumor
and the effect it had in making panicked Cubans transfer their funds to Canadian and European
banks. Morales warned that this rumor would have negative effects on Florida’s economy
“because it reduce[d] capital investments here.”26 Morales’s predictions were dire enough that
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Fascell immediately contacted the Department of State with them.27 The rumors would persist,
however, and would eventually lead the State Department to issue a statement reassuring exiles
of means that their money was safe in American banks.28
Another group of exiles proved their affluence when they sought to regularize their
immigration status. To do so, they paid into a lobbying scheme that would later be investigated
by the Florida Bar Association for possible violations of ethics.29 Attorneys Jack L. King and A.V.
Bethencourt approached the Cuban exile community in Miami in mid-1960 with an offer to
lobby the United States Congress for a bill that would grant permanent resident status to a
specific group of exiles to be individually named in the piece of legislation. King ran
advertisements for this scheme in the local Spanish language newspapers, while Bethencourt
distributed a mimeographed letter among his Cuban clients explaining the plan. 30
Bethencourt’s letter included a breakdown of prices for participation. Cubans were expected to
pay $100 for an individual exile, $150 for a married couple, $200 for a married couple with a
child under sixteen years of age, and $100 for each child over the age of sixteen.31 King and
Bethencourt were able to collect $18,000 and $3,200, respectively, from Cuban exiles and stated
they were holding the money in special accounts, to be returned if the bill did not pass.32 After
collecting the fees, King and Bethencourt proceeded to lobby congress on the behalf of the
nearly 500 Cubans who had made payments to them.
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Between April and August of 1960, King inundated Dante Fascell and other members of
Florida’s congressional delegation with agitated correspondence.33 In his letters, King pointed to
problems faced by the Cuban exile community in trying to stabilize their status in the United
States, but he made appeals specifically for his clients. Many of the Cubans listed in the private
bill, he claimed, had families back in Cuba who would not be able to obtain any sort of entry visa
into the United States because their father was in the United States as a political exile. King
attempted to sway members of Congress by focusing on the angle of family reunification. “The
situation being what it is in Cuba,” he wrote, “no one can say how long these families will
continue to be separated.”34 Fascell warned the attorney that the bill was unlikely to be brought
before Congress, much less passed, as the Department of State and Immigration and
Naturalization Services did not desire to “commit themselves with respect to legislation until
they have had an opportunity to review the entire problem.”35
Even as some Cubans sought permanence in the United States, there was a growing
sentiment among the exiles that Castro’s government could not last. They simply needed to
wait for the revolution’s inevitable collapse before returning home.36 Former prime minister
and former president of the Cuban Senate, Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona, for example,
predicted in early November, 1960 that there would be a “blood bath” in Cuba within 90 days as
the people turned against Castro.37 One federal official found this attitude quite different from
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that of previous refugee populations, such as the refugees from the Hungarian revolution. “The
Hungarians knew they could not go home and so they had to make their lives here for
themselves,” wrote Tracy Voorhees, who had worked with the Hungarian refugees and would
be a special envoy to Miami for President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “whereas most of the Cubans
were optimistic that circumstances in Cuba would change so that they could return to their
homes.”38 While some Cubans sought to stabilize their status in the United States while still
adhering to this belief, members of the United States government believed that taking such a
step could have problematic implications on a symbolic level.
When Congressman Fascell forwarded King’s letter to Francis E. Walter, Chairman of the
House Un-American Activities Committee and the House Subcommittee on the Judiciary with
Special Jurisdiction over Immigration and Nationality, the latter responded with deep concern.
He advised Fascell to hold fast against local pressures to pass such a bill because of the way King
and his associates had collected the money from the Cuban community. Furthermore, he
cautioned that to rush legislation granting permanent resident status to Cuban refugees “would
imply that we consider the present situation in Cuba as a permanent one and that we see no
hope of that situation changing so as to permit the people persecuted by Castro to return to
their own country.” He went on to write that many in Washington believed that it “would not
be consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States to permit that
implication to arise.”39 Walter was not only rejecting passing a bill that would grant permanent
resident status to some Cubans; he was rejecting the very idea of any piece of legislation that
suggested that Castro’s regime would have any permanence. For a staunch anti-communist like
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Walter, and like-minded allies within the U.S. government, the humanitarian dimensions of the
growing crisis in South Florida were secondary to the symbolic and practical implications of this
crisis in the fight against Marxism in Latin America.
Not all Cubans could afford to lobby Congress. As time went on, more restrictions were
put on the amount of currency Cubans were able to remove from the country when traveling to
the United States. The Bank of Cuba established restrictions on the sale and removal of U.S.
dollars from Cuban territory. It established that a Cuban citizen could, as a tourist, take $150 a
year out of their country. Given that so many Cubans were emigrating from the island utilizing
tourist visas, however, many of the exiles arriving in Miami reported that their requests for the
$150 from the were usually denied under one pretext or another. For Cubans immigrating to
the United States on resident visas, the amount they were allowed to carry upon leaving the
island was five dollars.40
The exiles who arrived in the Miami area with five dollars or less to their name would
often seek out family or friends among the established Cuban community in Miami. These
personal ties proved life saving for many exiles. Because those who entered the United States
on tourist visas could not legally seek out jobs in the Miami area, the help of established Cubans
was crucial in feeding and housing much of the first wave of exiles. Wendell Rollason, of the
Miami Inter-Affairs Commission, went so far as to report that the effects of the influx were
somewhat delayed by the efforts of the Cubans who had settled in Miami before the revolution
or soon thereafter.41 Father Bryan Walsh echoed this assessment when he stated that the
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resident Cuban colony “had done a commendable job of absorbing their compatriots into their
homes and places of business.”42 The established Cubans could only do so much, however, in
the face of the ever-growing numbers of new exiles arriving in South Florida every day.
Cubans who did not have any friends or family in Miami or who found the resources of
their allies in the city taxed to a breaking point sought out help from familiar institutions. As
Father Walsh explained to the National Council of Catholic Women Convention in 1966, “the
Cuban turned to the Church for help.”43 As director of Catholic charities in Miami, Walsh was
among the first to see the growing problems posed by the increased Cuban presence in the city.
A growing number of exiles sought help at the recently created Centro Hispanico Catolico.
Bishop Carroll’s idea for a center to welcome and aid new Hispanic arrivals to Miami would be
more important than ever as the exiles found themselves without work, shelter, or money in a
foreign city. Walsh estimated that in the first two years of the exile, the Catholic Church
provided some $200,000 in aid and services to refugees. Because of their migratory status, the
exiles had no access to any services from the city or state except for emergency medical
assistance. 44
By October of 1960, Bishop Carroll reported to the press that Catholic charities had set
up a bread line at a church on Miami Avenue that fed 300 exiles a day. The Diocese had also
spent $75,000 to remodel a building at what had been the Gesu Parish School, on NE 2nd St. The
church provided English classes, daycare services, and a clinic for the refugees, all with an
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operational cost of $25,000 a year.45 These expenditures would grow even faster by the end of
1960 as more exiles sought out their help. Between December 1960 and March 1, 1961 Catholic
charities saw 1,653 patients at its medical clinic, provided assistance for 2,450 families,
distributed 6,200 baskets of food, arranged emergency housing for 4,520 exiles, and helped
provide hospital care for 512 exiles. The Diocese of Miami spent $197,065 on these services,
nearly doubling their expenditures to date.46
The Catholic Church was not alone in trying to aid the exiles flowing into South Florida
between 1959 and 1960. The organizations that joined it in this endeavor saw their resources
taxed in similar ways. The Miami Latin Center, chaired by Reverend Dr. Harold Buell of the
White Methodist Church served as a clearing house to bring employers together with exile
jobseekers. In October of 1960, however, Buell warned that there were not enough jobs to go
around. Similar efforts were undertaken by the Hotel Employees Union and the resort industry
in Miami, who collaborated to open an office which found jobs for some 400 Cubans. Tony
Farinas, a Cuban-born representative of the union, echoed Buell’s statements when he declared
that “the industry cannot absorb all who are in need.”47 While multiple agencies and
organizations sought to help solve the problem, there was no coordination of efforts and their
combined impact on the refugee situation was insufficient to deal with a problem on this scale.
The problem, the Herald suggested, was one of visibility. When the newspaper hosted a
panel of community leaders including Bishop Carroll, Reverend Buell, Farinas, Welfare Planning
Council president Dr. Franklin Williams, and Congressman Fascell, they sought to inform the
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public in Miami of the growing problem with a population they called “our Unnoticed
Neighbors.”48 These community leaders provided statistics and stories about the challenges
presented by the refugee problem to the Herald’s readers, but also a clear understanding of the
origins of the problem and some prescient policy predictions. Carroll emphasized the
uniqueness of the situation by declaring that Miami was “the first city in the U.S. to ever have a
Communist state as a next door neighbor.”49 Franklin Williams, who also served as the vicepresident of the University of Miami, agreed, calling it “a cold war problem,” but he suggested
that the federal government had specialists who could help: “someone who has worked in
Palestine or with the Hungarians could help us to assess our situation and tell us how to plan.”50
The idea of resettling the exiles to other parts of the country was met with resistance from the
panel. Unlike the refugees from the Hungarian Revolution, Farinas warned that the Cuban exiles
would not go. “They’re in a strange land and worried,” he said, “and they want to stay near one
another.”51 While the group discussed possible outside solutions and the possibility of
assistance from such organizations as the Red Cross and the United Nations, Congressman
Fascell warned that no outside agency would want to help Miami until information regarding
the number of refugees in South Florida and the extent of their needs could be determined.
Miami needed to define the problem and try to solve it.52
In the spirit of defining the problem and conveying its urgency, both to the people of
Miami and to the world at large, Herald reporter Juanita Greene wrote a series of stories that
illustrated the different situations and shared problems of the exiles in Miami. In a cheap
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duplex on NW 50th St., on the “fringe” between white and African American areas, Greene met
the Bequer family. The husband, Napoleon, a former member of Castro’s rebel army, had made
a dramatic escape from Havana’s Morro Castle prison with twenty other former officers in late
1960, and had soon been followed to the United States by his wife and children. The Bequers
had managed to bring $200 to the United States—gifts from sympathetic friends in Cuba—and
had received $100 from friends already in Miami upon arrival. This money had allowed them to
obtain a place to live and some used furniture. Napoleon had, just days prior to the interview,
obtained a part-time, temporary job as a rug cutter. It paid $1 an hour and had been given to
him by his employer as a favor to a friend. Even with this economic uncertainty, Bequer
considered himself lucky. While his job might have been temporary, he was still doing better
than the father of Luis, the red-headed neighbor boy, who was visiting when Greene conducted
her interview. Luis’s father had been a lawyer in Oriente, but had no job in Miami. “They were
a very wealthy family in Cuba,” Mrs. Bequer told Greene, “now they have nothing.”53
Not all exiles were able to live in single family dwellings like the Bequers. The refugee
influx created a housing shortage that was also covered in The Herald’s series. On NW 7th St.
Greene found twenty-six Cuban men who had converted a house, a small cottage, and a garage
on a single property into an impromptu barracks. Groups of single men would band together to
rent a dwelling, sharing space and expenses. During the daytime the men would stack their
mattresses together to be able to walk around in the house. Of the 26 men, only three had jobs,
including Jose Lopez Legon, a 30 year old exile who worked part-time as a plumber’s helper for
$1.25 an hour. Once a day, one of the men would set two large pots on the house’s stove and
make rice and beans for the group: only meal the men would have until the following day. The
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group from the 7th St. house had sought help from different organizations in Miami including the
Centro Hispanico Catolico, which provided the group with $60.54 These group dwellings served
as a transitory living situation for single men or men who had come to the United States without
their families. Once they found more stable situations, exiles would leave these barracks
behind—but there would often be two men ready to take their place.
Greene then sought out an area of the city that was already a hub of exile activity. She
referred to it as the “fringes of the city’s core,” because the name Little Havana was not yet
common. “From downtown Miami,” Greene explained to her readers, “it’s only a few blocks to
Cuba.” The owners of the Cuban grocery stores told Greene of the hard times their customers
were going through. One store owner spoke of a distinguished man who walked into his store
and checked the prices of the merchandize. The man left the store and counted the change in
his pocket. When the man returned and asked to buy two bananas, Joseph Mota, the business
owner, gave him the fruit and some crackers for free. The man burst into tears, telling Mota he
had never had to ask for help before. Another store owner told Greene about a woman who
handed him a diamond ring, asking him if she could exchange it for groceries. She was not the
first to offer jewelry for food. Pawn shops were also profiting from the influx of Cuban jewelry.
Exiles forbidden from taking cash out of the country by the Castro government bought jewelry
they could convert to American dollars in Miami, even if at a loss. It helped them survive while
they sought out any available jobs. Some travelled out from their downtown neighborhoods as
far as Hialeah in search for any sort of factory work that might pay $1.10-$1.50 an hour. Things
were not so dire for all exiles, Greene admitted, as many had their jewelry, bank accounts, and
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jobs in Miami. “But a walk down SW Eighth St. is all it takes,” she concluded, “to convince the
skeptic that Miami has a real refugee problem.”55
Greene and the Herald editorial staff wanted to expose the refugee problem, and in
doing so to spur state and, in particular, federal authorities into action. For nearly two years the
problem had been left to local authorities and charity groups. The Herald took the stance that
“unless state and federal officials recognize it as their problem, too, they will show themselves
exceptionally short-sighted.”56 It argued that not only was the task of managing this refugee
wave ill-suited to volunteer groups and municipal government, but the way in which these
refugees were treated in the United States would resonate throughout Latin America. The exile
problem was not simply an emergency for one tucked-away town; on the contrary, it was a
problem with serious implications for Americans and American foreign policy as a whole. Even
when the federal government began to show an awareness of the problem, the Herald’s
editorial board was dissatisfied with their response. “It is a disappointment,” they declared,
“that the federal government apparently still considers the Cuban refugee situation something
we must handle on our own.”57 The Herald and those in the community who had sought to get
the attention of the federal government were glad to have President Eisenhower appoint a
special representative to determine the nature of the Miami situation. This representative,
however, was just the kind of skeptic Greene derided in her articles.58
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In late September of 1960, a group of community leaders from the greater Miami area,
including Bishop Carroll, Reverend Buell, and Franklin Williams, formed a committee which
sought to determine the scope of the refugee problem and the possible avenues by which its
effects could be ameliorated. In early October, the committee invited William Kirk, an expert on
refugees, to come to Miami. Kirk was the director of International Social Service, an agency that
had helped in resettling 35,000 Hungarian refugees throughout the United States. Before
arriving in Miami, Kirk made it clear that the resettlement of Cubans to other areas would
almost certainly be a significant part of any resolution to Miami’s refugee problem. The city’s
resources would not be enough to handle the problem alone, which he likened to a natural
disaster. 59 Kirk made a series of recommendations to the committee, including the creation of a
centralized employment agency to help job-seeking Cubans.60
State and local authorities cooperated to create an employment center by November,
but community leaders understood that Miami’s economy could only accommodate a limited
number of new workers in the short run, and that they would need help from the federal
government.61 In response to Kirk’s findings and the expert’s assertion that officials in
Washington seemed largely unaware of Miami’s refugee problem, the temporary committee
became a permanent committee tasked with exerting pressure at the state and federal level in
order to bring refugee aid to Miami. Miami’s Mayor, Robert King High, joined the permanent
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committee and declared that the problems it faced were not simply those of one American city.
High stated that because Miami was now the “bastion against communism,” Washington
needed to help the city immediately.62
On October 17, 1960, the chairman of the newly minted Cuban Refugee Committee, Ira
Willard, sent a letter to President Eisenhower directly stating Dade County’s need for help. The
letter, which was also sent to Florida Governor Leroy Collins and to the members of the state’s
Congressional delegation, echoed High’s rationale regarding the federal government’s
obligation. “Our community has become a ‘front-line’ in the cold war tactics of the Communist
world, and a point of first asylum for those Cubans who find their present regime intolerable,”
Willard explained to the president. The letter estimated the number of official refugees in South
Florida at 4,500, but it also speculated that some 20,000 exiles were in the area on tourist visas.
Willard’s missive applauded the Cubans even as it requested aid to stem the drain on resources
they had become. The problem, as Willard saw it, was not in the refugees themselves but in the
very scale of the crisis; it simply dwarfed the capabilities of a single city and its people. “By its
nature,” he wrote, “the problem is one that demands the attention of the national government
and that our community alone must not attempt to deal with it as a purely local situation.” He
urgently entreated President Eisenhower to assign federal officials to travel to Miami so they
could clearly determine the extent of the problem and direct the aid the refugees and the
community so desperately needed. The eyes of the world were on Miami. Willard warned
Eisenhower that any action taken in Miami to resolve the situation would have “implications or
repercussions abroad affecting our entire nation, for good or ill.”63
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The committee’s letter spurred federal and state government into action. The letter to
Eisenhower was soon reinforced by a call to the White House from Governor Collins.64 For his
part, Collins sought and obtained approval from the state budget commission for a $35,000
emergency fund to alleviate the situation.65 The Eisenhower administration engaged the crisis
by inviting Collins, Willard, and Mayor High to a conference where they could present their case
for broad scale federal assistance. The Florida delegation met with Eisenhower’s Deputy
Assistant for Interdepartmental Affairs, Robert Merriam. It reiterated the position that while
most of the burden had fallen on Miami, the Cuban refugee crisis stemmed from the federal
government allowing entrance of these exiles into the country.66 After the meeting, Merriam
had a better idea of the situation, or at least of the dissatisfaction among local and state
officials. In order to learn more about the situation and silence the calls for federal involvement,
Merriam reached out to a refugee expert who had previously assisted the Eisenhower
Administration: Tracy S. Voorhees. 67
Almost four years prior, Voorhees had been selected to head up the President’s
Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief, a temporary organization that sought to deal with the
refugees escaping from the Soviet Union’s repression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956. As
head of the PCFHRR, Voorhees coordinated the refugee-resettlement efforts of voluntary
agencies, the federal government and private-sector contributors and oversaw the resettlement
of 35,000 Hungarian refugees within the United States.68 Hoping to make use of Voorhees’s
expertise, Merriam called him into a meeting at the White House on October 25. Voorhees
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urged Merriam to hold off on involving the president personally until other avenues had been
explored. A small government conservative, Voorhees believed that the situation might be
better resolved through volunteer agencies such as the Red Cross and the National Catholic
Welfare Conference. He travelled to New York to meet with American Red Cross president
Alfred Gruenther, to determine if the Red Cross would be willing to undertake the challenge of
dealing with Miami’s Cuban refugees. Gruenther rebuffed Voorhees. The Red Cross could not
involve itself in the Miami situation in any major way due to the long, chronic nature of the
problem. Despite his best efforts to have a private organization handle the bulk of the refugee
problem, Voorhees reported to Merriam that the president would have to involve himself
directly in South Florida’s refugee crisis.69
On November 10, following continued pressure from the Cuban Refugee Committee,
the White House formally announced that Voorhees would be tasked with investigating the
problem and reporting the scope of it directly to the president.70 To the disappointment of
many in Miami, however, Eisenhower declared that the refugee problem “must in the main
continue to be dealt with locally,” with Voorhees serving only to determine what added moves
the federal government would adopt.71 This restriction of Voorhees’s immediate powers was
actually a condition set by Voorhees himself. He had asked the president to make his role
investigative in order to avoid “what would otherwise have been heavy local pressures upon me
for immediate action before I could find out for sure what the extent of the problem was and
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what needed to be done.”72 Upon arriving in Miami, he told reporters that he had no specific
answers to the refugee problem “because we don’t’ know yet what the needs are,” but that he
was being advised by former President Herbert Hoover who “knows more about dealing with
refugee problems than all of us put together.”73
Once in Miami, Voorhees met with government and community leaders in an effort to
evaluate the scope of the problems in the area. Everywhere he went in those early days,
Voorhees was bombarded with appeals for help with the refugee situation. Despite these pleas,
he remained skeptical. “There was no doubt that the problem in Miami was a very real one,”
Voorhees wrote later, “but it was hard to define and I was not at all sure that it had not been
overstated.” The Cuban refugee situation was quite different from Voorhees’s previous
experiences with the Hungarian refugees coming from Europe. With the Hungarian refugees,
the scope of the problem had been made immediately obvious by the meticulous collection of
information when they arrived in the United States. The Hungarian refugees were fingerprinted
in Austria, brought to a centralized location in the United States—Camp Kilmer, NJ—and were
clearly identifiable as destitute refugees. In Miami he found that confusion reigned, preventing
him from developing a clear picture of the situation. “I found it impossible to tell from any facts
available what the extent of the real refugee problem—that is, those needing help and
resettlement—really was,” Voorhees remembered, “because with all the excitement about the
situation no one had the facts.”74
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Voorhees was shielded from the pressures put on him by local authorities and
community leaders by his mandate to investigate but not act. This allowed him to begin
gathering facts. The mass of refugees who had come into the United States as tourists who had
yet to be fingerprinted made it impossible to determine the numbers and backgrounds of the
exiles in South Florida, but it was estimated that there were 40,000 Cuban “tourists” in the U.S.,
30,000 of which were in Miami.75 Where the INS failed to give Voorhees solid numbers, some
were provided by different branches of local government. The Dade County school system, for
example, explained that there were 3,500 refugee children in Dade County schools, but only 7%
of them were paying the $50 charge that Florida Law had established for non-resident pupils.76
The rest had the fee waived by Miami school authorities. This led to increased crowding in
Miami public schools, something that drew complaints from parents not only because it strained
educational resources, but because in a still segregated school system many white parents
resented the presence of young Cubans in their children’s schools.77 From religious leaders he
learned than another 3,000 had been accepted into parochial schools.78
Miami City Manager Melvin Reese reported a recent increase in certain types of crime
that had been attributed to the presence of the Cuban refugees. Reese indicated that a division
of the Miami Police Department was focusing on an increase in prostitution in the city stemming
from the Cuban problem. The women involved were not “representative of the professional
prostitute, but rather were women who found themselves in a strange land, displaced from
their native country of Cuba and without shelter, food or economic security—resorting to the
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practice of prostitution.”79 He later indicated that he had authorized the Chief of Police to put
281 officers on 48 hour work weeks as a preventative measure against the crimes committed by
the exiles. By December 10, the city of Miami had spent $33,410.90 on the payment of
overtime salaries, not counting related expenses which had been absorbed by the city.80
Pressures continued to mount in Miami. James Hennessy, deputy director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, dispelled the idea that those who had entered under
tourists’ visas would be forced to return to Cuba if they registered with the agency and instead
encouraged them to regularize their situation.81 This was good news for the exiles, but it
solidified the permanence of the refugees for local officials and citizens, some of whom started
to suggest more radical solutions to the problem. In November, the Herald published a letter to
the editor from a man named Nathan Altshul suggesting that the solution of the city’s problems
lay in the deserted Opa-Locka Air Base. A base of operations for the Navy during the Second
World War, the Opa-Locka had not been used in some time. Altshul suggested that the Cubans
could be put to work in cleaning up the base and the thousands of acres of land surrounding it.
The refugees could be housed on the base barracks and fed at the mess halls, and some of the
other buildings could be repurposed to become schools and a “rehabilitation center.” He
further suggested that there was sufficient land around the base for the refugees to raise some
of their own food by starting a dairy and chicken farm, and that the boats that brought some of
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the refugees to the United States could be remade into a small fishing fleet to feed the refugees
in the base.82
As the year drew to a close, the idea of using Opa-Locka Air Base as a refugee camp
gained some popularity. Whether he got the idea from Altshul’s letter or came to it
independently, Arthur H. Patten Jr., a member of the Dade County Board of County
Commissioners, proposed that some 15,000 refugees could be housed at the base.83 The
refugees, he said, would “increase Dade County’s growing governmental problems of law
enforcement, schooling, medical care and housing.” Putting the refugees in the camp, he
argued, would make it easier to evaluate the problems and abilities of the individual exiles in an
attempt to place them in jobs in other parts of the country. Patten’s idea was met with
resistance not only from the refugee community, but from Voorhees and his staff. Publically,
Voorhees’s deputy, Leo C. Beebe, stated that the idea of the camp did not seem feasible or in
the interest of either the refugees or the community.84 In private, Voorhees had long seen the
need for a refugee center to process the Cubans in need of help. He was hesitant to use any
military facility, however, for fear that the federal government would be accused of preparing
an invasion of Cuba sponsored by the U.S. military.85
Regardless, Voorhees felt that he needed an equivalent to the Kilmer processing center
if any organized effort for Cuban resettlement could be made. His initial focus still placed the
bulk of the responsibility for running the center on local authorities and civic groups, describing
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it to reporters as a central refugee office operated by a broad based committee of local
citizens.86 This office would serve the same function Camp Kilmer had, but without providing
refugees with room and board. The problem with establishing such a center, and with waiting
for a statistically significant number of Cubans to register there, was that it would take (in
Voorhees’s estimation) six weeks to two months to gather the data needed to determine a
permanent solution to Miami’s problems. In the meantime, his fact-finding mandate was just
barely allowing him to resist the pressures from Mayor High, the Cuban Refugee Committee,
and other organizations that demanded he take action at once and “recommend that the
Federal Government take the whole problem off Miami’s hands.” This was a recommendation
he was still not prepared to make.87
Voorhees’s recollection of events suggests that he withstood the pressures from local
groups by professionally shielding himself with his mandate. Others had a different recollection
of him, painting him as harsh and cold hearted. Bryan Walsh recounted an encounter he had
had with Voorhees during the latter’s tenure in Miami. The priest had made an appeal for
greater action on the part of the federal government. The Cuban refugees, Walsh argued, were
in dire straits and needed immediate help. “Give them a tin can and let them beg on Flagler
Street,” Voorhees retorted.88 Regardless of his reactions to it, the pressure was mounting. It
soon became clear to Voorhees that he could not simply wait six weeks before he started acting
to relieve the situation to some degree. Ever the skeptic, Voorhees was still bothered with the
question of whether or not he had enough facts to create such a center and to ask President
Eisenhower for a substantial sum of money to begin operations. On December 1, Voorhees
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once again contacted Herbert Hoover in an effort to lay out the facts—frankly, and urgently—as
best he could. The former president told Voorhees that he was justified in acting and should
report the facts as he understood them to the Eisenhower Administration, along with a request
for funds.89
That same day, Voorhees wrote a preliminary report to the President regarding his
activities and his assessment of the situation in Miami. While he felt obligated to explain to the
president that there were no adequate figures to determine the scope of the problem, he had
determined that the situation in Miami was “most critical.” The refugee issue in Miami was one
which differed from the crises of previous decades. “The United States is, for the first time in
many, many years, the country of first asylum for large numbers of refugees fleeing oppression,”
Voorhees wrote. This fact, combined with the muddled migratory practices and the sheer
number of refugees, created twin problems in Miami: the humanitarian emergency and the
potential security threat of infiltration by Castro loyalists. The solution to both problems was
the “resettlement of substantial numbers of these refugees in places away from the Miami
area.” The crisis, he concluded, was greater than could be handled by the local or state
authorities or welfare agencies. Voorhees recommended that he or someone else be given, on
a temporary basis, “the power and adequate support requisite to take necessary action as your
representative pending my final report.” This support was to take the form of funds not to
exceed a total of one million dollars.90
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After receiving Voorhees’s report, the White House began to involve itself more directly
in Miami’s refugee situation. On December 2, the Eisenhower Administration authorized the
$1,000,000 grant and made Voorhees the President’s personal representative as he had
requested, broadening his authority to act in Miami.91 In doing so, the White House took a more
aggressive rhetorical stance against the Cuban government. The money would be used to aid
refugees from what Eisenhower officially described as a “Communist-controlled” regime.
Although officials in the State Department had previously accused the Castro regime of being
influenced by communism, the New York Times noted that this assertion upon the granting of
Voorhees’s request was the first time in which the United States had officially accused the
Cuban government of being communist controlled.92 This rhetorical escalation likely resulted
from a legal calculation based on the origins of the funds. The million dollars to aid the Cuban
refugees came from the President’s $150,000,000 fund for special contingencies. It had been
drawn from that reserve through a provision of the Mutual Security act known as the DirksenDouglas amendment. This section of the act proclaimed a hope that “peoples who have been
subjected to the captivity of Communist despotism shall again enjoy the right of selfdetermination” and that “they shall again have the right to choose the form of government
under which they live.”93 The language chosen by the White House in announcing the funds
allotted to help the situation in Miami provided the justification to use security funds in dealing
with a humanitarian crisis centered on an American city and served as a geo-political chess
move. By complying with Voorhees’s request, the Eisenhower administration was able to both
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formally identify Castro’s Cuba as a communist state, and to use the situation in Miami as
evidence to both the American public and the world.
Upon receiving the authority and funding with which to act, Voorhees called in a
temporary staff of workers who had worked with him during the Hungarian situation. He
contacted Leo C. Beebee of the Ford Motor Company, who had run the program at Camp Kilmer
and secured his services to oversee the operations of the volunteer agencies that would handle
the resettlement of the refugees, including the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), Church
World Services (CWS), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC).94 Voorhees secured office
space for the registration of the refugees and the operation of these volunteer agencies at the
Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, which had been established by the city just days before.95
Voorhees envisioned the work of the center as primarily collecting information. Any relief
provided for refugees should be channeled from private funding sources, instead of government
funds. Upon receiving the $1,000,000 he had requested of the White House, he made it clear to
reporters that he expected to return most of those funds to the federal government.96
Voorhees worried, however, about directly requesting funds from private sources. His position
as the president’s personal representative might make it appear that these appeals came
directly from the Eisenhower White House. He later recalled with pride that the publicity he and
his staff had brought to the issue in requesting the assistance of the American people resulted in
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several gifts, including a $10,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation that went to the Centro
Hispanico Catolico.97
The most memorable of the gifts from private agencies came in the form of a $100,000
gift from the Texaco Corporation. The bulk of this money went to the charitable organizations
working in Miami. Catholic charities received $50,000. IRC received $25,000, while CWS and
HIAS received $5,000 each.98 While Voorhees shifted Texaco’s money to different charitable
organizations, he kept some in reserve for the fast approaching Christmas holiday. Voorhees
and his staff used $1,956.75 from the Texaco funds, and a matching contribution from the First
National Bank of Miami, to establish a Christmas dinner program.99 More than 2,500 refugees
came to the center’s offices and received $1.50 each, or $6.00 per family for the purchase of a
Christmas dinner, thanks to the arranged corporate sponsorship. “Nobody, therefore, who
came for help went hungry on Christmas and our offer of help was well publicized,” reported
Voorhees to his contact at Texaco after the New Year.100
Because Eisenhower would be stepping down in January, Voorhees knew that his tenure
as the president’s representative would be brief. He sought to advance the resettlement of
Cuban refugees past his tenure by holding a conference on the matter between January 29 and
31, 1961. Voorhees brought 150 delegates from all over the country to discuss the need for
resettlement and the problems facing Miami and the refugees. He estimated that two thirds of
the conference participants were Catholic priests, and he credited the National Catholic Welfare
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Conference as the most effective group in the resettlement of refugees, both Hungarian and
Cuban, stating that they “truly embodied humanity in action.”101 Voorhees saw resettlement as
the only viable option for the resolution of the refugee crisis. Many of the very priests whom he
credited with ably resettling significant numbers of refugees throughout the United States did
not see resettlement as the wholesale solution to South Florida’s refugee problems. While they
agreed that resettlement would serve as an important pressure valve for the community, the
Diocese of Miami “never regarded the Resettlement Program as the ultimate solution to the
Cuban refugee problem.” The Diocese believed that the refugees needed to be given free
choice to determine whether they wanted to stay in Miami or to relocate, and that the federal
government and the national resettlement agencies had a responsibility to those that chose to
stay in Miami. 102 The resettlement conference did not resolve the issue of whether or not this
policy would solve the refugee problem, but it established the framework for national
resettlement and a network of actors across the country that sought to further this agenda.
Two days before President Kennedy took office, Tracy Voorhees filed his final report to
President Eisenhower. Dated January 18, 1961, the report conveyed his recommendations on
the refugee problem and his resignation from his temporary post, effective at the President’s
convenience. The report stated that in Miami “an ever-mounting Cuban population quite
obviously has overrun the community’s capacity to cope with it.” The problem, Voorhees
informed the President, was now a national one. To illustrate this point, Voorhees utilized the
hard data he had obtained from the refugee center. Between November 21 and January 12
some 4,000 Cuban adults in need of help had been interviewed, each representing a family unit
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of 2.77 persons. Voorhees could now directly address the problem using comprehensive facts
on nearly 12,000 Cuban living in Miami between those dates. All respondents were
unemployed, and their material needs were significant.103
In the area of housing, Voorhees reported that 43% of refugee families were living in
one-room dwellings that were sometimes shared with friends or relatives. Referring to living
situations similar to those described by Juanita Greene two months before, the report stated
that larger dwellings were often occupied by enormous groups. Dwellings with 11 to 30 rooms
were shared by groups ranging from 17 to 127 refugees. This housing situation was
compounded by other needs. Over 40% of respondents needed aid in food, clothing, housing,
or a combination of these. “In view of the very bad housing conditions above described,”
Voorhees wrote, “it is a tribute to the courage of these distressed people that the least frequent
request made upon the Center has been for Housing assistance.”104
These problems extended to the younger refugees as well. There were, in this period,
6,500 Cuban students attending Miami’s public and parochial schools. About 93% of those
attending the public schools had been exempted from the $50 for non-residents due to
necessity. Necessity also exempted 18% from school charges for instructional supplies and 6%
from the school lunch charge. Cafeteria supervisors reported that many of the Cuban students
were getting their one hot meal per day at school. Class sizes ranged up to forty-two students in
the public schools and up sixty students per classroom in the parochial schools with nearly two
thirds of the students, in some instances, being unable to speak English. While the public school
system was developing special orientation sessions for the students given by Spanish-speaking
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teachers, the schools needed at least twenty-five more bilingual educators and up to fifty more
additional teachers in order to cope with the influx of new students. At the university level,
Voorhees estimated that as many as 900 Cuban students were experiencing financial difficulties
and might have to leave U.S. colleges and universities.105
Voorhees used the report to reiterate his belief that “the heart of the problem remains
in Miami and the crux of it is our ability to resettle refugees from Miami.” He advocated a
significant push for resettlement utilizing, primarily, private charitable funds. Voorhees
explained the attitude of many Cubans who expected a swift return home after an inevitable fall
of the Castro regime, and indicated that a key to successful resettlement efforts lied in “the
assurance to the refugees that the United States will be equally interest in giving needed
assistance to them to return to their homeland if conditions improve there in a manner to make
this possible.” If the refugees could be assured that they would be provided the means by
which to return to Cuba once Castro was gone, they would be far more likely to brave a
language barrier, the separation from the larger Cuban community, and the colder weather of
the northern states for a job that better suited their qualifications and needs.106
Out of desperation, Cubans had been taking any jobs available in the Miami area. These
jobs were often informal service jobs that ill-suited a highly educated and highly motivated
migrant community. “The problem—which in reality is a great asset,” Voorhees wrote, was that
so many of the refugees were in a professional or highly skilled class. Out of the Cubans adults
who had registered at the center, 55% had completed a high school education, 12% were
college graduates, 7% had advanced or professional degrees, with over 300 of them having
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medical degrees.107 The large proportion of professionals and highly skilled workers drove
Voorhees’s conclusion that the assimilation of the refugees had to be done on a national level
instead of a local level in which their skills would be wasted by sheer over-abundance. The
refugee situation was a significant problem, but the makeup of the exile population could also
serve the United States. Voorhees believed that this situation had to be treated as both “a
national responsibility and a national opportunity.”108

The first two years of the refugee crisis in Miami were characterized by a slow
realization of the scope of the refugee problem in South Florida and an even slower reaction by
the federal government. These early years saw the establishment of patterns that would hold
for many years even as conditions changed. The Catholic Church in Miami established itself as
an ally to the refugee community and established its role as an advocate for its needs, often
pushing the local, state, and federal authorities to do more for the exiles. While concerns over
the conflicts that would spill over onto the city streets were overshadowed by a Cold War-fueled
sympathy for the exiles and a concern over their sheer numbers, the fear of how the Cubans
would change the city began to take hold in the minds of many Miamians. Officials in the U.S.
government began to exhibit an interest in the Cuban refugees that went beyond the
humanitarian; the refugees could, perhaps, be useful in the larger struggle against communism.
And Tracy Voorhees, despite a distaste for the idea of government directly involving itself in the
refugee crisis, established the inchoate Cuban Refugee Center and set in motion a resettlement
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program that would remain central to the federal government’s reception of the refugees for
well over a decade to come. As the Kennedy Administration transitioned into power, however,
it would become clear that their response to the refugee crisis, and the effect of this response
on the city, would be vastly different from Voorhees’s vision.

60

CHAPTER 2—“THE SCORE”: FEDERAL FUNDING, REFUGEE MANAGEMENT, AND THE CHANGING
ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE OF SOUTH FLORIDA, 1961-1973
On January 18, 1961 Tracy Voorhees was contacted by one of John F. Kennedy’s aides.
Voorhees had already submitted his resignation to the president elect. The new administration
wanted to know if Voorhees would continue in his role until January 31 and if he would be
willing to carry on his work in Miami within the framework of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare after that date. Voorhees assented to the former, but declined the
latter, informing the aide that he would not be able to work successfully under those
conditions.1 Kennedy was certain that the best approach to the Cuban refugee problem was to
centralize the work under HEW and its new Secretary, Abraham Ribicoff. As a cabinet member,
Ribicoff would be able to coordinate the efforts of other federal agencies in the field.2 The new
president’s idea of how to handle the refugee influx was decidedly different from Voorhees’s
own approach to the problem. This was not lost on Voorhees or on his mentor, Herbert Hoover.
In February, the former President wrote Voorhees a letter inquiring of his protégé why
he was no longer in charge of the refugee situation. After Voorhees explained that he had
declined to continue serving under a new bureaucratic structure, Hoover wrote Voorhees again
and explained that he was “well out of it,” and that while he had done excellent work, “these
1
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new people do not yet understand what sort of task it is.”3 Voorhees, for his part, agreed.
When President Kennedy diverted an additional $4,000,000 for the refugee situation to set up
more direct forms of aid for the refugees, Voorhees was displeased. “As soon as the refugees
realized that the Government was willing to put them on welfare most of them were happy to
stay where they were in the warm climate of Miami and live at Government expense,” Voorhees
wrote later. He believed that in committing itself to more direct aid, the Kennedy
administration had undercut the position of the resettlement agencies he had been working
with. He admitted that while some resettlement had taken place, the foundation of the
program had been undermined. “In short,” Voorhees summed up, “the Welfare State had taken
over!”4
Voorhees had sought to use as few public funds as he possibly could in alleviating the
situation in Miami. After his tenure in South Florida ended, he bragged to Hoover that he had
spent only two thirds of the $1,000,000 allocated to him.5 He had believed that the Cuban
refugee influx would be best resolved by making resettlement in other areas of the country the
most attractive option for the exiles. Forcing the refugees to relocate from Miami, however,
would be antithetical to the promise of freedom that the United States had implicitly and
explicitly made them. This did not deter the U.S. government from trying to direct the refugees
towards resettlement through the promise of jobs across the country. By increasing the levels
of direct aid to the Miami area, the Kennedy Administration was, in Voorhees’s eyes, ensuring
that the Cuban refugees would not have need to seek out colder and less culturally familiar
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climes. His work in Miami and his experience from the Hungarian refugee crisis were being
discounted in favor of a big government approach that blocked what he saw as the only viable
solution.
While Voorhees rightly identified the intervention of the welfare state in the
management of Miami’s growing Cuban exile crisis, he failed to identify it as a significant
intersection between the welfare state and the national security apparatus. The Kennedy
Administration was responding to the continuing calls for help from Miami’s political and
community leaders, but the new round of efforts to resolve Miami’s problems also had deep
national security implications. The creation of the Cuban Refugee Program and the meanings
that officials within the national security apparatus assigned to the lives of exile civilians in
Miami implicated even the most mundane activities as actions of foreign policy. This was not
been meant to permanently change the face of South Florida. As years passed and the exile
community became more and more entrenched in the city of Miami, what was intended as
short term aid became an access to structures of privilege that mirrored those of middle class
white Americans. This fundamentally transformed the Miami metropolitan area, just as other
defense related expenditures re-shaped cities all across the Sunbelt. While this transformation
carried with it a unique cultural element, the economic and political structures worked on a
parallel tract.

While Tracy Voorhees’s efforts had helped many Cubans and the organizations that
sought to relocate them, the immediacy of the problem remained. Voorhees’s enthusiasm for
relocation was shared by federal authorities who continued to fund and coordinate with the
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volunteer agencies that sought to ease Miami’s burden by relocating significant numbers of
exiles. In the early days of 1961, many exiles were still reluctant to take up offers of relocation
to what often seemed cold, distant, and foreign new locations in the United States. There was
also a feeling among many exiles that the Castro regime would not last for much longer. This
belief that el exilio would end “soon” was not restricted to the exiles. Early in 1961, this feeling
had come to infect many of those who sought to help the exiles both in a private capacity and as
part of a larger, concerted federal effort.
Father Bryan Walsh, for example, was dealing with an ever increasing number of Cuban
refugee children in Miami. Some of them were in the care of their parents, of extended family,
or of family friends, but many were unaccompanied minors who had been sent to the United
States by their parents and who had no one to care for them but Miami’s Catholic Church. By
January 14, 1961, when Walsh started a diary of his experiences with these children, Miami’s
Catholic Charities had forty-one Cuban children in their care.6 Miami’s schools were already
overtaxed by the introduction of the exile children into their classrooms, so Walsh and others
sought to find solutions for this overcrowding problem. He also encountered a problem that
was directly related to the pervading sense that the refugees would soon be returning to a Cuba
operating under the educational traditions of the previous regime. The night before he started
his diary, he was advised that any education that high school-aged refugees received in Dade
County schools would be worthless upon their return to Cuba. The Cuban students would have
to begin their secondary education once again or pick up from the point at which they left Cuba
for the United States. “The American high school curriculum,” Walsh concluded, “is of no use to
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them as far as continuing their Cuban education.”7 Walsh did not address the idea that the exile
of the Cuban people would be coming to an end in a relatively short time frame, but it is implied
by his perception of this as an immediate problem and the actions that he proposed as head of
Catholic Charities. Walsh planned to create a Cuban Secondary School at the Centro Hispanico
Catolico with the help of James Baker, headmaster of the Ruston School, an American school in
Havana. Walsh estimated that this new school could serve some 400 Cuban students who
would receive both an American high school diploma and a Cuban bachillerato degree upon
completing their education.8
The influx of unaccompanied Cuban children only increased in the days after Walsh
began writing his diary. Walsh failed to mention in his journal, however, that the increase in
unaccompanied minors arriving in Miami and the percentage of this group that ended up in the
care of the church was, in part, a result of his own actions. In the last months of 1960, Walsh
was already involved in the care of unaccompanied Cuban minors. The priest became
particularly concerned for this population when he was introduced to a young exile named
Pedro. Pedro had arrived in Miami a month before and his parents had expected that he would
be taken care of by friends and family already in the United States. Pedro’s parents did not
expect that these caretakers would have their own troubles with merely subsisting in Miami.
The boy had passed from household to household until he was brought to the Catholic Welfare
Bureau. Walsh met the scared and hungry boy and learned that in the month since he had
arrived in the city, Pedro had lost twenty pounds.9 In the weeks that followed, Walsh attempted
to get the resources needed in order to care for the young exiles. He convinced Tracy Voorhees
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of the needs of this population and the latter included a recommendation that funds be used to
this end in his report to President Eisenhower.10
In early December of that year, James Baker came to Miami to meet a group of
American businessmen from the Havana-American Chamber of Commerce. Much like the
Cuban exiles, the representatives of the American corporations that had withdrawn from Cuba
after the revolution were waiting in Miami for what they expected was the imminent overthrow
of Castro’s regime. Baker brought the concerns of many of his Cuban friends, including several
members of the anti-Castro underground, about the safety and the possible interruption to the
education of their children to this meeting. He hoped to gain the help of these businessmen in
creating a boarding school for the children. One of the participants agreed to introduce him to
Walsh.11 Baker’s meeting with Walsh provided a solution for the priest. Walsh had become
convinced that scattered and separate efforts would only do damage to the cause. In Baker he
found an able and willing partner. Walsh and Baker agreed on terms and determined that Baker
and his Cuban contacts would be in charge of getting the children out of Cuba, while Walsh
would see to it that these young refugees were met at the airport and cared for in the United
States. Baker originally estimated that 200 children would be sent by their parents to the
United States.12 Baker and his Cuban contacts established what came to be known as Operation
Pedro Pan, which helped Cuban parents get their children out of Cuba. In the United States,
Walsh developed the Cuban Children’s Program for the care and protection of these children.13
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Baker and Walsh soon found that their original estimate of 200 children was quite
inadequate. A series of rumors were quickly spreading throughout the Cuban middle class. CIA
sponsored Radio Swan stated that the revolutionary government was seeking a transfer of
parental authority to the state, removing the patria potestad over Cuba’s children from their
parents.14 Rumors of children being removed from their homes were particularly troubling to
the significant section of middle class Cubans who had emigrated from Spain or who were the
children of Spanish immigrants. They recalled memories of the removal of children from
battlefronts in the Spanish Civil War by the Republican government and their relocation to the
Soviet Union. The rumors that the children of those arrested for counterrevolutionary activities
would be sent to the USSR as an additional reprisal against their parents were particularly
alarming because of these memories.15
Miami’s Cuban community was soon “buzzing” with reports of Castro’s alleged intention
to indoctrinate the children and there was talk of “hundreds” of Cuban children arriving at
Miami’s airport each day.16 Walsh had a true appreciation of the international implications of
his actions and those of his agency in housing the unaccompanied children. “No longer were we
simply a social agency concerned about a community problem,” he wrote, “we were now
sharing the worries of families we did not even know, hundreds of miles away in a life and death
struggle in the Cold War.”17 Walsh used this very perspective in obtaining visas for the refugee
children. He convinced the Department of State to issue visa waivers for the children, which
14
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they did so long as the minors became the ultimate responsibility of the Catholic Welfare
Bureau.18 An agreement between the Department of State and the Catholic Welfare Bureau
allowed for the issuance of up to 250 student visas for unaccompanied minors from Cuba.19
The program that came to be called Operation Pedro Pan ran from December 1960 to
October 1962.20 On December 26, 1960 Bryan Walsh welcomed the first two Pedro Pan children
to the United States, a pair of siblings named Sixto and Vivian Aquino.21 Baker established a
network of parents and dissidents who would distribute the visa waivers to parents in Cuba.
Once the children landed in Miami, Walsh and his organization would see to it that the children
were placed with relatives or in the care of the Cuban Children’s Program, which had facilities in
Florida and 35 other states and the District of Columbia.22 By January of 1961, it became clear
that the volume of children arriving in the United States would far overshoot the initial
estimates. In a meeting at the State Department, Walsh was told that the Catholic Welfare
Bureau could petition for a waiving of visa requirements for Cuban children, whom he argued
were in imminent danger of communist brainwashing. This plan was approved and Walsh was
invested with the authority to grant visa waivers for Cuban children under the age of sixteen.23
This allowed for greater number of exits by unaccompanied Cuban minors, sent to the United
States by desperate parents who did not know when or if they would see their children again.
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Over the nearly two years of Operation Pedro Pan, the Cuban Children’s Program helped
14,124 children enter the United States.24 Walsh estimated that approximately 50% of the
unaccompanied youths were reunited with family members upon arrival in Miami.25 Of the
minors taken into the care of the Catholic Welfare Bureau, 85% were between the ages of
twelve and eighteen and 70% were boys over the age of twelve. Statistical information
regarding the children who were delivered to relatives upon arrival and those older minors who
came of age and became independent soon after arrival was not collected.26
With the cessation of regular flights between the United States and Cuba following the
Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962, the influx of new unaccompanied minors was
significantly reduced. The Catholic Welfare Bureau’s own statistics from September of 1963
indicate that after October 22, 1962, only 269 children were accepted into the program. Of the
children they had assisted, 10,611 had been reunited with parents or relatives and 3,438
remained under the care of the CCP. Of these, 1,914 were placed in group care and 1,569 were
placed in foster care.27 Since the program had been established to safeguard the parental rights
of Cuban parents over their children, none of the Pedro Pan children were ever placed for
adoption.28 A crisis regarding parental rights did arise early on when one of the children was hit
by a car next to a roller rink in Hialeah. Father Walsh had to appear in court and have the child
declared a dependent of the institution in order to have medical care administered after the
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accident. The following day the CCP secured a blanket declaration for all the unaccompanied
minors under their care in order to prevent any future hindrance to the care of the children.29
To fund the care of an increasing number of these children, the Catholic Welfare Bureau
turned to the federal government once again. President Kennedy charged the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare with the care of the children while in the United States,
expecting they would return to Cuba in the near future. HEW’s Children’s Bureau worked with
the Florida Department of Public Welfare to disburse funds and contract the services of social
service agencies. A total of $138,619,000 was spent for the Unaccompanied Children’s Program
and by 1967 the Children’s Bureau reported that 8,331 Cuban children had been in the care of
foster homes and institutions.30 For those children relocated to other parts of the country, the
voluntary agencies in charge of relocation were reimbursed by the federal government for costs
and expenditures related to travel.31 The Catholic Welfare Bureau, for example, estimated that
in 1962 the costs incurred by the organization related to the transportation of children
throughout the United States amounted to $285,585.32
As the number of children in the Church’s charge increased, Walsh and the Catholic
Welfare Bureau sought placement for the minors. While the national Church helped with
placement for a significant number of the refugee minors, Miami’s Catholic Church was faced
with the housing needs of an ever-growing group of children. The Miami Catholic Welfare
Bureau’s Unaccompanied Children’s Program saw its ranks swell to 300 staff members including
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priests, social workers, doctors, office personnel, cooks, social workers, drivers, and others.33
This increase was necessary as several temporary homes for the young refugees were
established in the Miami area. The furthest and largest shelter was Florida City, established in
October of 1961, some 35 miles south of downtown Miami. Florida City was established in a
series of light colored two story buildings divided into apartments. It was licensed to house 700
children in a unique arrangement by which the children were allowed to live in apartments
under the supervision of Cuban refugee couples, an arrangement that proved less traumatic
than the foster care experiences of other Pedro Pan children. They could bond with the other
children in the common areas while maintaining a semblance of family life in their living
quarters.34
While many of the Pedro Pan children have fond memories of the program, and
particularly of Father Walsh, there are others who encountered abuse and heartbreak within
the program. A group of Cuban boys, sent to Helena, Montana alleged that Monsignor
Harrington, the local Director of Catholic Charities, had both physically and sexually abused
them.35 At least one boy recalled midnight visits from sexual predators in the all-boy Camp
Matecumbe. There were also incidents of hazing and bullying at that camp and at other
locations.36 At St. Vincent’s Orphanage in Vincennes, Indiana, the children were stripped of
almost all their possessions in order not to differentiate between the Cuban children and the
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local orphans by class. In a state with a very low percentage of Hispanics, the Cuban children
were referred to as “spics” by the white orphans.37
Some of the children were particularly traumatized when, because of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the number of children needing care declined and Archbishop Coleman Carroll and his
advisors decided that all the remaining homes should be consolidated into a single location.
Bryan Walsh, by then promoted to the rank of Monsignor, disagreed with the decision. He had
wanted to move the remaining children into smaller facilities where they could receive foster
parent care in the model of Florida City. Walsh was overruled and ordered to open a 500person shelter at Opa-Locka Naval Station, in the disused barracks, where the beds were lined
up next to one another in a cavernous hall.38
Monsignor Walsh was not alone in his discontent with the Opa Locka facility. Many of
the remaining minors were furious at being moved to Opa Locka. At least one boy made his
displeasure known to Monsignor Walsh himself. A former resident of Saint Raphael’s, Angel
Wong Alcazar wrote the priest that he felt “betrayed, offended and defrauded.” Opa Locka,
according to Wong, was known as “la pajarera del Welfare,” Welfare’s birdcage. There, he
wrote, the boys who were being treated for homosexual tendencies had reverted “to such
extremes” that one afternoon he had found “a boy exhibiting a pretty woman’s hair due [sic], of
the latest style, through the whole Camp.” 39 The closer supervision the young exiles had
received in the smaller homes and which had reinforced heteronormative practices was absent
in the larger camp, allowing for freer experimentation regarding sexuality and gender
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performance among the Pedro Pan children. Wong saw this as a betrayal of both the social and
religious norms that the parents of the children sent to the United States had expected would
be maintained by the minors’ caretakers.
These norms were violated in other areas outside heteronormativity. Wong wrote that
Opa Locka was also a place where boys became “cheap gangsters” and where the children of
proud Cubans of breeding lost their middle class manners and ate “like pigs.” Wong felt that the
remaining young Cubans had been abandoned by the church and instead delivered into the
hands of the monolithic “Welfare.” The children raised in this environment would be a
disappointment to their parents, “who one time fill [sic] with faith sent their children to a
Catholic institution to save them from Communism and they found that they are worst [sic] than
if they would have stayed there under Communism.”40 If the children had been sent to the
United States to avoid an institutional takeover of their upbringing and to ensure that they
would be raised according to their parents’ wishes, then, in Wong’s view, the sacrifice had illserved the children at Opa Locka. For many of the Cuban minors who remained in the custody
of the church for years after their parents sent them to the United States, the myth of a swift
return had proven itself entirely false and the face of the kindly Irish priest who welcomed the
children to Miami had been replaced by a faceless institutional bureaucracy.
The children who were cared for outside of an institutional setting, by foster parents,
faced their own set of challenges. Some had terrible experiences, but even those who were
cared for by truly generous and good foster parents were still faced with problems such as
discrimination and a fundamental desire to understand and live with their parents’ decision to
send them to a different country. This burning existential question led to both frustration and
40
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confusion. One unaccompanied minor hoped to explain her exile experience in the form of a
poem:
What It Means to Be An Exile
By a Cuban Foster Child
It means to wake up a day and find yourself in a new country and home.
It means to remember how just yesterday you left your country and home for
the first day.
It means to know that your flag is being walked upon and your country is being
torn apart.
* * *
It means to wake up every morning and wish for time to stop because you want
to see your sister grow.
It means to remember your parents, and how you thought they were wrong,
but they weren’t.
It means to know that you must try and lead a new life, but you can’t.
* * *
It means to wake up and try to remember about that country you left so long
ago.
It means trying to remember about your country, but you can’t because your
mind wanders farther and farther apart every day.
It means to know that you are forgetting your language and customs and you try
to do something about it, but you can’t.
* * *
It means to wake up a day without a mother or father to run to, even though
they are alive.
It means to remember all those things you used to do so long, long ago.
It means to know that you are becoming an American and on the outside you
are proud.
But on the inside, Oh God, doesn’t that matter too?
* * *
It means to say your prayers at night and ask for the Communist government to
fall.
It means that then you will wonder what you do if this happens.
It means to know that you have a dilemma, because you can’t choose between
your real parents and foster parents. You love them both!
* * *
And above all it means to pray:
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Oh! God! Please help me to understand your doings, help me to have faith in
You and please help me to have the courage which I don’t have.41
Even those children who had positive experiences as unaccompanied minors when coming to
the United States faced the dilemma and the uncertainty of not knowing if they would ever see
their parents again. Those who formed attachments to their foster parents both dearly wished
and dreaded news that they would be joined in the United States by their families. They were
torn between their love for a home country that each day became more and more of a hazy
memory and their lives in a new environment. In this way, many of the Pedro Pan children were
among the first to face a crisis of national identity that would become endemic to the Cuban
American experience in the years that followed.
While Operation Pedro Pan ended with the cessation of flights between Cuba and the
United States following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cuban Children’s Program continued until
1981.42 The minors cared for by the Catholic Welfare Bureau in the latter years of the program
tended to be Cuban children who had entered through third countries or who had lost parents
in an attempt to enter the United States. Walsh claimed that even following the Cuban Missile
Crisis, nearly 90% of the children who remained in the care of the Cuban Children’s Program
were reunited with their parents by June of 1966.43 Because there were no follow-up
procedures in place for the children who were handed over to relatives or family friends at the
airport, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of Cuban children for whom the temporary
dissolution of their families would turn permanent. The separation of these children from their
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parents, however, would play a role in shaping American refugee policy in regard to Cuba’s exile
community and the politics of the emerging Cuban American community for years to come.

For those exiles who were not unaccompanied children and who did not have significant
resources to draw on in the United States, the beginning of 1961 marked a change in the
availability of aid in the Miami area. The incoming Kennedy administration sought to build on
the foundations Voorhees had laid, but they sought to further these efforts by centralizing them
and bringing them within the formal institutional structure of the federal government.
President Kennedy wrote a letter to former Connecticut governor and incoming Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare Abraham Ribicoff, on January 27, 1961 directing him to assume
the responsibilities for all Cuban refugee activities on February 1 of that year. Kennedy
instructed Ribicoff to travel to Florida and investigate the problem within a week. The new HEW
Secretary was to “make concrete my concern and sympathy for those who have been forced
from their homes in Cuba, and to assure them that we shall seek to expedite their voluntary
return as soon as conditions there facilitate that.” The new president sought to re-emphasize to
audiences both at home and abroad that the United States would act as a humanitarian
sanctuary. “In the presently troubled world, we cannot be a peacemaker if we are not also the
protector of those individuals as well as nations who cast with thier [sic] personal liberty and
hopes for the future.” 44
By February 2nd Ribicoff had prepared a report for the president based on his
experiences over several days in the Miami area. “It is apparent that many of the refugees are
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now in serious need,” Ribicoff wrote, “they are living in extremely crowded quarters; their
resources have been used up or have largely depleted; and health and educational facilities are
badly overtaxed.” He warned the president that many of the refugees were at the point of
desperation and that many others were rapidly approaching it. While he stated that the
courage and fortitude of the exiles in the face of such and overwhelming disruption of their lives
were “magnificent,” he did report that there was widespread anxiety. In order to combat the
continuing crisis, and drawing on his observations, Ribicoff made a series of recommendations
that embraced Voorhees’s resettlement push, but which would also create a safety net for those
refugees who chose not to resettle.45
Resettlement of the Cuban refugees from the Miami area was to be encouraged and
supported and was to remain primarily the responsibility of volunteer agencies with the federal
government providing supplemental support including transportation and adjustment costs.
While many exiles were wary of being resettled for fear of new environments and of being away
from Miami should things change in Cuba, Ribicoff recommended that return transportation to
Miami be provided for those who had been voluntarily resettled if there were some
fundamental change in the situation on the island. “The Federal program is based on the
principle of facilitating the eventual return of the Cuban refugees to their homeland,” Ribicoff
advised Kennedy. A program of financial assistance was also to be established for Cuban
refugee families both in the Miami area and elsewhere, to be administered through existing
federal, state and local channels. A similar arrangement was to be reached with established
public agencies to provide essential health services to this population.
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Ribicoff also proposed a series of measures to aid in the education of the exiles,
including loans for higher education, financial assistance for language training, skill refresher
courses, orientation and vocational training, and programs in cooperation with the University of
Miami to provide accreditation to Cuban professionals. He also endorsed the funding of care for
the unaccompanied Cuban minors, the distribution of surplus food, and the requirement that
the head of household be registered at the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in order for a
family to be eligible for aid. Ribicoff explained that the remainder of the $1,000,000 allocation
made by President Eisenhower the previous December would allow the Cuban Refugee
Emergency Center to operate until June 30, 1961. In order to run the larger, comprehensive
program additional funds would be required. For that same time period Ribicoff estimated an
additional allocation of $4,000,000 would be necessary.46
The following day, February 3, President Kennedy approved a plan based on Ribicoff’s
recommendations. The new program would be based around the idea of temporarily resettling
as many refugees as possible to ease the burden on South Florida, to encourage this migration
by promising to return them to Miami the moment there were changes in Cuba, and to create a
system of aid for refugees both in Dade and in other areas. President Kennedy ordered that the
program be established along nine central points:
1. To assist voluntary relief agencies in relief, resettlement and employment;
2. To obtain the assistance of both private and government agencies in
securing useful employment opportunities
3. To provide supplemental funds for resettlement;
4. To give direct financial assistance to Cuban refugees through local welfare
departments based on standards used in the community involved;
5. To supplement health services;
6. To assist public schools taxed by the influx of refugee children;
7. To augment educational and training facilities for refugees;
46
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8. To assist unaccompanied children;
9. To distribute surplus food.47
While Kennedy’s nine points do not explicitly state the common conception that the Castro
regime’s days were numbered and that the exiles’ stay in the United States was temporary, this
is the mindset with which the Kennedy administration initially built the Cuban Refugee Program.
As one study of the program conducted four years later pointed out, “until the ill-fated invasion
at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, refugees as well as the American authorities considered the
program as a brief stop-gap.”48 The new administration was committed to more actively
managing the refugee crisis but they ultimately believed that the plan for an upcoming invasion
of Cuba by CIA trained exiles would soon make the program obsolete.
On February 6, Ribicoff tasked Commissioner of Social Security William L. Mitchell with
implementing and administering the Cuban Refugee Program. Mitchell’s Social Security
Administration took the lead of the program with the aid of the Public Health Service and the
Office of Education.49 Mitchell appointed Marshal Wise as director of the program, working out
of the Cuban Emergency Refugee Center, which found a permanent home at 501 N.E. First
Avenue, the skyscraper that had been the headquarters of the Miami News and which came to
be known as the Freedom Tower.50 By the end of the month, the Center began distributing
assistance checks to those exiles who had registered with the program. On February 27,
refugees stood in line outside the center waiting to receive their first biweekly check. Officials
at the center estimated that the average monthly assistance for each Cuban family would be
$75. Refugees spoke to reporters regarding the hardships they had been enduring. Waldo
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Rodriguez, a former Cuban senatorial candidate and government employee from Matanzas had
been attempting to sell television sets on commission. “I didn’t make out so well,” Rodriguez
told the Miami News. Others made it clear that they did not expect their current situation to
last much longer. A former land developer named Jose F. Viciana spoke of a 125-acre farm he
owned on the Isle of Pines. “When that man Castro is gone,” he said, “it will be one of the finest
resort areas in the Caribbean.”51 It was only a matter of time before Viciana, his daughter, and
his two grandchildren would be able to return to Cuba to rebuild the lives they had left behind.
The refugees’ sense that they would be returning home in the near future stemmed
from what one historian has called “an open secret” in both the United States and on the island:
the planned invasion of Cuba by American trained exile forces.52 In March of 1960, President
Eisenhower had authorized a CIA plan for an exile led invasion.53 The CIA began training
volunteers from among the exile population in Guatemala, a fact which was very publicly
suggested in January of 1961 when the New York Times ran an article with the headline “U.S.
Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force At Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base.” Times reporter Paul P.
Kennedy revealed that the Guatemalan government was training forces to engage in battle with
forces of the Cuban government. Guatemalan government officials insisted that the training
program was designed to repel an expected invasion from Cuba, but critics claimed otherwise.
While the article focused on the training of Guatemalan troops by men who appeared to be
American military personnel, it also indicated that the rapidly growing project had brought in
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foreign trainers specializing on guerilla tactics that included Cubans. The Guatemalan official
who briefed Kennedy, however, denied that any Cubans were being trained in the camp.54
As the days and weeks went on, speculation only grew on both sides of the Florida
Straits. The “secret invasion” became a subject of public discussion. A week before the
invasion, the Times ran another article speculating on what the specific invasion strategy the
exile forces would follow would be.55 The invasion was so taken for granted that it became the
object of humor in exile publications. One political cartoon entitled “Hombre Precavido” (A Man
Forewarned) showed a toadyish aid informing Fidel Castro that the invasion had begun. A
distraught and cowardly Castro then has the aide see to the readiness of his escape submarine,
dons armor, starts packing large stacks of cash into a suitcase, and ensures that there is an
airplane standing by to evacuate him to Mexico, all before going on television and denying that
the Cuban government is at all worried about an invasion and stating all officials remain at their
posts.56
In March of 1961, the Kennedy administration made changes to the CIA’s original
military plans and the resulting invasion was an unmitigated military and public relations
disaster for both the United States and the exiles.57 The failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion
dampened the mood in Miami concerning a swift return, but it did not extinguish the flame of
hope in the hearts and minds of many of the exiles. This failure added importance to the Cuban
Refugee Program not only as a relief measure, but also as a Cold War propaganda program. This
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second dimension was made clear both by the public statements of U.S. government officials
and by documents related to high level discussions regarding the usefulness of the program.
Individuals involved in running the Cuban Refugee Program and the Cuban Refugee Center were
clearly often driven by humanitarian desires to help the ever increasing exile population in
Miami. This humanitarian desire did not preclude figures like future Cuban Refugee Center
director J. Arthur Lazell from expressing concern with how the treatment of the refugees would
resonate in Latin America. “How the Cubans are treated is, in the minds of many Latin
Americans,” Lazell wrote, “indicative of the extent of United States’ determination and
effectiveness in combatting Communism in the Western Hemisphere.”58 The Cuban exiles, then,
would serve as an effective propaganda tool so long as they were shown to have received a
warm welcome in the United States.
Discussions of the “Cuban Problem” and its national security implications between the
White House and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare show that in the aftermath
of the Bay of Pigs Invasion the federal government considered placing a greater emphasis on
Cuban refugee civilians than on paramilitary activities in the planning for a Castro-free Cuba. A
confidential memorandum from April 29, 1961 outlined the objectives of a new, revised Cuban
Refugee Program. It suggested that the program’s intent was to facilitate the melding of Cuban
refugees into American life in a “useful and self-supporting role.” The memorandum went on to
state that the CRP also sought to “preserve or increase their skills and professional attainments
to the end that they as individuals may live more satisfying lives and be a source of trained
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manpower available to meet the needs when opportunity arrives to return to a free Cuba.”59 In
essence, efforts to teach new skills to refugees or to facilitate the ability of Cuban professionals
to practice in the United States served to make the refugee self-supporting, to improve their
lives, and to provide a post-communist Cuba with a social and economic force that would help
turn the country into something more acceptable to US policymakers.
This memo was part of larger discussion about the potential of the Cuban refugees in
Miami outside of paramilitary roles. A secret report from May of 1961 suggested the creation of
a radically different Cuban Refugee Program that would take on an even greater hand in Cuba’s
future. The proposed program would “capitalize on the resource these exiles represent” by
identifying and training “potential top leadership and key bureaucratic personal for a postCastro government,” preparing the “armed services components of such a government,” and
providing relief and resettlement to those exiles who did not fit in the previous categories. This
proposed version of the CRP would comply with international law and existing treaties by
making it clear that any military training performed would not be done in preparation for
another attempted invasion of Cuba by exile forces. 60 This version of the Cuban Refugee
Program would have carried out the principal duties of the program as it already existed, but it
would have also engaged in the creation of a pre-packaged state building apparatus.
So why did this new version of the program not coalesce? Most likely it was judged to
be simply too unwieldy of a concept. The organizational structure for such a program would
have required a massive bureaucracy and the expense would have dwarfed the impressive
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expenditures of the Cuban Refugee Program in the 1960s. Some elements of the plan survived
in altered forms, as when Cuban exiles were encouraged to join the armed forces of the United
States in the early 1960s.61 The greatest challenge to this plan was probably the conception its
authors had of the Cuban exiles. The authors of the secret report wrote that most of the exiles
believed that a swift return to Cuba was contingent on the United States being an active
participant in the process and providing leadership for the endeavor. “Therefore,” they
concluded, “[the Cubans] can be expected to follow and support the U.S. in any venture
promising an early elimination of Castro.”62 That American policymakers and intelligence
officials would expect any group of exiles to blindly follow their directives is only mildly
surprising. That American policymakers and intelligence officials would expect this blind
allegiance in the aftermath of Bahia Cochinos is astounding.
Even in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the United States government felt, as
many exiles still did, that it was only a matter of time until Castro’s regime toppled in Cuba. The
passage of time, however, solidified the need for the Cuban Refugee Program as a more stable
institution. A series of congressional investigations into the Cuban Refugee question resulted in
a report, in April 1962, which concluded that the Cuban Refugee Program could “no longer be
regarded as a temporary or emergency matter.”63 Following these conclusions the Migration
and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 was adopted in June of that year, formalizing the Cuban
Refugee Program. When the Missile Crisis occurred the following October and the resolution of
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the standoff over Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuban soil did not end with the removal of Fidel
Castro from power, belief in a swift return to Cuba by the exiles was further diminished.
The aim of the program remained not only to aid those refugees who could not help
themselves, but to cement the foundations for a new Cuba free of Castro and of Soviet
influence. This was succinctly stated by a Kennedy administration insider when he testified
before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees on April 13, 1966. “Of
course our entire refugee program has in one sense been an investment in the rebuilding of
Cuba,” Senator Robert F. Kennedy told the subcommittee, “the positive experience in this
country of those thousands of Cubans who will choose to return to their native country will
make a great difference in the future of the nation.”64 The Cuban Refugee Program, both in
public and in private, was a fundamental cornerstone of American foreign policy towards Cuba.
The refugee crisis was framed by local officials and activists in terms of the ideological
arguments of the Cold War. In turn, the U.S. government sought to resolve it through the
creation of a program that both explicitly and implicitly made the mundane experiences of
Miami’s residents political actions in a global conflict.

As the Cuban Refugee Program took shape as a large-scale endeavor, firmly entrenched
in the structure of the welfare state, it became something far different from anything Tracy
Voorhees had ever conceived of as a solution for Miami’s problems. One of Voorhees’s original
conceptions did take hold and became one of the primary functions of the program: the
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resettlement of refugees to other parts of the United States. The program sought to ease
tensions in South Florida, but many also considered that resettlement would be essential to
imparting a true American experience to the refugees, particularly the younger ones. In his
testimony before Congress in December of 1961, Senior Judge for the Dade County Juvenile
Domestic Relations Court, W.R. Culbreath encouraged the relocation of Cuban families away
from metropolitan areas and into small towns. Not only would any aid received by the refugees
go further in a small town setting, but it might prevent any juvenile delinquency problems in the
Miami area and impart small town American values on the young exiles. “I feel that the United
States has in this group of young people the greatest possible potential of good relationships
with Cuba and with the other Latin American countries,” Culbreath stated to the Subcommittee
to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees.65
Culbreath and likeminded individuals believed that in addition to solving and preventing
problems on a local level, relocation would best serve American foreign policy goals. Other
officials believed that the resettlement of the Cuban exiles would serve to awaken Americans
“as nothing else has to the oppressions of communism.” In a radio interview meant for Spanish
speaking audiences in 1967, the director of the Cuban Refugee Center, Errol T. Ballanfonte told
an interviewer that people in the Miami area were well aware of how articulate freedom loving
Cubans could be in regards to the dangers of communism. “In scattering out to self-supporting
opportunities all over this country,” he went on, “Cuban refugees have told their convincing
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stories and alerted Americans by this first-hand information.”66 In sending the refugees to new
communities and giving them new audiences for their personal stories, support for the Cold War
at home could also be reinforced.
The Cuban Refugee Emergency Center provided office space for representatives of four
different volunteer agencies engaged in the resettlement of refugees. Catholic Relief Services,
the Protestant Latin American Emergency Committee of the Church World Service, the United
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Service, and the International Rescue Committee all worked to
entice the refugees to resettle to other areas of the country. When a refugee came to register
at the center, they were interviewed and classified by job skills, numbers of employable family
members, friend or relatives living in the United States, and whether they desired voluntary
agency assistance. After a medical examination they were interviewed by one of the four
volunteer agencies based on religious preference or the desire to be aided by the secular
International Rescue Committee. Social workers would interview and screen the refugees and
certify their eligibility to receive monthly financial assistance checks for a maximum of $100 per
family and $60 per single adult and for hospital care for acute illnesses.67
In order to find sound resettlement opportunities for the exiles, the CREC needed to
inform the American public both of the plight of the Cuban refugees and of the resettlement
program itself. In January of 1962 the program made comprehensive contact with daily
newspapers around the country. That month more than 1,500 letters to the editors were sent
with information about resettlement and operations of the center. The resulting news stories
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and editorials helped increase consciousness about the Cuban exile situation and about the
need for resettlement. The Center’s media blitz also included over 4,000 envelopes addressed
by the National Association of Broadcasters to all its members, completing a comprehensive
coverage of all radio stations in the United States. By August of that year, the CREC had also
sent 10 minute interview scripts to be conducted by an announcer and a local official or
influential citizen regarding the program to 117 ABC television stations, 111 CBS stations, and
191 NBC stations.68
The Center’s publicity campaign encouraged audiences to do their patriotic duty in
helping to fight the Cold War by offering opportunities to the exiles. The program also sought to
make inroads with local and state politicians around the nation by sending information packets
to the governors of every state in the union and by sending a speaker to the Conference of
Mayors held in Miami Beach in May of 1962.69 It also engaged civic organizations around the
country like the United States Junior Chamber of Commerce. Telegrams were sent to all
“Jaycee” chapters and officers received “Make Mine Freedom” reminder cards reminding them
about the Cuban Refugee Resettlement Program and that they should “talk it up next
meeting.”70
Seeing the reluctance of refugees to resettle to other areas of the country for fear of
missing a swift return to Cuba, of colder climes, and of culture shock in leaving an area now
densely populated by other Cubans, officials sought to both coerce and entice the exiles to
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consider resettlement. The Cuban Refugee Program’s public assistance aid for exiles in Miami
was not unconditional. The CRP considered that exiles could be offered “sound” resettlement
opportunities one of two ways. The exile could be offered suitable employment through a
responsible sponsoring organization that was within their capacity to perform, conformed to fair
labor standards and would not exposed them to undo hardship. They could also be offered a
relocation opportunity by a responsible sponsoring organization that would guarantee their
maintenance in decency and health until they could become self-supporting. If an exile was
offered a sound resettlement opportunity and they refused the offer without “adequate cause,”
the refugee would be removed from public assistance rolls and become ineligible for any further
cash assistance under the program.71 If the exiles feared the changes that relocation would
bring they were free to stay in Miami, but they would find themselves shut out from the more
direct forms of assistance that the CRP had been created to provide.
Other exiles found little choice but to be resettled should they desire to be reunited
with family members who had arrived before them. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the flow
of refugees arriving in the United States slowed significantly due to the revolutionary
government’s decision to halt commercial air travel between Cuba and the United States. For a
period of three years, ending in the fall of 1965, Cubans could only get to the United States by
travelling to a third country and applying for a visa, by demonstrating sufficient medical need to
have the Red Cross bring them to the U.S., or by crossing the Florida Straits by boat. During this
phase between 30,000 and 50,000 Cubans arrived in the United States.72 While the rate of
migration slowed, the Refugee Center continued its efforts to relocate as many of the Cubans in
the Miami area as they could. When Fidel Castro decided, in the fall of 1965, to open the port of
71
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Camarioca to family members of exiles who wanted to leave the country, some five thousand
Cubans were brought across the Straits to Miami. In an effort to control the movement of
refugees the Johnson Administration signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the Cuban
government that allowed two daily flights of refugees from Varadero Beach to Miami. These
“freedom flights” were in operation between December 1965 and April 1973 and brought
approximately 340,000 new refugees to the United States.73
This agreement allowed both governments to place restrictions on who could make the
journey for the first time. The American government prioritized family reunification, focusing on
those potential exiles that already had family in the United States. Havana, meanwhile, refused
to let men of military age, those citizens deemed essential to the economy, and political
prisoners migrate to the United States.74 This new influx of refugees only reignited the urgency
of the resettlement program. Miami Mayor Robert King High appointed a committee of
representatives to assess this new phase of the refugee crisis. The White House responded by
meeting with representatives of the State Department and HEW to review and expand the
resettlement program.75 This, in turn, led to a reunification policy that had relocation as a
prerequisite. For example, this family reunification focus served to reunite several of the Pedro
Pan children with the parents they had not seen in years. In the first month of the Freedom
Flights, December of 1965, the parents of 128 Pedro Pan children arrived in the United States,
setting the stage for many reunions.76 Because of the concerns in South Florida the federal
government forced families to leave Miami if they wanted to reunite with their children. Most
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parents with children living in other areas of the United States sought to have their children
brought to Miami where they might have friends or relatives and where the culture shock would
be far less than in other areas. Parents, however, were to be brought to their children instead
of the children being brought to Miami.77
In addition to the more coercive measures they applied, officials at the Refugee Center
also attempted to make relocation seem like an enticing possibility for the exiles. The Center
regularly released a newsletter entitled Resettlement Re-Cap, which provided information on its
efforts and included stories about successful resettlements throughout the country. The
November 1962 issue, for example, told the story of Mr. and Mrs. Rigoberto Areces, who had
been relocated to Nevada, Iowa, population 5,000. Mrs. Areces gave Spanish lessons to her
neighbors as a way to improve her English and said of small town life that she and her husband
“never really knew what family life was like here. Until we came to Iowa, we didn’t know how
nice American people are.”78 The Center reprinted stories from local newspapers about the
ease with which resettled Cubans integrated into new communities. They distributed these
stories in both English and Spanish in the Miami area. They also reached out to resettled
Cubans in order to get positive statements about their resettlement experience. “The day we
left Miami we were a bit scared,” wrote Pedro Heng, who had relocated to Kansas City, Mo, “but
now we feel at home and are very happy to be in this city. I work at Memorial Baptist Hospital
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as a laboratory technician.”79 These stories, of course, never carried negative comments
regarding any hardships, discrimination, or isolation that exiles might have experienced after
being relocated from Miami.
In time, resettlement became a way for the Cuban Refugee Program to measure its own
success. The literature released by the Program often updated statistics regarding resettlement.
The Resettlement Re-Cap newsletter, in fact, carried a text box near its masthead entitled “The
Score.” For the week ending on September 28, 1962, the newsletter indicated that 2,044
refugees had registered at the Center that week, 963 refugees had been resettled, that since
January 1961, 150,544 refugees had registered at the Center, of those 44,258 had been
resettled, and that over 100,000 refugees remained in the Miami area.80 By May of 1963, a
program press release was proudly proclaiming that with the resettlement to Alaska of a 20 year
old Cuban who claimed not to fear the cold, the resettlement program had touched every state
in the Union.81 Resettlement figures also played a significant role in the weekly fact sheets
published by the Program regarding its activities. With the increased emphasis on relocation
that came with the establishment of the Freedom Flights, the CRP gave particular attention to
the ratio of resettlement based on new arrivals.
By the end of 1970, the Program’s materials classified its operations into three time
periods. The first from February of 1961 until the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 saw
153,534 registrations and 48,361 resettlements. The time period between the missile crisis and
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December 1, 1965 had 29,962 registrations and 46,547 resettlements. And the family reunion
phase consisting of 2,555 flights from Varadero to Miami between December of 1965 and
December 31, 1970 had 236,521 refugee arrivals and 172,343 resettlements. Overall, between
February 1961 and December 1970 the center reported 420,390 registrations and 267,251
resettlements. The center proudly reported that the rate of resettlement for Freedom Flight
refugees was 73.0% while the overall resettlement rate was 73.1%.82 What these figures and
statistics did not convey was that the CRP did not track any statistics regarding the return of
resettled Cubans to the Miami area.83 Cuban refugees were told in no uncertain terms that if
they resettled, they would become ineligible for any further aid should they move back to the
Miami area.84 As such, they had little reason to report to the Refugee Center or to provide the
institution any information if they returned to South Florida. Another problem with the
statistics provided by the Cuban Refugee Program is that they were entirely based on those
exiles that chose to register at the Center. A 1965 study, derived from statistics produced by the
immigration and Naturalization Service, indicated that while 85,465 Cubans had registered at
the Refugee Center, 94,987 had settled in Dade County without assistance.85
As time went on, the Cuban government put more restrictions on immigration and the
educational and social composition of the exiles changed. As exiles with fewer resources and
less training arrived in the area a greater percentage of refugees must have sought assistance
from the center. The center was unable to formally track these statics due to the lack of
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information gathering procedures involving the entire refugee population. It was well
established, however, is that there remained a significant and growing Cuban exile population in
the city of Miami despite the federal government’s efforts to encourage resettlement. This
required a significant investment from the Cuban Refugee Program in the form of economic
disbursements not only in the form of direct aid, but also through subsidies for relocation,
medical care, and other services.
The costs of the Program rapidly escalated after President Eisenhower’s original
$1,000,000 appropriation and the additional $4,000,000 that President Kennedy provided for
the first six months of 1961. Kennedy then allocated $13,560,000 for the remaining six months
ending on December 31, 1961.86 The total appropriations for the years 1962-1965 totaled
$141,901,869.87 Ultimately, the Cuban Refugee Program disbursed approximately
$2,000,000,000 in aid and provided relief for more than 700,000 Cubans in the United States.88
Direct aid for individual refugees and for families continued at a rate of $60 maximum per
individual case and $100 per family until July of 1971 when new maximums of $86 and $246
were enacted.89 This direct aid helped to revitalize the local economy.
There was another source of direct payment for a sector of the Cuban exile community
which had a significant effect on Miami’s economy. The University of Miami’s South Campus
was the site of a cluster of office buildings and warehouses, which was allegedly the site of
Defense Department weapons system research, publicly known as Zenith Technological

86

Statistics from the Cuban Refugee Program, “U.S. Cuban Refugee Program,” February 6, 1962, Folder
71, Box 4, Series I, Cuban Refugee Center Records, CHC.
87
Holborn, “The Cuban Refugee Program: Its Development and Implementation,” July 31, 1965.
88
Miguel A. De La Torre, La Lucha for Cuba: Religion and Politics on the Streets of Miami (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003), 37.
89
U.S. Cuban Refugee Center press release, May 28, 1971, Folder 35, Box 2, Series I, Cuban Refugee
Center Records, CHC.

94
Services. This entity was one of South Florida’s largest employers between 1962 and 1968.
Zenith Technological Services was actually the front for an operation known to insiders as
JM/WAVE, the largest Central Intelligence Agency installation in the world outside of CIA
headquarters in Langley, Virginia. JM/WAVE employed thousands of Cuban agents and
maintained hundreds of pieces real estate in the Miami area.90 Operation Mongoose, the
Kennedy directed plan to destabilize the Castro regime was run out of these facilities, involving
more than 500 caseworkers handling over 3,000 Cuban exile agents at a cost of over
$100,000,000 a year. These funds allowed for the establishment and operation of over fifty-four
front businesses.91 The full extent of the CIA’s economic influence over the Miami area in the
1960s has yet to be fully understood as the records regarding JM/WAVE and most of these
operations remain sealed. What is certain is that the economic disbursements related to the
Agency’s presence in the South Florida further augmented the funds provided by the Cuban
Refugee Program.
The Cuban Refugee Program’s influence over the Miami metropolitan area went well
beyond direct payments issued to qualifying exiles and their families. An essential element of
the program was to aid the exiles in securing economic self-sufficiency. Given the
socioeconomic makeup of the early exile waves and the belief among federal officials that the
skills of those professional and educated exiles needed to be maintained, particular efforts were
made on behalf of the those exiles with the greatest levels of education and experience. Among
those refugees who registered for assistance at the Center there were a significant number with
professional and semi-professional occupations. As of March 1963, the registered refugees with
professional occupations broke down in the following way:
90
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Professional and Semi-Professional Occupations92
Occupation

Total

Accountant—Bookkeepers
Architects
Chemists
Dentists
Engineers (all types)
Lawyers
Pharmacists
Physicians
Professors (University Level)
Teachers (elementary and secondary)
Total Professionals and Semi-Professionals
Registered

2,009
208
115
283
556
1,770
542
1,051
498
2,937
9,969

Percent of
Registration
2.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.7%
2.0%
0.6%
1.3%
0.6%
3.4%
11.5%

The potential economic benefit for the United States represented by the education and
experience contained in these early waves, the so called “Golden Exiles” was tremendous. This
was well understood by federal officials and by the exiles themselves. “No other country in the
world has ever been so fortunate to receive the cream of the crop from another society,” stated
Manuel Gonzalez-Mayo, a Cuban veterinarian, when questioned by a researcher in 1969. “It
takes $85,000 to produce a new doctor - - a green beginner - - in this country, Gonzalez- Mayo
went on, “but the United States has got more than 2,000 experienced M.D.’s from Cuba, as a
gift.”93 In order for the United States to receive this gift, the Cuban Refugee Program had to
take steps to ensure the exiles’ training would not be wasted.
Starting in early 1961, federal authorities began working with the University of Miami’s
Medical School to create a program that would allow exile physicians to practice their
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profession in the United States. The faculty of the University of Havana School of Medicine in
exile joined with the Faculty of the School of Medicine of the University of Miami to establish a
program tailored to meet the group and individual needs of these physicians. The program
included English language courses for the physicians established by special arrangement with
the UM’s School of Languages and with Barry College. Explaining their aspirations, creators of
the initiative hoped “that as a result of helping them continue their education, they will be
exposed to the most lasting and valuable impression of Democracy that is possible.”94
By the fifth course of the program, starting on January 3, 1963, the medical school saw
an enrollment of 130 physicians from 12 Latin American countries, 114 of whom were Cuban
exiles. Representing 14 medical specialties, these doctors hoped to take the course and pass
the Emergency Council for Foreign Medical Graduates’ Examination. The ECFMG certificate was
necessary for foreign trained physicians to practice medicine in the United States and each
subsequent course of the University of Miami’s program saw greater and greater success in the
percentage of students who obtained this certification. The first course, from January to March
of 1961, had a success rate of 67%. By the fourth course, held between July and October of
1962, the graduates obtaining the ECFMG certification reached 80%. By March of 1963 the
faculty expected that 110 physicians from the program would obtain their certification, be
qualified to work in American medical institutions, and would share with their friends
“knowledge of how education was used to advance the cause of democracy.”95
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The program began as a University of Miami project and was largely funded through
private donations.96 After the establishment of the Cuban Refugee Program, the University
began working with the federal government on this project and received a grant from the
Department of Health Education and Welfare to fund its operations. Over 2500 Cuban doctors
would make their way through the program with the majority obtaining the certification to
practice medicine in the United States.97 This allowed for the accreditation of well educated,
often very experienced medical doctors in the United States for a cost of $384 per physician.98
By 1963, even with federal authorities pushing for resettlement, at least 18% of the newly
accredited physicians had found work in the Miami area.99 Not only did this benefit the Miami
area, allowing for a greater concentration of medical professionals locally, but it often provided
great successes for the resettlement program to tout in encouraging the relocation of exiles
from the area. This was the case when the refugee program reprinted a November 1967 story
from the Kansas Kansan about how Dr. Alfredo L. Hernandez, a Cuban psychiatrist, had been
named the new chief of the main section at Osawatomie State Hospital.100 Accreditation
allowed exile physicians access to work in their field and to further opportunities as
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organizations like the American Medical Association established revolving funds for loans to
Cuban physicians attending postgraduate programs.101
Not all Cuban professionals had the same opportunities to engage in the fields in which
they were trained. In February of 1961, after having laid the groundwork for the training of the
Cuban physicians, the University of Miami was making plans to extend the same type of training
opportunities to the significant number of Cuban lawyers among the refugees.102 There was a
stumbling block for the refugee lawyers in that the English system of common law that was
prevalent in the United States was significantly different from the codes that served as the basis
of Cuban law. In March of 1961, the American Bar Association sought to help the exile lawyers
by establishing a special committee to help Cuban lawyers, judges, and legal scholars to find
employment as teachers, librarians, and legal counsel in corporations. Unfortunately, if a Cuban
lawyer wanted to enter private practice in any state they would be required to start their legal
education over in an American Law School. It was not until 1973 that the University of Florida
and the University of Miami created an intensive eighteen month training program specifically
for Cuban lawyers that allowed them to graduate with an American law degree.103
The Cuban Refugee Center sought to find employment for these refugee attorneys in
alternate fields. As part of their Resettlement Re-Cap, the Center asked potential employers “a
Cuban lawyer as a Spanish language teacher? Why not?” The Center sought to urge Cuban
lawyers who were sufficiently qualified in English and who could not use their advanced
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university training in jobs related to the law to undertake teaching.104 Starting in January of
1963, a new program was established at the University of Miami’s School of Education under
the direction of Associate Dean Herbert W. Wey and with financial support from the Welfare
Administration. This was followed by the creation of other programs to teach English to Cuban
exiles so they could become Spanish educators at Indiana University, the College of Great Falls,
Montana, and Pacific University in Forest Grove, Oregon, among others. A significant number of
the exiles who participated in these programs were former lawyers.105
Similar programs were attempted for optometrists and dentists among the exiles.106
Dentists faced greater difficulties than medical doctors. Cuban refugees were able to obtain
student loans if they were admitted to dental schools. Cuban dentists, however, had to return
to dental school and be evaluated by the school in regards to what standing they would be
allowed. If a dentist entered dental school with a third year standing or better and they were
residents of Miami when they entered then they were eligible for maintenance grants from the
Cuban Refugee Program, this in addition to student loans.107 This is indicative of the difficulties
faced by Cubans in certain professions, but it also illustrates the availability of student loans
under the U.S. Loan Program for Cuban Students, which used funds made available by the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 and which were administered along the same
guidelines as other government student loan programs in the United States. In order for an
institution to be eligible to be eligible for these funds, they had to be participating in the
National Defense Student Loan Program or to meet the eligibility criteria for participation in that
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program. A three percent interest rate would be accrued on the unpaid balance of the loans
twelve months after the refugee stopped being a full time student.108
Access to educational opportunities for the exiles went beyond the Program’s
profession-specific initiatives and the subsidies paid to Dade County public schools. The push
for exile self-sufficiency was particularly important in the Miami market, now flooded with exiles
either already on public assistance rolls or who might be potentially added to them at any
moment. One of the most significant obstacles for exiles attempting to find work in an
American marketplace was the language barrier. Just as intensive language programs were
established as part of programs geared for professionals, English language courses were
established and made available to any adult exile in the Miami area that chose to participate in
them. The Refugee Center made card sized fliers to hand out to exiles visiting the facilities that
asked in Spanish “Are you improving your English?” The Center advertised free extension
classes available day and night and listed several junior and senior high schools and educational
centers where adult exiles could work to attain a greater grasp of the English language. At the
bottom of each card the exile recipient was reminded that “Opportunities come more quickly to
those refugees that help themselves.”109 English language training was thus positioned as a
cornerstone of financial self-reliance and independence from the program.
Locally available training for the potential exile workforce went beyond these English
language classes. The center provided training that would allow professional and semiprofessional Cubans to enter the marketplace either in their own professions or in professions

108

Loans Branch, DSFA, Bureau of Higher Education to Institutions of Higher Education, March 15, 1967,
Folder 257, Box 13, Series I, Cuban Refugee Center Records, CHC.
109
U.S. Cuban Refugee Center, “Are you improving your English?,” undated, Folder 18, Box 1, Series I,
Cuban Refugee Center Records, CHC.

101
where they could use some of the skills they had acquired over the years. It sought to do the
same with skilled and unskilled laborers who had come to the United States as refugees. The
first step in this process was to sort out what skills and aptitudes exiles had for placement in
industrial and service jobs. The Center was the site of 75 weekly aptitude tests administered by
the U.S. Employment Service to identify “men and women whose manual dexterity and fast
reactions can be directed toward a variety of skills.” This allowed center personnel to offer
enticing candidates to manufacturers providing with-pay training courses, ideally setting the
refugees on a path to a well-paying job and self-sufficiency. The staff also reached out to out-ofstate manufacturers, noting that exiles had already been sent to shoe factories in New England,
clothing makers in New York State, and electronics producers in Texas, but many of the exiles
would wind up using these skills and aptitudes to gain jobs in local manufacturing concerns.110
The Center also offered new skillsets to individuals who had never before held jobs in
manufacturing or in the service industry. While many of the exiles were able to achieve success,
the Cuban Refugee Program established an initiative for those that had been left behind. This
was particularly important for the significant number of exile women who were the heads of
their families in the United States. The “Training for Independence” program started in July of
1964 when 1475 women started intensive English classes as a precursor to vocational training
aimed at ending dependence on public assistance. For the eight to nine months of the course,
each student received two and a half hours of intensive English instruction five times a week
before they could proceed to further training. Cuban Refugee Center officials had found that
female heads of household were characterized by low educational levels. Seventy one percent
of these women had less than a high school education. A similar percentage had no knowledge
110

U.S. Cuban Refugee Program, “Attention Manufacturers!,” Resettlement Re-Cap, September 1962,
Folder 192, Box 9, Series I, Cuban Refugee Center Records, CHC.

102
of the English language. Among this group, 33% were married but without a spouse in Miami:
most of their husbands were still in Cuba or in some country other than the United States,
leaving the women as the only source of support for their children.111
While the stated aim of the Training for Independence program was to establish “a new
approach to the problems of dependency,” the official attitude of the program registered a
heavy dose of paternalism in its description of the women interviewed to participate in the
program. Officials in the program directly compared them to the American mothers served by
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and found their reactions to their
situation similar. “Many were unable to face reality and, while unhappy in their ghetto slum,”
read a report on the program encased in a glossy booklet, “had only vague and improbably
dreams of how their lives might ultimately change for the better.” In order to ensure that these
women would participate in the program, they were forced to enroll in the project or they
would cease to be eligible for financial assistance from CRP. While the Program described the
way in which many Cuban women actively and enthusiastically sought out participation in the
Training for Independence initiative, they also gave examples of those who had to be coerced
into it. This was the case of a woman the program referred to as Mrs. H, a 30 year old Cuban
refugee with three children under the age of ten who had been on public assistance for three
years when she was brought into the program. Mrs. H was described as “an obese, slatternlylooking woman, with only two years of formal education,” who lived in a dingy bedroom
equipped with a gas plate and a refrigerator. According to the Program’s narrative, Mrs. H was
far from interested in the slow and arduous process of gaining independence by learning English
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and a trade. “It would have been difficult to enable her to become employable,” the Program’s
writers went on, “even if she had been genuinely interested in achieving independence.”112
Mrs. H was portrayed as being frequently absent from the program despite being
provided with child care during class hours. The narrative claimed she had attempted to “buy”
her way out of the program multiple times. On one occasion she was reported to have written
President Lyndon B. Johnson a letter requesting he send her an automobile as a present,
explaining it was her lack of a car that kept her from earning a living for her children. When her
caseworker questioned her about the letter, Mrs. H “admitted that she did not know how to
drive a car and had no plans for using it, but she still felt that if the president would give her
one, all her problems would somehow be solved.” Ultimately, Mrs. H was able to complete the
language training and a course in laundry work, but kept missing job opportunities until her
caseworker forced her to meet a prospective employer. The silver lining to the story, as
explained by the program, was that a few months later the agency received a letter from the
employer lauding Mrs. H’s work and asking if any other workers of her caliber were available.113
The officials of the Cuban Refugee Program sought to illustrate the effectiveness of their
plan to bring the destitute out of a state of dependency and into self-sufficiency. The Program’s
narrative of the Cuban exodus had been that it was, as John F. Tomas, Director of the CRP’s
Social and Rehabilitation Service, described it, a “a top flight migration” of people with “special
talents, ambition and initiative.”114 Thomas was describing the upper classes of the Cuban
refugees and how they had integrated themselves into American society with relative ease.
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Other refugees found in the narratives of Training for Independence well fit in the long
established mold of the “worthy poor,” who actively sought to escape their situation.
In the case of Cuban women like Mrs. H, the program sought to liken them to another
segment of American society by comparing their situation to that of women who received
assistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. This comparison had
a very intentional purpose. The Program’s publication, “Training for Independence: A New
Approach to the Problems of Dependency,” claimed that the project had been successful in
“virtually eliminating the problem of hard core poverty among the individuals in this group.”
Their study of the initiative was meant to provide ideas and encouragement to community
leaders, welfare officials, and employment specialists in dealing with problems of extreme
poverty because Cuban Miami served as a social laboratory where they could conduct
experiments in order to understand larger society issues. “In this Cuban group,” wrote Cuban
Refugee Program Director Howard H. Palmatier, “all the complexities of the problem of hard
core poverty are reduced to a scale which facilitates study and comprehension.”115 By
instituting an initiative that used government funds to provide child care, education, and work
placement, the Cuban Refugee Program sought to provide for the larger Department of Health
Education and Welfare and for officials and activists throughout the nation a model by which to
tackle one of the major issues of the larger War on Poverty. The hybrid nature of the CRP
allowed officials to serve American foreign policy aims through welfare programs that they, in
turn, believed could be mimicked and used to address the some of the major problems facing
the welfare state.
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The Training for Independence initiative produced tangible successes for the Cuban
Refugee Center beyond an attempt to influence the rest of the HEW structure. Of the 3,800
women who initially qualified for the program, 2,103, approximately 55%, had been removed
from the financial assistance rolls by June of 1965. A small, mixed-gender group of Cubans ages
56-64 were also included in the program and by that same month nearly 20% of them had been
removed from the assistance rolls.116 The vocational schooling provided by the Training for
Independence initiative allowed women to receive training in the hotel industry, childcare, and
upholstery work. It also had clerical courses that included lessons in typing, filing, bookkeeping,
and general office practices. It also provided training in industrial power sewing machine
operation.117
This last form of training was particularly important because it allowed the women who
chose this path to become part of a larger trend that saw Cuban women enlivening Miami’s
garment industry. Before 1960 most of the labor in the city’s small garment industry was
performed by “snowbirds,” elderly garment workers from the East Coast who spent their
winters in Florida. Things changed significantly after the surge in refugee arrivals. By
November of 1967, there were some 350 clothing factories operating in the Greater Miami area,
ranging from large industrial plants to small, sparsely equipped family shops. Operating in two
garment districts located in Northwestern Miami and Hialeah, this industry employed more than
12,000 workers. Over 85% of these workers were Cubans who worked in the manufacture of a
great variety of garments, principally women’s and children’s wear. For the fiscal year ending on
June 30, 1967, the value of garment production had exceeded $120,000,000. This annual output
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had been growing at an annual rate of 15% for the previous three years, and it had made Miami
the third largest garment center in the nation, rapidly approaching a position in which it would
challenge California for second place. One Miami garment executive told a reporter that the
only time he could thank Fidel Castro was when he thought of what an asset the Cuban refugees
had been to his industry. Another spoke to the almost magical skills of Cuban women in
working in the manufacturing of clothing, stating that his company had operators who had
never worked a day in their lives but who immediately adapted themselves to industrial work.
He then went on to list the reasons that made South Florida so appealing to the garment
industry, the first of which was the ample Cuban labor supply. While it was an industry still
seeking stability, the presence of the Cubans was credited with its explosive growth.118
This was not the only time that the presence of the Cubans, and their access to
structures of privilege granted to them by the federal government, would make an impact on
Miami’s economy. Early on during the refugee crisis, there had been many who expressed fear
that the influx of the refugees would only exacerbate the economic recession in the city. An
economic study published by the University of Miami in 1967, however, attributed the economic
stagnation from 1960 to 1964 to two earlier sharp declines in economic activity in both the
tourist and building industries related to the national recession in 1958. The study found that
the refugees did cause a significant amount of economic dislocation. When the Cuban refugees
moved into areas with large number of vacancies and improved lagging housing occupancy they
changed the consumption patterns for local businesses. This caused some of them to fail or
move. The researchers also found that the exile community had a significant impact on the
city’s economy through their entrepreneurial activities once they were properly established in
118
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South Florida. “With the passing of time,” the researchers found, “methods for establishing
credit for business and business loans in the absence of credit records and references from Cuba
have been developed and Cuban participation in the business community has been
increasing.”119
The practice of obtaining loans through references from Cuba came to be known as
“character loans.” Carlos Arboleya, who had been a banker in Cuba before coming to the United
States, claimed to have started this practice. Arboleya’s story was reminiscent of those of other
Cubans who were highly educated or highly experienced. Arriving in Miami on Halloween night
1960, Arboleya found that no bank would give him a job. He, instead, went to work at a shoe
factory and rapidly rose through the ranks. After a year and a half at the factory, he was offered
a position at Boulevard National Bank, where he rose to the position of executive vice-president.
Arboleya would go on to become the first Cuban president of an American bank, Fidelity
National Bank. When Arboleya rose to positions of authority within these financial
organizations he began the practice of character loans. When a Cuban refugee would come to
Arboleya seeking a loan to start a business, Arboleya based his decision on the man’s character
and reputation. If he knew that the applicant had had a business of the same type in Cuba and
that he was a man of good character, he felt compelled to aid the exile. “Their financial state
did not warrant a loan,” Arboleya later recalled, “but this person’s character, and experience,
and life did warrant it.”120 Most professional exiles had lost their wealth in fleeing from Cuba
after the Revolution, but as members of the community attained wealth and the clout to aid
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new arrivals they found they had carried with them an asset in the form of the history they
shared with other exiles of the same class.
Entrepreneurial exiles also received aid from the federal government in establishing
new businesses through loans from the Small Business Administration. Statistics on the loans
granted by this organization between 1968 and 1979 show that Hispanics received 46.9% of
available funds, totaling $47,677,660. By comparison, Euroamericans received 46.6% of the
available funds, while African Americans received 6.3%.121 While there were fluctuations in the
composition of Miami’s Hispanic population over the years, by 1970 this population was
estimated to be 87.3% Cuban.122 If Cubans were the recipients of a comparable percentage of
the total funds that went to Hispanics, this suggests that this group received approximately 41%
of the total available funds. Regardless of whether the funding came from the SMA, a character
loan, some other privately secured loan, or another source, Cuban businessmen and women
opened a significant number of new businesses in the Miami area. By 1971, ten years after the
creation of the Cuban Refugee Program, the Miami area had close to 6,000 Cuban owned
businesses.123
In the early 1960s, the Cuban refugee influx had added thousands of new Hispanic
residents to Dade County, most of who had been in need of aid from the established Cuban
community or the federal government. By the latter half of the decade, market studies were
being commissioned to properly measure the spending power of this market in Dade County. A
study conducted by First Research Company in 1970 found significant growth in the total annual
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income of the county’s Spanish language origin households. The survey, carried out for the third
consecutive year, found that the annual figure of $588,000,000 represented an increase of
about $246,000,000 in the period from mid-1968 to the end of September 1970. While the
number of Hispanic households increased by 37.3% from 59,500 to 81,695 in the same time
period, the increase in total income was of nearly 72%, outpacing the growth in population. By
the start of the 1970s the Hispanic population in Miami had high levels of car ownership and
38.9% of them owned their own home.124
These economic indicators suggest a massive change from the first two years of the
refugee crisis. Within ten years, what had been a destitute population had gained, through
access to structures of privilege usually denied to minority groups and migrants and through
their social composition, education, experience, and entrepreneurship, a significant share of the
economic power in Dade County. By serving the needs of the U.S. national security apparatus,
the Cuban Refugee Program set the Cuban exiles and the Miami on a path towards economic
growth. This, however, does not mean that either the national security officials who began the
program or the Cubans themselves felt particularly satisfied with the way this arrangement
unfolded. On a local level, the empowerment of the Cuban community challenged the
established social order, and prompted confrontations between the exiles and Miami’s African
American and white residents. As the refugee community navigated international, national, and
local politics, the stage was set for a political transformation of Miami that rivaled the
demographic and economic metamorphoses that came about because of the intersection
between the national security and welfare states in South Florida.
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CHAPTER 3—“A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE MIX”: RACE, CITIZENSHIP, AND EXILE POLITICS AT THE
NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS, 1965-1972
In July of 1972, the New York Times ran a piece on how Miami’s “long-passive” refugees
were becoming active in local political life. The Times estimated the Cuban population in Miami
at around 300,000 people. Some 80,000 Cubans were eligible to vote, but only about half of
them were registered to do so. There was, however, a drive to register as many eligible Cubans
as possible in time for the presidential election later that year. The drive for registration was
seen as problematic by the Democratic Party, given that 80% of the Cubans who registered to
vote also registered as Republicans. The Times contrasted a number of Cuban civic groups that
had sprung up in the city to the “now moribund anti-Castro organizations of the 1960s,” stating
that the new groups were principally aimed at participating in community affairs. The
newspaper of record informed its readers that the Cuban community was now led by a younger
group of exiles who had come of age in the United States; men like Manolo Reboso, the
recently-appointed, first Cuban-born member of the Miami City Commission. Another young
leader, Armando Lacasa, stated that Cubans were the largest minority in Dade County, and that
“in a short time we have attained an economic power, and now we have to unite to attain
political power.” This union, however, was far from assured as differing Cuban factions were in
competition for power and influence over a united Cuban voting bloc. Regardless, these
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struggles were framed as a new, local political force coming into being; one which had forsaken
the counterrevolutionary struggle of the past to focus on their present in Miami.1
The Times correctly identified the growing influence of the Cuban community in South
Florida and an evolution in its politics. The article accentuated a separation between the politics
of exile and the politics of an inchoate Cuban American community. The piece prematurely
declared the death of the exile organizations that directly engaged the Castro regime in order to
drive it from Cuba. What the author failed to identify was that the change in political direction
by Miami’s Cubans in the late 1960s and early 1970s was simply a new manifestation of the
same world view and the same desire for a Castro-free Cuba. The access to economic
opportunity created by the Cuban Refugee Program and other endeavors of the federal
government allowed the Cuban community to harness increasing social and economic power in
South Florida. The troubled history of exile political organizations with the federal government
in the early 1960s set the stage for a new approach to Cuban politics in South Florida, one that
used the community’s local clout as a springboard to influence American policy.
The event that tied these two trends and which permanently married the politics of
exile with local politics in Miami was the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966. This
piece of legislation solidified the exiles’ access to the structures of privilege offered by the
federal government: a path to citizenship through permanent residency in the United States.
Exile politics were complex and divided in the 1960s, but the experience of the refugees on a
local and national level informed how individuals and groups made the politics of the Cold War
as local as they were global. Likewise, the presence of the exiles and their actions affected the
way in which the federal government reacted to their initiatives and how Miami’s black and
1
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white communities regarded the exile and the federal intervention in their city. The Cuban
presence and the federal aid they received were transgressive to the established social order in
Miami. Once a path to citizenship was open, this transgression became a new and unstable
social order. It also created a larger Cuban American community that sought to influence
American foreign policy not as an outside group making demands of a host state, but as a voting
bloc that could mobilize influence for friendly candidates in local and legislative elections.
This process led to a specific set of historic circumstances that publicly associated the
growing Cuban American community to the Republican Party. Many scholars and casual
commentators have portrayed the rapport between these two groups as being based on some
natural conservatism inherent in the Cuban exile or being due to some un-bridgeable chasm
that followed the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. While there were some very vocal
conservative elements in the Cuban American community, both of the major political parties in
the United States were invested in anti-communism in the 1950s and 1960s. Likewise, while
John F. Kennedy’s “betrayal” of the Cuban cause was a significant obstacle to future relations
between the Democratic Party and the exile community, exile organizations continued to clash
with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as they sought free reign in their struggle against
the Castro regime. This narrative of the Democrats and the Cubans Americans being
permanently at odds was ultimately accepted by both Democrats and Republicans in Dade
County, leading to an institutional abandonment of the Cuban Americans as a Democratic
constituency and the creation of a superior Republican recruitment effort in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
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In the early 1960s, federal policy makers were forced to balance their desire to see the
Cuban revolutionary government toppled with their concerns regarding directly engaging the
Soviet Union and with fears of another embarrassment on the level of the Bay of Pigs Invasion.
While American policymakers could sympathize with the exiles and saw them as comrades in
arms in the global struggle of the Cold War, Cuba was a single battleground in a larger conflict
and not the dream that drove them. Scholars of the Cuban exile often focus on this division
when attempting to understand the complex history of relations between the anti-Castro
Cubans and the U.S. government. Sociologist Silvia Pedraza described the relationship between
the United States, Cuba, and the exiles in terms of an “impossible triangle.”2 The relationship
between Cuban home regime, the North American host regime, and the exile community was
indeed an impossible triangle because any attempt at relations between two corners of the
triangle results in the alienation of the third corner. Because of this, the exiles have often felt
betrayed by the host state when its relations with the home state become more important than
its relations with the exiles. The Bay of Pigs Invasion was the first perceived betrayal of the exile
cause.3
The question of whether or not to establish a Cuban government in exile in the United
States, for example, would seem to fit securely within Pedraza’s model. The United States
government had officially warned the exiles that it would tolerate no attempt to set up a
government in exile in the United States in late 1959. A representative of the State Department
informed the media that they had been spurred by reports of a government in exile being
prepared by supporters of Dr. Emilio Nuñez Portundo. The establishment of a foreign
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government in American territory “without the consent of the United States would violate the
sovereignty of the United States and run counter to international law,” warned spokesman
Lincoln White.4 In this case the host state was avoiding antagonizing the home state at the
expense of the exile community.
At the same time, the Eisenhower administration was trying not to tip its hand about
any future plans it might have for the end of Castro’s regime. By openly rebuking Nuñez
Portundo’s followers it was ensuring that whatever de facto government in exile ultimately took
control of the combined Cuban exile efforts would be compatible with long term American
interests in Latin America. In addition, this rebuke did not permanently eliminate the possibility
of a Cuban government in exile in the United States. In the lead-up to the invasion, the Kennedy
administration created a government in exile in-everything-but-title in the guise of the Cuban
Revolutionary Council. José Miró Cardona, formerly the first Prime Minister of the revolutionary
government, was elected as head of the CRC. This infuriated many in the Cuban exile right who
claimed that the CRC’s platform was “Fidelismo without Fidel.”5
While the Kennedy administration meant to unify the exiles and to benefit them at the
expense of their home state, it ultimately ran into the problem that the exiles did not have a
unified political leaning outside of a general opposition to Fidel Castro. In the fractured
landscape of Cuban exile politics, the Cuban Revolutionary Council was one of the most
ambitious attempts at unifying the anti-Castro Cubans living in exile. The CRC, however, was not
up to the task of unifying the many different organizations that emerged in the United States.
By May, 1962 the CIA reported that over 200 anti-Castro organizations had been formed in Cuba
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or among Cuban exiles in other countries, most prevalently in the United States. “The exile
community, divided and quarrelsome,” explained the Agency’s report, “forms into groups and
organizations, breaks up, disappears and reforms in a kaleidoscopic picture which varies from
week to week.”6 In October of that year, the CIA provided National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy with a handbook “designed to provide an abbreviated read reference to pertinent
available information concerning known Cuban Counterrevolutionary organizations.” This
abbreviated guide was 102 pages long.7
The lack of Cuban unity was not the determining factor in the failure of the operation
the CRC had been created for: the Bay of Pigs Invasion. American intelligence officials and the
members of the exile organization they were working with had expected the invasion to bring
about a national uprising, or to at least allow the exile force to move into the countryside in
order to carry out guerilla tactics against Cuba’s revolutionary government with the aid of the
local resistance. Having been forewarned of the invasion, however, Castro had made military
preparations and in the weeks prior to the invasion had shattered the resistance’s ability to
organize any support by capturing several of its leaders.8 The invasion force, comprised of 1400
exiles accompanied by three Catholic priests, found itself at a massive tactical disadvantage. By
the end of the battle, 114 exiles had been killed, a few were executed shortly after falling into
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the hands of the defensive force, and 1,189 were captured. Some 150 exiles were not able to
land, were never deployed, or barely managed to retreat and make their way back.9
In the wake of the failed invasion, the federal government offered those members of
Brigade 2506 who had not been captured the possibility of serving in the United States military.
Meanwhile, the exile community actively sought to have the captured members of Brigade 2506
returned to the United States. The United States government refused to formally participate in
the negotiations, but it did allow private citizens and the exiles to try to secure the release of
those members of the invasion force who had not been executed or condemned for political
crimes. Ultimately, all but seven of the soldiers who had been imprisoned in Cuba were
returned to the United States in December of 1962. On December 29, President Kennedy
addressed the members of the Brigade at the Miami Orange Bowl and after receiving the flag of
Brigade 2506 he told the cheering crowd, “I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this
brigade in a free Havana.”10
Kennedy had plans for Brigade 2506. Prior to the rally at the Orange Bowl, the President
had had a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Palm Beach. The President was looking for a
group that might become a “focal point” in Miami. The Joint Chiefs again brought up the issue
of a government in exile, but the President was not ready to take that step. They all agreed that
something needed to be done about the lack of direction among the exiles. “Right now,”
summarized an aid, “these various groups sit down there, stew in their own juice, elect
committees, become emotionally upset, and then finally call upon somebody in Washington to
let off their steam.” Should a “focal point” be established, it could be used to direct and focus
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the energies of these many groups.11 The Kennedy administration had already attempted to
establish a focal point in the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The Council had been meant to have
been the basis of a new government following a successful invasion. It continued to exist in the
wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, when the White House designated the CRC its point of contact
related to any refugee issues.12 In October of 1961, the U.S. government tried to solidify the
power of the CRC over other Cuban exile organizations by having the aid provided to those
organizations flow through the Council.13
This central position allowed Miró Cardona to serve as a spokesperson of the Cuban
exile cause. He served in this role, for example, when he testified before the House Committee
on the Judiciary in December of 1961. As part of his prepared statement he outlined exactly
what he saw as the mentality of the Cuban refugee population. Every exile man, woman, and
child, had “but one wish, one idea, one obsession—to go back to his country as soon as
possible.” Miró Cardona reinforced both the desire of the exiles to return to Cuba and the
intent for a brief stay in the United States. The Cubans, he stated, “would rather fight and die
than try to remake their lives in a friendly but foreign country.”14 By March of the following
year, Miró Cardona and Antonio de Varona asked McGeorge Bundy to give the CRC “the
wherewithal to invade Cuba and overthrow the Castro regime.” Bundy replied that should the
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United States support any military action against Castro’s Cuba, such action had to be both
decisive and complete. In view of the military state of Cuba, Bundy informed the CRC leaders, it
did not appear that decisive action could be accomplished without the open military
involvement of U.S. armed forces. The United States did not believe that open war against Cuba
was advisable at that time. Miró Cardona told Bundy that the CRC needed to be permitted to
carry out covert operations against Cuba or it would need to disband.15 Frustrations only
mounted as the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 did not bring about the
removal of Fidel Castro from power in Cuba.
By late 1962, Miró Cardona and the Cuban Revolutionary Council were in a particularly
difficult position. They were the official point of contact for the United States government, but
they were not allowed to carry out the type of operations that they believed would result in a
victory over Castro’s government. While Kennedy was planning to use Brigade 2506 as a new
focal point for exile activities, Miró Cardona was attempting to ally himself with this group as
well. Those attempts backfired when, on January 3, 1963, the members of the Brigade received
$250 bonus payments for their service. The combatants were not against the bonus payment,
but rather against receiving it publicly from Miró Cardona. A Central Intelligence Agency report
indicated that the members “were enraged by the humiliating publicity and pictures appearing
in the press and on television of them lined up to receive cash from ‘Miro, Benefactor of the
Brigade.’” Brigade members were furious over being used for Miró Cardona’s political gain and
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they held that the publicity was ultimately harmful both for the United States and for the
Brigade because it followed the Castro propaganda line of the Brigade being mercenaries.16
The CRC’s head was unable to recast himself as the exile community’s leader. Miró
Cardona, in fact, became an object of ridicule and scorn among many in the exile community.
As one refugee wrote of him, “we felt Miro Cardona was the instrument of U.S. policy among
exiles.”17 Miró Cardona remained mostly silent about his own discontent with the federal
government, only expressing his displeasure when the United States refused to allow exiles to
conduct raids against Castro’s Cuba.18 This changed on April 18, 1963, when Miró Cardona
resigned from his post at the Cuban Revolutionary Council and ended his silence on matters of
U.S. foreign policy, becoming more and more vocal about what he saw as American failures. By
the end of his life in the early 1970s, Miró Cardona put it quite simply, “one American, Teddy
Roosevelt, helped Cuba’s Independence; another, John F. Kennedy handed her to Russia.”19
In deciding how to respond to Miro’s accusations, one voice in the Kennedy
administration urged the president to use restraint instead of castigating the CRC’s former
leader. Miró Cardona had not told the press everything he knew and antagonizing him might
lead him to present a “hopelessly squalid picture of our covert dealings with the exiles,” advised
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Miró Cardona’s problem was that he saw only Cuba, while the United
States had to consider the whole world, Schlesinger explained to the President. “Miro Cardona
is basically a high-minded and decent man,” wrote the Special Assistant to the President, “who
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has behaved fairly well for two years, who has been sorely tried and under great pressure, and
who is still, I believe genuinely doing what he thinks best for his country.”20 Ultimately, the
State Department responded to Miró Cardona’s statement by calling it “a gross distortion of
recent history.”21
With Miró Cardona gone, the Cuban Revolutionary Council soon disbanded. Cuban exile
politics were completely bereft of a “focal point” through which the United States could deal
with refugee issues. Miró Cardona’s resignation also stoked the anger of many in the Cuban
community towards the United States government for not giving the refugees the full military
and intelligence support to which they believed they were entitled. The Miami Herald’s
editorial board took offense to the fact that the refugees appeared to feel entitled to determine
American foreign policy. “Our foreign policy is our own to control,” declared the Herald, “it is
not subject to changes determined by how loudly a troublesome ally shouts his own contrary
policy.”22 The Herald’s editorial board wanted it to be very clear to the exiles that they were the
tail, not the dog.
The disappearance of the Cuban Revolutionary Council left a vacuum that others sought
to fill. In early 1964, five candidates were presented as a group that would represent exiles in
the United States and abroad and to continue to work for the liberation of Cuba. A referendum
was held and voted on by Cuban exiles in multiple countries. José M. Bosch, Chairman of the
Board of the Bacardi Corporation, had financed all the preparations for the referendum and was
attempting to ensure a positive response of over 25,000 for the referendum, despite a reaction
20
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among Miami’s exiles that was described as “indifferent and skeptical.” The organization
created by this referendum, RECE (Cuban Representation in Exile), did not have a major impact.
While RECE carried out covert operations and attempted to advance the cause of a post-Castro
Cuba, its most notable feature was the participation of a 24 year old member of Brigade 2506
named Jorge Mas Canosa. Mas Canosa would go on to accrue significant political influence and
wealth, but in 1964 he was described by the State Department as “politically ambitious, good
speaker… courageous, impetuous, considered a troublemaker by MDC colleagues some years
ago, but may have matured since then.” 23
By the time RECE entered the scene, there was a new president in the White House and
the federal government was no longer actively seeking a “focal point” for exile activities. In a
1965 memo on whether to RECE, Gordon Chase, assistant to McGeorge Bundy, wrote that he
did not think “that the Cuban exiles have much to offer the U.S. by way of significantly helping
us to solve our Cuban problem.” To start a program of support for RECE would cost the United
States money and time and might “cause us a Pandora’s Box-full of typical exile problems.”24
Chase’s statements are representative of the “buyer’s remorse” experienced by several national
security officials who found that their investment in the Cuban exile community had not paid
off. They had also found that their conception of a docile, easily controllable exile population
that would fall in line with American foreign policy needs was less than accurate.
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By the mid-1960s, the United States was entirely committed to aiding the refugees
despite the negative experiences of members of the executive branch in dealing with the
various Cuban exile organizations. One issue that drew particular attention in Congress was the
issue of status normalization for the Cuban refugees. As parolees, the Cubans remained in a
sort of legal limbo. If a refugee wanted to change status from parolee to permanent resident of
the United States, they were forced to leave the United States and to apply for an immigrant
visa at an American consular office.25 Normalization was intended to allow refugees to apply for
permanent residency without having to leave the borders of the United States. In the midst of
the legislative conflicts surrounding the passing of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,
the Johnson White House had come out in favor of status normalization for the Cubans, but had
not pressed the issue.26
In October of that year, President Lyndon Johnson received a letter from New York
Congressman William F. Ryan. Ryan had introduced legislation aimed at allowing status
adjustment by the Cuban refugees in the United States. Ryan’s discussions with the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare revealed to him that the lack of permanent resident status
was one of the most difficult problems that Cubans faced in the United States and that status
adjustment would lighten the welfare rolls of many of these refugees. “If we are going to admit
them, then we should admit them with as much help as possible,” he explained to the President.
“We must not admit them, then hold them at arm’s length from many of the privileges of living
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in our society.”27 The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 solidified the access of Cubans in the
United States to the very privileges alluded to by Congressman Ryan.
The Cuban Adjustment Act allowed Cubans who had entered the United States after
January 1, 1959 to apply for permanent resident status and set them on a path to citizenship.
Instead of having to wait an additional five years after attaining permanent resident status in
order to apply for citizenship, the Cuban refugees were allowed to count up to thirty months of
the time they had spent in the United States toward satisfying the five year residency
requirement. This cut the wait time between a successful adjustment to permanent residence
and the ability to apply for citizenship, allowing for refugees to become citizens in two and a half
years.28 Permanent residency and a path to citizenship would be crucial for the development of
the Cuban community in Miami. Not only did the community secure the economic gains made
in the 1960s, but the Adjustment Act provided access to new forms of political power that were
not dependent on exile organizations having the patronage of a presidential administration.
This new, more permanent power helped the Cubans further transgress the established social
order. It is no wonder, then, that the legislation was strongly opposed by leaders in South
Florida’s black community, a group that felt it had been negatively affected by the advantages
that were given to the Cuban refugees now living in their area.29
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Avenue, in the predominantly black area known as Liberty City. Several meetings and rallies had
been held in the preceding days in reaction to the Republican National Convention being held in
Miami Beach. Liberty City was the crowded home to some 45,000 African Americans, many of
whom had been forced into the area by urban renewal schemes. The crowd had already begun
to throw stones and pebbles at passing cars when a white man driving an automobile with a
“Wallace for President” bumper sticker approached the intersection. The driver soon found
himself in the middle of a rain of rocks. He panicked and attempted to flee, driving around two
other cars, speeding through a red light, hitting a truck, and ultimately seeing his vehicle stall.
The driver waited for police intervention as his car was pelted with rocks and bottles amidst
cries of “Get Whitey,” but when no authorities arrived he fled his car and was pulled to the
safety of a nearby bar by a group of African American spectators. Teens from the crowd then
proceeded to overturn the man’s vehicle and set it ablaze. This began two days of rioting that
were ultimately ended through the intervention of Miami City Police, the Dade County Public
Safety Department, and members of the Florida National Guard.30
The Liberty City Riot was a minor event when compared to the other urban disturbances
that occurred that same year, but it still warranted investigation by the National Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence. The NCCPV had been established by President Lyndon
Johnson in the aftermath of the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy in
1968 and it investigated several of the major civil disturbances of the late 1960s. The
commission’s investigators concluded that rioters had been driven by many of the same causes
that had set off other riots across the country: chronic unemployment, poor access to public
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services, and bad relations with city police. The task force’s report did note several
characteristics that were unique to the disturbance in Liberty City; the most unique was the
widespread feeling among African Americans that jobs in the city were being kept from them
and being awarded to the Cuban refugee population.31 The issue of refugees and jobs had a
significant effect on racial politics in Miami. Many African Americans blamed whites for their
systematic exclusion from first class citizenship, and they feared Cuban competition for the jobs
they might be allowed to have in the city’s tourism industry. When he lived in the city,
Muhammad Ali was reported to have remarked that in Miami the division between heaven and
hell was the railroad tracks.32 On one side of the tracks were the crowded, impoverished African
American communities, on the other were the playgrounds of affluent whites and tourists.
When interviewed by the commission, long time Miami disk jockey and respected member of
the African American community, Milton “Butterball” Smith, suggested that the Cubans made
this division even starker. “So the argument is that not even is the white man going to let us live
in Heaven, over there,” Smith stated, “they won’t even let us work over there—they give the
jobs to Cubans. They don’t even live in this country… they can’t even vote here…”33
That African Americans would feel excluded of the economic privileges associated with
living in a Sunbelt city was not uncommon in the late 1960s, but the inclusion of the Cubans in
Miami complicates established understandings of race relations and economics in the area.
While the flow of federal funds related to the Cold War and the national security state served to
fundamentally alter the economy of the Sunbelt, it generally did not challenge ingrained power
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structures established along lines of race and class.34 The influx of federal funds aimed at
helping the Cuban refugees, however, served to fundamentally alter power relations in the city
of Miami. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s the Cuban community was able to carve a
space for itself that challenged preconceived notions of power in a southern city. The Cuban
challenge to the racial order, aided by the unprecedented access to welfare state structures of
privilege this group had received, drew anger and confusion both from whites and from African
Americans in Miami. The reactions of both of these groups shaped politics in the city and the
Cuban responses to their fellow Miamians.
Much of the conflict had its roots in how African Americans received the news of the
Cuban refugee influx and of the federal assistance the exiles received. Miami’s African American
press was receptive to the idea of providing shelter for Cuban exiles, but it also welcomed the
idea of resettling as many refugees as possible from Dade County in an effort to ease
unemployment in the area.35 By late 1961, the Miami Times, the city’s African American weekly,
reported on complaints that Cubans were being given preference for jobs. In some cases black
workers were being replaced by refugees. “While we sympathize with the unfortunate Cubans
we feel that charity should begin at home,” the newspaper’s editorial read, “or in other words,
American citizens should at least stand an equal chance of getting employment.”36 The Times
questioned the logic of providing such levels of aid to a foreign group while American citizens
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were suffering from high unemployment numbers and a lack of access to welfare programs that
would aid them in that situation. This narrative arose multiple times in the newspaper’s
editorial page, particularly after each increase in refugee presence. After a new wave of exiles
started to appear in Miami in 1965 the Times once again suggested that while it was “an act of
Christianity to help those in need,” the burden of this act fell on the taxpayers and it was hard
paying taxes without employment.37
From the start, the Times followed the Cuban situation with interest. The newspaper
was particularly concerned with the development of the federal policies regarding the exiles
with whom they now shared a city. At the end of the Cuban Refugee Program’s first year, the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with
Refugees and Escapees held a series of hearings on the problems caused by the influx of the
Cuban refugees. When the Times reported on the hearings, it focused on the testimony and
requests of certain witnesses. Representative Dante Fascell advocated for a system of work
camps for jobless Cuban refugees. Mayor Robert King High called for an emergency meeting of
the U.S. Conference of Mayors aimed at speeding up resettlement. Dade County Commissioner
Arthur Patten proposed a screening program to ensure the refugees were fleeing for political
and not economic reasons. Finally, Bishop Coleman Carroll appealed for an increased structure
of relief payments for resettled refugees.38 In short, the Times was particularly interested in
those witnesses who came before the Subcommittee and advocated for faster removal of
Miami’s Cuban exile population or for measures that would decrease the number of refugees
even allowed to enter the United States. It was telling that this was the focus of the Times’s
coverage, but perhaps doubly so because all four of these men testified on the same day as Dr.
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Miró Cardona. The Cuban Revolutionary Council Chairman had the first time slot on the first day
of the hearings and was received with much interest by the member of the Subcommittee.
Those reading only the Miami Times would have been hard pressed to find a single reference to
Miró Cardona, the CRC, or his testimony in the article.
The Times article also failed to mention the testimony of Miami Herald reporter Juanita
Greene, who directly addressed African American discontent with the federal government’s
policies regarding the refugees. “Resentment in Miami appears highest among our Negro
population,” Greene wrote in a statement submitted to the Subcommittee.39 Greene related to
the Senators the discontent of many of Miami’s African Americans who saw children of Afro
Cuban descent attending public schools from which their own children were barred. She also
told the story of an African American minister who suggested that the only thing that black
parents might do in the face of this compounded inequality would be to teach their children to
speak only Spanish. Greene referred to those leaders in the African American community who
were trying to gain equal opportunities for their community in a southern city, indicating that
many of them were outspoken “about the fact that here, in the name of freedom and
democracy is a group of foreigners that is given not only more assistance but more dignity than
their own American group.”40 Greene reported on the problems of the African American
community and advocated for proper attention to those problems in her testimony, just as she
had the year before when she had informed her city and the country about the destitution of
the Cuban refugees.
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While Greene had the ear of the Senate Subcommittee by virtue of her profession and
her whiteness, Miami’s African Americans were perfectly comfortable advocating for
themselves. There were many voices in the black community who decried this inequity in the
years before the Liberty City riot. Attorney Donald Wheeler Jones, president of the local NAACP,
wrote a letter addressed to several public officials including President Lyndon Johnson,
Congressman Dante Fascell, and Governor Haydon Burns stating that the federal government
had a responsibility toward the economically oppressed of South Florida, as well as toward the
politically oppressed of Cuba. Jones stated that each African American who had lost a job to a
Cuban had “borne his burden in silence as a sacrificial lamb for the extension of freedom and
democracy to refugees from another land.”41 For Jones, as for many other African Americans in
Miami, full access to the welfare state was a zero sum game in which they had been labeled the
losers before they had even taken a turn.
The game was rigged not just in support of white Americans, but now also of the Cuban
exiles. In time, this local grievance was taken up by African American leaders outside of the
Miami area. Missouri Congressman William Clay of St. Louis requested that the Nixon
Administration end the Freedom Flights, which had brought thousands of refugees into the
United States over the previous five years. Clay argued that the true refugees had left Cuba
many years before and those coming to the United States in recent waves were seeking
economic opportunities. Many of those arriving were also among “the aged, the blind, the
invalids and the unemployables.” To spend $300,000,000 over the previous six years in “direct
subsidization of the welfare program of an alien nation” was simply “madness.”42 Clay’s call for
an end to the airlift, however, struck a chord with more than just Miami’s African American
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community. It also drew praise from other locals, including prominent ones who sat on the
editorial board of the Miami Herald. The Herald criticized local politicians and praised
Congressman Clay, who had “assumed leadership from away out yonder in Missouri on a touch
political issue here in Florida. And those keeping hands off might one day find it difficult to
explain to the folks here at home.”43
Despite the growing feeling among several sectors in Miami that the airlift simply
needed to be stopped, its agenda forgotten, many African Americans maintained—indeed,
intensified—their criticism of the program and highlighted it as evidence of Washington’s
subtler but ultimately more scarring discriminatory practices against black citizens. The same
year that Representative Clay asked for an end to the exile airlift, Times writer Ricky Thomas
started an installment of his column, “Out of the Dark,” by stating what many in Miami’s African
American community firmly believed, “being a Cuban ain’t bad.” For a people who some twelve
years before were living under Batista’s dictatorship, the Cubans were “reaping great financial
gains and services in this Democratic Country were we have lived for hundreds and hundreds of
years and have yet to see the Federal Government put this kind of money into our areas.”
Thomas questioned the fairness of providing such largesse to new immigrants while his people,
burdened with centuries of oppression were denied any sort of program to overcome the
circumstances created by that oppression. He suggested that a Cuban could get one hundred
dollars or sometimes more with only one condition set upon him: that of need. “How many
black families do you know,” he asked, “that have the condition called NEED, but still have to go
through rigid restrictions and requirements to get their monthly checks.” Thomas’s column took
on the fundamental differences in access to multiple benefits between African Americans and
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Cubans and recoiled at the imbalance. He asked why the federal government could not create
such a program for African Americans and poor whites. This was particularly frustrating for the
city’s black population because the Cubans had been, under Batista, “as prejudiced, clannish,
and had imbedded in them as much hatred towards the poor as any Mississippi Whites.”44
Many Cubans did not help the attitudes of African Americans towards them with the
statements they made regarding race relations in Cuba and in the United States. In 1969,
journalist and racial progressive John Egerton visited South Florida to draft a report on race
relations in the city after years of Cuban migration, and in the aftermath of the Liberty City Riot.
Over several days, he collected data on the very complex racial landscape of the city of Miami.
He found that Cubans and African Americans were not at each other’s throats, concluding that
the resentment over the loss of jobs was more directed towards white decisions makers, and
that the exiles thought themselves more racially progressive than white Americans.
Egerton also observed that Afro Cubans were well integrated into the larger Cuban
communities in the area. One Cuban he spoke to claimed that “There was no racial
discrimination in Cuba. Class discrimination, yes, but not race.” While Egerton met with
scholars who suggested that racial and class discrimination were intrinsically linked in prerevolutionary Cuba, most of the Cubans he met acknowledged no part in the repression of
African Americans. Sometimes, those he interviewed were keenly aware of the structures that
created racial discrimination, as when one group of Cubans suggested that it was white
Americans who created ghettoes. “They are free to move when and where they choose, but
Negroes are not,” they told him, “Cubans don’t feel any animosity toward Negro Americans, like
the white Americans do.” These Cubans were able to identify racial exclusion, so long as they
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were not associated with it. The same group could then turn around and tell Egerton that the
Civil Rights Movement was a communist ploy. Castro, they said, was pitting African Americans
against whites and Cubans, planning and inspiring black unrest. “We have seen this protest
against authority before,” one Cuban told Egerton, “it is how our trouble started. It should not
be allowed to happen here.”45 This conflation of the increasing radicalism of the Civil Rights
Movement with communism was not rare in Egerton’s interviews, nor was it a recent
phenomenon among Cubans. These types of assertions by refugees from a communist state
had had long been used by American conservatives as confirmations of their fears of the
movement.46
There was an essential disconnection in the way in which Cuban exiles and African
Americans saw one another and the role of the federal government in their lives. The exiles
welcomed the aid they had been given, but they believed that their success in the Miami area
had little to do with these privileges and everything to do with their own actions. African
Americans were able to correctly identify the structures of privilege that had been provided for
the refugees and how they were parallel to those which had been denied their community as
the welfare state began to crumble, but they were not privy to the information that would allow
them to verify what they had long suspected: that their wellbeing had no tactical value for
American foreign policy goals. Still, they saw access to privilege and asked why they themselves,
as citizens, were being denied what was being given to migrants. At the end of his column, Ricky
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Thomas quoted the promise in the preamble to the Constitution to ensure the general welfare
of the American people. He found, in the phrasing of that document, the justification for such
privilege to be made available to poor black and white Americans as well as to the Cubans.
“Being an American, not a refugee,” he wrote, “no greater case can I state.”47
African Americans were not the only ones to claim that Cubans were not, in fact,
American citizens and that they were overly privileged in relation to their status in the United
States. Officials in the same local and state government organizations that had so actively
sought federal aid for the Cubans and which administered the federal funds earmarked for the
exiles also expressed their dissatisfaction. In late 1967, an article in “The Cuban Beat,” a
recurring feature in the Miami Herald’s local section, featured a complaint from Dr. Bernardo
Benes, a Cuban exile director of the Welfare Planning Council of Dade County and a vice
president of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, that Cuban refugees were
treated as “second class citizens” in regards to the services they received from local and state
government agencies in seeking jobs. Upon reading this, Harry L. Tyson, the Metropolitan Area
Manager for the Florida State Employment Service, wrote a letter to the editor of the Herald
seeking to clear up what he saw as a fundamental misconception on Benes’s part. “The Cuban
refugees are not second class citizens,” Tyson stated, “they are in fact, not citizens at all, but
refugees on parole.” Tyson pointed out that the operations of his agency were not paid for by
the taxes collected from working refugees, but rather by an excise tax imposed upon employers
by the federal government. He went on to state that it was the responsibility of his agency to
seek out jobs for citizens first and for refugees second. “There are jobs going begging all over
the country which the refugee could fill if he was willing to relocate,” Tyson suggested before he
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finally asked the Herald editor and his readers how much more of the refugee population Miami
could absorb in the current labor market. 48 While there was significant statistical evidence
suggesting that the refugees were not a consistent drain on Miami’s economy or labor market,
this perception persisted even in the minds of local officials.
Like African Americans and local and state officials, many white Miamians complained
about the Cubans almost from the moment of their arrival in the United States. Most Miamians
were quick to point out that the Cubans were allies in a larger struggle and that their exile was
tragic, but this did not mean that they appreciated the Cuban presence in their city. In July of
1961, for example, Congressman Dante Fascell received a letter from a constituent who was
irate about the effects of the Cuban migration. Mrs. Alyeene S. Brown informed Fascell that she
had known him for twenty years and that she had worked for him during his first election in
Dade County. She was infuriated by the fact that American jobs were being taken by Cubans
who worked for lower wages. She was also angry at how the Cubans had entirely taken over
certain areas, recounting how some native Miamians were forced to leave a local beach by
“dirty Black Cubans” who had hotel staff terrorized and controlled. The influx of Cubans had
also resulted in “social disease” running rampant. This was not the Miami she desired, and she
wondered how long it would be before they destroyed her nation.49
Fascell’s staff did not think much of Brown’s letter. They openly mocked it in the
summary that they presented to the Congressman. A staffer facetiously warned that
Congressman that if he did not personally put on a hood and ride with the Klu Klux Klan, he
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would soon not be able to run for dogcatcher in Dade County. Brown’s racist attitudes were
clearly considered ridiculous the staffer reporting on the letter, who concluded by writing:
“remember, if you’re going to write, it’s much better to be irate: if you want to rate, be irate.”50
The problem for Fascell and his staff was that it was not only overtly racist individuals like Brown
who wrote to voice frustration with Cuban migrants. In August of 1962, the Congressman’s
office received a letter from an attorney named Effie Knowles who informed Fascell that “too
many Cuban refugees” lived next door to the home she had owned for 38 years. Knowles
claimed one of her neighbors had phoned her home early one morning and threatened to break
every bone in her body and that the Cubans called their neighbors “dirty Americans.” Knowles
was outraged because the Cubans got “free money, free food, free clothing out of our tax
money.” “If they can not behave,” she asked, “why should they get our money, our food, our
clothing? Do we vainly imagine they are all anti-Castro?”51 Knowles called into question the
veracity of the refugee claim to political asylum, suggesting, as many others did, that many of
the exiles were in fact coming to the United States for better economic opportunities. If the
Cubans wanted to come to the United States and be entered in the public welfare rolls, could
they not at least behave?
Fascell and his staff forwarded the complaint on to the Cuban Refugee Program and
received a response from Staff Adviser A. A. Micocci. Micocci reminded Fascell that the type of
behavior described by Knowles was “very much out of line with the generally fine behavior of
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the Cuban refugees in Miami and elsewhere.”52 Micocci also reached out to Knowles and
presumably suggested she take her neighbors to court. After this communication, Knowles once
more wrote Fascell, letting him know that she was “rather fed up on the attitude of these
Cubans on big salaries and the bureaucrats on big salaries—that decent, respectable, law
abiding American citizens, LADIES, should stoop to go to Police Court with Cuban prostitutes and
procureers[sic] who have invade our good neighborhoods.” The language Knowles used clearly
reflected that used by other white Americans when faced with racial and class transgressions in
what had been previously homogenous communities. Instead of impugning the refugees for
their race as Brown did in her letter, Knowles differentiated herself from the Cuban “invaders”
not only by her nationality, but by her class and her distance from their perceived criminality.
She went so far as to use a property rights argument against the Cuban presence in her
neighborhood by stating she did not know “why my peace and property values should be
disturbed by the scum of Cuba.” 53
Knowles’s rage against her Cuban neighbors not only stemmed from the conflicts she
was having with them and their racial and class transgression of the social order, but also from
another transgression: she believed that her government was far more interested in the
wellbeing of the Cubans than they were in her own. The government was not on the side of the
white lawyer, but rather on that of the Cuban refugees. “The trouble with the Cuban Refugees,”
Knowles explained to Fascell, “is they know that they are backed in whatever they do.” It was
not only the government that was backing the exiles. She saw “our Churches are all tearing
their shirts giving them MORE.” The social institutions established to defend her racial and class
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interest were failing Knowles. They were, instead, supporting the refugees. The national
security argument provided little comfort for Knowles as she believed officials were being
duped. She sought desperately to open the Congressman’s eyes by asking him if “any of you
realize that Castro is letting out his friends too?” Clearly the Cubans had infiltrated the
government through their work for the Cuban Refugee Program and she told Fascell that the
federal government needed more Americans on its staff in Miami. She concluded by telling him
that she did not want her second letter sent to Micocci and that all Fascell needed to do to see
ill-behaved Cubans was to take a walk on Flagler Street.54
Knowles was not the last white Miamian to criticize the Cuban exiles and their effect on
South Florida. In August of 1970, a woman named Violette McCrary attempted to call Fascell
and complain about the continued Freedom Flights, her plummeting property values, and the
recent increase in her property taxes.55 Another constituent wrote that because of the Cubans,
Miami’s schools were overcrowded and the city was “no longer a place where retired Americans
can migrate to and spend their latter days—nor do folks from the north who sued to come for
the winter for vacation care to come down because the probability of finding a place to stay has
diminished.”56 One woman put it even more bluntly, stating that Miami was “ruined already.”
“Our downtown is a pollution of street-walkers,” wrote Mrs. Samuel J. Constance in a letter
copied to a group of politicians including Dante Fascell and President Richard Nixon, “mostly
brazen 50¢ whores who approach our teenagers male and female.. wallowing in their dopewealth.”57 One man called into question Fascell’s stance on not immediately ceasing the airlift

54

Effie Knowles to Dante Fascell, October 3, 1962.
Phone message discussed in Dante Fascell to Violette McCrary, August 13, 1970, Folder 14, Box 2052,
DBF Papers.
56
Getrude Beidler to Dante Fascell, July 20, 1970, Folder 14, Box 2052, DBF Papers.
57
Mrs. Samuel J. Constance to Dante Fascell, July 25, 1970, Folder 15, Box 2052, DBF Papers.
55

138
from Cuba and promised not to vote for him again. “You are supposed to represent us,” wrote
Fred C. Oakley, “not Cubans.”58 The Cuban issue also created solidarity across race lines, as
when William Purnell wrote Fascell to complain that “we ordinary, low-income, put-upon white
and black American citizens have reached our point of disgust re government assistance
($112,000,000.00 package) going exclusively to the Cubans brought air express to Miami.”
Purnell wondered when it would ever end.59
Other citizens expressed equally negative but more muddled perspectives on the Cuban
presence. George A. Troiani wrote Fascell to inform him that if a vote were taken among
Miamians in July of 1970, they would “be inclined to favor any plan that would discontinue the
Cuban airlift, furthermore they would like to see the Cubans who now reside in this area sent
back to Cuba; or to some other part of the country.” Troiani recounted the claims of exiles
politician Manolo Reyes that the reason for the Cuban exodus was that the island had been
converted into a Soviet military base. By that logic, Troiani asked, why should Miamians who
had been born in the United states “have to put up with these people who do not speak our
language, or do they care to learn, as did the emigrants who came from Europe.” Miami had
been turned into a Cuban camp, falling right in line with Fidel Castro’s plans of eliminating any
opposition and securing his hold on the country. Had the United States not allowed this exodus,
the Cubans would long have resolved their problems. Troiani went on to list the hardships that
the Cubans had caused in the area; from the damage done to Miami’s black community to
housing shortages to higher school taxes. “If they have benefited the area,” he asked,
questioning the suggestion that the Cuban presence was positive, “why are taxes going up?”
Despite this laundry list of complaints, however, Troiani then asked Fascell to consider what
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would happen if matters became favorable for a return to Cuba. An exodus of the Cubans and
they great deal of money they spent in the area would cause a “condition not unlike a disaster
area.” He informed the Congressman that he felt like a stranger in his own country. He decried
their presence, yet he also worried about the disaster that would result from losing the
Cubans.60
Fascell and other members of his congressional delegation, like Senator Claude Pepper,
received multiple letters from constituents railing against the continued stay of the Cuban
refugees in the United States. They were not alone. By 1963 Miami’s journalistic community
had turned a critical eye on the Cubans, a fact made particularly clear by the opening song to a
90 minute show performed by the several journalist to a sold out crowd of 650 at an event
aimed at raising money for journalism scholarships at the University of Miami. Sung to the tune
of “South of the Border,” the full cast began:
South of the border,
By way of Key West,
They sneaked out of Cuba’s isle, the rank and file
To be our guests,
Right here in Miami,
Where everything’s free
And here’s where they’ll stay, bub,
Till eternity.61
The scene then shifted to the Cuban Refugee Center, where the roasters portrayed Cubans
waiting in line to pick up relief checks while they smoked expensive cigars and sported diamond
stickpins. The refugees then took up their own song: “Oh, resettle us not on zee cold prairie/
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Where zee men must work, and zee dough ain’t free…”62 This satire allowed the journalists to
openly portray the Cubans as undeservedly privileged freeloaders, a far cry from the early
articles that portrayed them as brave and tragic in the face of adversity. More drastic, in light of
their part in the 1960 drive to obtain federal aid for the refugees, was when the Miami Herald
published an editorial entitled “Cuban Airlift Simply U.S. Aid To Castro.”63 The Herald had been
critical of exile attempts to control U.S. policy toward Cuba, but voices within the paper were
growing increasingly concerned about the long term effects of the influx on Miami’s economy
and its politics. A decade had decidedly changed the perspective of Miami’s press in regards to
the refugees.
There were also voices in local and state government that were growing increasingly fed
up throughout the 1960 and into the 1970s. Some had already suggested using the Opa Locka
base as a self-sustaining Cuban community, but in March of 1963 former Governor LeRoy Collins
went further and suggested the creation of a new nation of Cuban exiles. Collins, who had been
part of the push for federal involvement in the refugee situation, was one of the most
prominent proponents converting an uninhabited West Indies island into “a new Cuban
homeland.”64 Many were quick to point out flaws with this plan. Officials in the Bahamas
explained that the uninhabited islands were in this condition because they were uninhabitable.65
The refugee community decried this idea as ridiculous, with one exile calling it an exercise in
land development instead of nation building. In a piece written for the Herald, former Prensa
Libre editor Humberto Medrano counselled Collins: “please do not confuse your plans of urban
development with the birth of a nation, because a nation is not born by building on an empty
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lot.”66 While this idea did not make serious headway into policy circles, it remained popular
among those Miamians who were opposed to a continued Cuban presence. One letter sent to
Fascell and Nixon years later simply asked “WHY NOT CLEAN THIS PLACE OUT AND PUT THE
MAJORITY OF THESE PEOPLE ON AN ISLAND OR TWO… AND LET THEM BUILD THEIR ECONOMY,
BUILD THEIR WAR SUPPLIES, as Free China has done?”67
This is not to suggest that the Cuban community in Miami was without allies. While
exile politics lacked unity and clout at the national and foreign policy levels, the growing
economic clout of the Cuban community in Miami ensured the growth of their political clout at
the local level. This made for overt intersections between local politics and the transnational
politics of exile. This was the case when, in September of 1969, the City Commission of Miami
passed Resolution No. 40983. This resolution condemned the treatment of political prisoners in
the “foul, pestilence ridden jails of Communist Cuba,” where these prisoners were incarcerated
“solely because they are patriots who were engaged in a death struggle to keep the world from
being enslaved by Communist Masters.”68 The resolution itself did not mention the exile
community, but it is clear that the growing power of the Cubans was becoming a factor in the
politics of Dade County.
While the Cuban Adjustment Act was only passed in 1966, it did establish a path to
citizenship for the Cuban exiles; a path toward the establishment of a larger Cuban American
community in the United States generally and in South Florida particularly. The terms of the
Adjustment Act did not drive up the number of Cuban voters flocking to the polls immediately.
A Cuban exile needed five years as a permanent resident in the United States before they could
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apply for citizenship, a step many Cubans were reluctant to take.69 This was compounded by the
fact that the Cubans applying for residency needed to fit within the western hemisphere quotas
established by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Cubans were not yet a powerful
voting bloc in South Florida in the late 1960s, but as early as August of 1967, they were
mobilizing at a local level in an attempt to gain the influence with the legislative branch that
they had failed to gain with the executive branch. In that month, Representative Claude Pepper
introduced Concurrent Resolution 492 which aimed to prevent the Cuban government from
pursuing its “hostile and disruptive course of action with impunity.” The resolution called for
the government of the United States to formulate and present a plan of action to the members
of the Organization of American States for the elimination of the Castro regime in Cuba “by
whatever means necessary.” The U.S. government was to undertake this task with the
cooperation of other governments or alone, if necessary.70
The resolution, committing the United States to an active, public plan to eliminate
Castro’s revolutionary government, did not pass, but it did spur the Cuban community in Miami
into action. Congressman Pepper’s friend, exile banker Bernardo Benes, held meetings with
other prominent exiles seeking their endorsement and support of the resolution. He was able
to immediately obtain the cooperation of RECE leader Ernesto Freye Varona and the financial
support from Jose Bosch Lamarque of the Bacardi Company. Together with Luis Botifoll, Benes
and Freye created The Sponsoring Committee in Support of Resolution 492 in September of
1967 after a private meal with Congressman Pepper to which nearly 60 prominent exiles were
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invited.71 This organization mobilized its lobbying capability, inviting members of congress to a
luncheon with Jorge Mas Canosa at the Capitol Hill Club less than ten days after the creation of
the committee.72 The Committee met several times until October 12, 1967 after which time
there were no more meetings. Factional infighting had once again destroyed any semblance of
a united front as U.S. government sources reported that Freye had attempted to dominate the
committee and present it as an effort of RECE, most likely as an attempt to revive the dormant
organization whose name Freye continued to use.73
By the election of 1968, Republicans in South Florida were attempting to use the clout
of the Cuban community to change the electoral equation of the traditionally Democratic Dade
County. A pamphlet entitled “¿Por que los Cubanos-Americanos Respaldan a Mike Thompson
Para el Congreso?” (“Why do Cuban Americans Endorse Mike Thompson for Congress?) was
circulated by the campaign of Dante Fascell’s Republican opponent.74 The pamphlet charged
Fascell with pandering to Cuban voters after having taken as stand against the Cuban exiles
when “certain anti-Cubans in Miami” had charged that Cubans were taking jobs away from
African Americans. Fascell was also portrayed as an enemy to the cause of Cuban liberation
because of statements he made in Congress, where he stated he did not believe an invasion
from the outside would attain the desired objectives. Fascell, based on the previous experience
of the Bay of Pigs invasion concluded that “an invasion might give Castro the opportunity he
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needs to unite the restive and changing Cuban populace, since, no matter how insane Castro’s
policy may be, Cuban nationalism [patriotism] remains ardent.” The pamphlet contrasted
Fascell’s statements with Mike Thompson’s track record, describing him as a “genuine antiCommunist” and claiming the Republican candidate had charged Fidel Castro as a communist in
his writings and speeches as a student leader at the University of Miami in 1959.75
Fascell won the election of 1968 due to a combination of factors: the county’s longstanding Democratic allegiance, the relative weakness of the Cuban voting bloc in the late
1960s, and the fact that Fascell had allies within the Cuban community. Despite Thompson’s
depiction of Fascell as an enemy of Cuban freedom, the Congressman was a valuable ally to
many Cuban organizations. In 1966, for example, the founder of the Truth About Cuba
Committee, Luis V. Manrara, sent Fascell a letter describing the way how the Congressman and
some of his colleagues kept “the torch of freedom for the countries enslaved by the
international socialist/communist conspiracy” as heartwarming. Manrara held Fascell up as an
example of the type of good man that would make a difference as he remained confident that,
“sooner or later, your great country will awaken to the dire peril of socialism/communism and
will destroy this most dangerous enemy of civilization.”76 It is not clear whether Manrara truly
felt that Fascell was so stalwart and steady an ally of the Cuban exile cause or if he was simply
maintaining a relationship with the existing power structure until a stronger ally in the fight
against Castro could be found. It is clear, however, that many among the most fervently antiCastro exiles did not see a direct challenge to Fascell as feasible in the 1960s.
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This did not mean that local politicians like Fascell were disinterested in courting the
Cuban community in Miami. In the months leading up to the 1970 midterm election, Fascell and
his campaign sought to bolster his standing among the Cuban community and his anti-Castro
bona fides. On May 20 of that year, the Congressman made a statement on the floor of the
House of Representatives regarding the 68th anniversary of Cuban independence and attacking
Fidel Castro for making a mockery out of the very concept. “Castro’s brand of ‘independence’
for Cuba,” he declared, “has meant the substitution of one dictatorship for another, and the
perpetuation of a drab and fearful life for 6 million Cubans.”77 Fascell and his staff then
contracted a booth at the Fourth Annual Cuban and American Exposition Fair, held July 15th
through the 19th in an attempt to reach out to this community. Billed as “30 Fairs in One,” the
show was meant to demonstrate the commercial, industrial, and artistic achievements of the
“USA, Free Cuba, and Latin America.”78 Fascell’s staff saw this as an opportunity to distribute
material about the Congressman’s work and he ultimately approved the use of 5,000 copies of
his May 20 speech for distribution at his booth.79
The following year, Fascell was particularly interested in a report written by two political
scientists on “The Projected Impact of Cuban Settlement on Voting Patterns in Metropolitan
Miami, Florida.”80 Paul S. Salter and Robert C. Mings saw Dade County as offering a unique
opportunity to political researchers to “examine a recent large in-migration of people, who, as
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they become naturalized citizens, will accrue the voting power potential to alter existing political
alignments and, perhaps, create a major restructuring of political power in Metropolitan
Miami.” They predicted that the ramifications of such a political shift could have “far-reaching
consequences—affecting not only local and state, but possible national elections.” Salter and
Mings placed estimates of Miami’s Cuban population in 1970 between 184,820 and 278,138,
noting that unofficial testimony from the U.S. Census office in Miami had declared the latter
figure quite conservative. For the purposes of their study, however, the researchers pointed to
estimations that the number of Spanish speaking residents in Miami would reach 482,000 by
1975. This would make 29% of Dade County residents Spanish speaking, and 90% of that group
Cuban.81
Salter and Mings identified three areas of high Cuban concentration in the greater
Miami area: the Center City District, the Hialeah-Miami Springs District, and the Edison District
of Northeast Miami. The researchers reported a strong Democratic leaning in all three districts
based on data from the presidential elections between 1948 and 1964. In the election of 1968
there was a change in these districts, given that it was the first “real, if limited,” opportunity for
Cubans to vote in a presidential election. While the Democrats carried Miami with 48.4% of the
vote, compared to 37% for the Republican Party and 14.6% for George Wallace’s American
Independent Party, these three areas saw the Republicans gain a slight majority over the
Democrats, 40.1% to 39.9%. These localities also showed a stronger turnout for Wallace than
the rest of the city at 20%. Salter and Mings noted that 70% of the Spanish speaking population
in Miami were not citizens and had not applied for naturalization, and attributed this trend both
to the five year residency requirement before naturalization is possible and the “wide spread
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hope among refugees that they are but temporary exiles in Miami awaiting the removal of Fidel
Castro before returning to their homeland.” They cited numerous studies that divided Cubans in
Miami between a temporary “exile type” who fully expected a return to the island and what
they considered to be a more realistic “immigrant type” who had begun to perceive South
Florida as home.82
The research team sought to gage where the Cubans fell within the American political
spectrum by conducting interview surveys with refugees at major street intersections in the
Cuban districts during July of 1970. The survey requested opinions on political party preference
and three societal issues facing the United States. The responses showed a strong preference
for the Republican Party at 73%, compared to only 16% preference for the Democratic Party.
The refugees were also asked to rank three topical issues by order of importance. Respondents
chose “law and order” as the most significant problem of the day by 78%, with only 10%
selecting “civil rights” and 6% choosing “pollution and the environment.” Salter and Mings
believed that classifying Cubans as prospective members of “right wing” politics was an
overstatement; they observed that ample anti-radical statement was prevalent. They also
explained that much of the distaste for the Democratic Party among the exiles came from its
association with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and that the “extremely unpopular
handling of the bay of Pigs Invasion has created seemingly ‘permanent’ hostility’” towards the
Party, comparing it to the distrust toward the Republican Party in the Deep South following
Reconstruction.83
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The authors warned that it was conceivable that the Cuban vote could turn Miami from
a traditional liberal stronghold to a source of conservative electoral strength. While they
conceded that many factors would affect that pace of this transition and that predicting voter
behavior without complete data could be hazardous, Salter and Mings made a prediction about
the electoral patterns in Dade County starting in the mid-1970s. If Fidel Castro’s regime did not
fall by 1976, then the presidential candidate who, in that election, “champions conservative
ideals and proclaims a militant anti-communist international policy should be able to speculate
with some confidence that he will receive a large proportion of the Cuban vote and probably
carry Miami, Florida in his victory column.”84 As the Cuban American community gained political
influence it was possible that they could serve as the lynchpin of any presidential election. The
price would be an embrace of a specific set of foreign policy objectives regarding Cuba.
Mings and Salter’s predictions did not cause Democrats in Miami to simply give up on
Dade County, but in the months before the 1972 presidential election it became clear that the
Republican Party was far more organized in recruiting Cuban Americans. Fascell received a
letter from Bernardo Benes in May of that year pointing out that between 1965 and 1970
Democratic registration in Dade County had dropped by 8,000 while Republican registration had
increased by 20,000. Benes, a registered Democrat, credited the change to the close to 800
Cubans who were becoming American citizens each month and registering as members of the
two major parties. “While the Republican Party has been active in seeking the support of the
Cuban-American in Dade County,” Benes wrote, “the Democratic Party doesn’t show any sign of
being alive.” Benes blasted the “over simplistic” reasoning by Republicans that the Cubans were
in Miami because of Kennedy’s handling of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, but he commended the fact
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that the GOP had recruited a group of Cuban Republicans to raise money for Richard Nixon’s reelection and they had already raised $800,000 toward that goal. Benes encouraged the Fascell
to work with Dade’s Democratic Leadership to develop the leadership of the Cuban Democrats
in the county. He pointed out that he had never heard anyone from the Democratic Party
challenge the Republican assertions regarding the Bay of Pigs, despite the fact that he believed
the Democrats had traditionally been more responsive to the needs of minority groups in Dade
County and that Latin America, including Cuba, was always better treated when the United
States had a Democratic Administration. Benes did not have any simple solutions, but he
encouraged Fascell to contact him or other Cuban American Democrats like Manuel Reboso and
Alfredo Duran.85
Fascell was in complete agreement with Benes. He related to the banker that he also
had urged the County and State Democratic Committees to engage in a campaign of active
registration and outreach to the Cuban American community. “Unfortunately,” Fascell confided
in Benes, “neither the County nor State Committees were able to mount any significant
continuing campaign.” In an effort to ensure that there was some sort of effort going, Fascell
undertook the effort of sending a letter to each person who became a citizen in Dade County
giving them basic information and “at least letting them know that one Democrat was
interested in them and anxious to maintain contact.”86 Other individuals in the Democratic
Party, like Congressman Claude Pepper, had also engaged in this tactic.87 As early as 1968,
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Pepper had expressed awareness and concerns about the “determined effort the Republicans
are making among Cuban-Americans in our area and throughout the country,” and had declared
that the Democratic Party needed to combat this effort.88 As Fascell pointed out to Benes four
years later, no concerted effort had materialized. While Pepper, Fascell, and others had made
overtures independently, “this individual effort is no substitute for a well-organized, highly
visible Democratic Party effort.” The Congressman vowed to work with Benes and other Cuban
American Democrats and to discuss the matter with Pepper, Senator Lawton Chiles, Governor
Reubin Askew, and any other Florida Democrats who would listen.89
Others in the traditionally Democratic Dade County were also reaching out to Fascell
and his fellow Party leaders and calling attention to the vast organizational superiority of Dade’s
Republicans in this area. Areas of traditional Democratic strength were showing the Republican
advance. A Manager of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union in Miami, Mayer
Finkel, contacted Fascell about the issue of voter registration two months after Benes did.
Given the large number of Cuban women working in Miami’s growing garment industry, Finkel
had significant contact with the Cuban American community. He informed Fascell that it had
come to the Union’s attention that when Spanish speakers in the Greater Miami area were
sworn in as citizens of the United States there was a delegation of Spanish speakers from the
Republican Party at the swearing in ceremony to “greet and congratulate these new citizens and
to assist them to register to vote, and indoctrinate them to the views and aims of the
Republican Party.”90 Finkel included a Spanish language leaflet distributed by the Republicans at
naturalization ceremonies encouraging the new citizens to make their opinions heard on issues
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including taxes and busing. The leaflet explained that at the end of the ceremony the new
citizens could register as members of the Republican Party at the tables located at the entrance
of the precinct so as to avoid having to take another trip. “New citizen,” the leaflet read, “the
Republican Party congratulates you, and needs you!”91
While the Republican Party had a superior outreach program toward the Cuban
American community this did not mean that the Cuban community in Miami was putting all its
energy behind just one major political parties. In July 1972, while the Democratic National
Convention was being held in Miami Beach, a group of 700 anti-communist Cubans marched in
opposition of the Castro regime.92 This demonstration was to coincide with an anti-war march
and a march for gay rights, creating what the Herald described as a “potentially explosive mix.”93
Dade County’s citizens and authorities were fearful that a repeat of the violence surrounding the
1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago might result from “a tangle between leftleaning kids and quick-blooded Latins.” Authorities, however worked to avoid such
confrontations by speaking both to Cuban leaders like Benes and former Cuban President Carlos
Prío Socarrás, and with representatives of organizations like the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War and planning ahead to avoid any
confrontation between the different groups of protestors.94 This lack of violence was a source
of pride to the Cuban demonstrators, at least one of whom told reporters: “We showed them.
We showed them the Cubans could do it without creating problems.” The Cuban protestors
were still fervently trying to influence policy, but their participation in peaceful demonstrations
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was a source of civic pride. Others in the community felt differently and declined to participate
because the marches served “no real purpose.”95
The following month over 2,000 Cubans once again congregated in Miami Beach to
march before the Convention Hall in which the Republican National Convention was being held.
The Cuban exile newspaper America Libre reported that there were tense moments in which
violence threatened between the exile demonstrators and the “hundreds of Vietnam veterans
waiting to have a confrontation with the exiles.” The demonstration once again was presided by
Carlos Prío and while intended to influence the policies of the Republican Party, it was also
attended by Cuban American Democrats like Benes and Alfredo Duran.96 America Libre’s editor,
Daniel San Roman, also took pride in the behavior of the Cubans demonstrator in front of this
Convention, contrasting it to the behavior of the “zippies and the yippies, shabby, traitors and
enemies of democracy.” San Roman was proud of the demonstrations before the Democratic
and Republican National Conventions, but he warned his readers that they “did not mean that
Cuba would be liberated, but they are a step on that road.”97 He was glad that Cubans could
influence American elections and, by extension, American policy, but after Nixon’s re-election
that year he warned his readers again expectations running too high. While he was glad Nixon
had defeated the “threat of a pro-Castro [George] McGovern,” he prided himself in his
newspaper’s track record of reporting the truth as they saw it. In that spirit he had to admit that
the staff of America Libre did not believe that Nixon would bring about the liberation of Cuba.
Nixon’s policy of détente had already shown them that while he was the better choice, no great
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change would come about in Cuba because of him.98 This message was a bitter pill to swallow
for the supporters of a candidate that four years before had told a crowd of thousands of exiles
that the objective of the United States needed to be the liberation of Cuba and the return of the
exiles to the island where they could rebuild their broken lives.99

By the early 1970s most exiles were well aware that there was no magic bullet solution
that would bring back the Cuba they had lost over ten years before. No one political victory
would bring about an end to the Revolution. This did not mean that hope was lost among
Miami’s Cubans that there would be an eventual return home in a post-Castro era. While more
and more former refugees were embracing American citizenship in an effort to influence policy
at a local and national scale, others still refused to take this step for fear it was an admission of
defeat. For all the predictions that the anti-Castro organizations of the past were dying out,
they continued to be a presence in Cuban American politics. They were no longer the only
approach to influencing the United States and the situation in Cuba. Instead there were new,
local approaches that made politics of Miami as important to el exilio as those of Washington or
Havana.
The political divisions among the exiles remained and deepened as variables related to
party affiliations in the United States came into play. These divisions would only come to the
surface more fully in the wake of the cessation of the Freedom Flights in April of 1973. The large
scale refugee influx was, essentially, at an end. The years that followed would see many among
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the Cuban community focus their energies on solidifying the gains they had obtained in Miami
since 1959. The new relative calm that set in after the end of the Cuban Airlift would not last, as
different factions within the community began to turn on one another over the issue of
diplomatic rapprochement with Castro’s government and some of the conflicts between the
Cubans and other groups of Miamians intensified. While the 1970s in Miami, as in much of the
rest of the country, lacked the urgent eventfulness of the decade the preceded it and the
decade that followed it, the city’s residents would discover that the calm at the eye of the storm
was relative.
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CHAPTER 4—“AT HOME, BUT HOMESICK”: BILINGUALISM, LOCAL POLITICS, AND THE DIVIDED
POLITICS OF CUBAN MIAMI, 1973-1980
The freedom flights ended on April 6, 1973. Between the start of the Cuban airlift in
1965 and its end, 3,048 flights brought 297,318 refugees to the United States.1 While some
refugees still entered the United States from third countries, the large scale migration from
Cuba ended with the cessation of the freedom flights. With much of the Cuban exile community
already resettled or in an economically stable position, the need for the Cuban Refugee Program
began to wane. Over the next two years the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
sought to phase out the CRP only to meet with significant resistance from Florida’s Governor
Reuben Askew and Florida’s Congressional delegation. In 1975, Howard Palmatier, director of
the program, died unexpectedly. The vacancy of the position led several rival groups of Cuban
Americans to pressure Gerald Ford’s administration to appoint a member of their community as
director. White House staffers supported the idea, but they expected that any candidate named
to the position would invite the ire of one or more groups of political connected Cuban
Americans.2 The Ford administration appointed Dr. Ricardo Nuñez director of the Cuban
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Refugee Program, a candidate who was supported by a section of the Cuban American
community and had the support of the Inter-American Chamber of Commerce of Dade County.3
The concerns of White House staffers proved justified when Nuñez was immediately
attacked by rival Cubans and members of the Cuban press as a detached, possibly corrupt
millionaire who had been absent from any anti-Castro activity during his exile.4 The attacks on
Nuñez led administration officials to question the new CRP director’s fitness. While Nuñez’s
work was not considered lacking, there was “sufficient controversy and criticism about him” to
cause the Social and Rehabilitation Service of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
to conduct a major program review and a federal audit of the Cuban Refugee Program.5 Given
that the mass migrations from Cuba were apparently over, the federal government used this
investigation of the program to justify its eradication. By the end of the decade, the Cuban
Refugee Program ceased to exist.
The controversy over Ricardo Nuñez and his tenure as director of the Cuban Refugee
Program is representative of the Cuban American community’s experience in the years after the
freedom flights ended and before the Mariel boatlift of 1980. Cuban Americans had gained
sufficient economic and political power during their tenure in South Florida and in other
enclaves in the years after the refugee flow began. This power allowed them to directly engage
high ranking federal officials and obtain their support in matters of policy. This also applied to
the appointment of officials, including the selection of a Cuban American as head of the CRP.
Much as they had been in the decade and a half after the revolution, however, the Cuban
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community remained divided. Lines were drawn along differences in political leanings, class,
age, and the embrace of the United States and American citizenship. These divisions would
severely hinder the community’s ability to project the power and prestige it had gained locally
into the national and international scenes with any lasting impact during the 1970s.
Even as the Cuban American community engaged in internal disputes that sometimes
resulted in violence and death, it also faced new challenges and opportunities from outside
forces during this time period. Cuban Americans were more prosperous and influential in Miami
than ever before during the 1970s, but this wealth and influence brought with it a backlash and
new battles over bilingualism, education, and the growing discomfort of the city’s traditional
elites and institutions with the community’s gains. Cuban Miami’s gains also brought about the
possibility of new relations with Cuba and with Fidel Castro’s government. This would not come
to pass. The divisions within the community would prevent any long-term understanding
between the exiles and their home nation. As the 1970s came to a close, the Cuban community
found itself on seemingly solid ground in Miami. Its inability to consolidate the myriad opinions
of its members into a cohesive, united front would belie its ability to maintain a lasting influence
over transnational trends and events. This inability, in turn, would shape the events of the
decade the followed.

By the early 1970s, after more than a decade of the Cuban exile in Miami, many in the
city were taking stock of the changes that had been brought about by the exodus, what further
changes it would bring, and what the status of the Cubans was in Dade County. A 1971 article
by Juanita Greene predicted that by 1975 Cubans would constitute one quarter of the residents
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in Dade County. Estimates of the Cuban population in the County that year ranged between
225,000 and 261,000, depending on if one went by census numbers or market research studies.
Cubans represented between 17 and 22 percent of Dade County’s population of 1,268,000
people, already surpassing the 15% of the population made up by African Americans. Within
Miami’s city limits the concentrations of these two groups were more pronounced. The Cuban
cluster around the Little Havana area accounted for about 80% of the population in the city’s
Southwest area. Of Miami’s 335,000 residents about 120,000 were Latino/as and the
overwhelming majority of this group was Cuban, constituting 36.3% of the city’s population.
The African American population constituted 23.7% of the population within the city. Greene
noted that together these populations made up 59% of the city population, but that the
possibility of a coalition between both groups to control the city was remote because there was
not much communication between the two groups. Another roadblock to this possible
collaboration was the fact that few of these Cubans had yet become American citizens.
Between 1959 and June of 1970, 50,505 Cubans in the United States had become citizens. This
number was set to increase rapidly, however, given that more than a third of that group had
become citizens between 1969 and 1971.6
The following year, reporter Roberto Fabricio wrote a piece outlining the results of a
survey that had been conducted among Miami’s Cuban population by the Herald. The Cubans,
the headline read, were “at Home, But Homesick” in Dade County. The survey of 600 Cubanborn residents showed that 79% of respondents indicated that they would like to return and live
permanently in Cuba, but only 59% believed that the political climate would change enough to
enable them to do so. Castro would have to be overthrown and socialism removed before they
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would even consider returning, stated 94% of the exiles.7 The division between those who
would return and those who would stay often had to do with age and with how long they had
been in the United States. Younger exiles who had received less education were happier in exile
than older, better educated exiles. This was not an absolute division. Dr. Antonio Garrastazu, a
70 year old exile, declared himself too old to return to Cuba to live, but he still hoped that his
“old bones” would “rest with the soil that saw me come into this world above me.”8 Those old
enough to remember a pre-Castro Cuba but young enough to feel like they could remake their
lives on the island still held out hope. “Faith is the last thing I will ever lose,” said one
respondent.9
The Herald’s survey found that the step of becoming a U.S. citizen had not been taken
by a vast majority of Cubans in Dade County, but that political participation was high among
those who had. One quarter of the Cubans in Dade had become American citizens by 1972 and
within this group 89% were registered to vote, compared to 71% of the general population.
Among Cuban registered voters 53% were registered Republicans and 40% were Democrats,
with 7% remaining independents. Despite the fact that this was a much more even split than
the internal conversations among Dade County Democrats, the survey indicated that 84% of
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respondents were still planning to vote for Richard Nixon. One respondent indicated he would
be voting reluctantly for McGovern, whom he held as an extremist, out of loyalty to the
Democratic Party. The man refused to be identified in the article “because it is a touchy thing in
the community.”10
Another touchy subject in the community was the division between those who wanted
to see the United States re-establish diplomatic relations with the Cuban government and those
who vehemently opposed any sort of dialogue. Despite the significant opposition to the Castro
regime both in the past and in the survey, 20% of respondents said they would like to see an
American embassy reopen in Havana. Among this group, respondents were evenly divided
between those who felt re-establishing relations would harm instead of validate the Castro’s
government and those who believed it should be done for humanitarian reasons. Whereas the
latter group believed normalization would help get needed food and medicine to friends and
loved ones still in Cuba, the former believed an American presence would allow for easier
surveillance of the regime. One Cuban high school student believed that if the United States
had an embassy in Havana “we could sneak in and know what is going on and Castro could not
lie outright because there would be tourists and others with information for the people.”
Despite the desire of this section of the Cuban population, a full 75% of respondents were
against the re-opening of an American embassy in Havana.11
The survey also supported the belief that resettled Cubans were returning to Miami
after spending some time in other areas. While 70% of respondents indicated that they had
been in the United States six years or longer, only 60% of them had been in Miami for that full
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period.12 A note written by sociologist Juan Clark appeared the following year in Ideal magazine,
which established the percentage of the Cuban population that had returned from resettlement
as 27.4%. Entitled “¿Donde Viven los Cubanos? (“Where do the Cubans live?”), Clark’s article
utilized data from the 1970 census which showed that close to 91% of the Cuban population of
the greater Miami area lived in three discrete areas: Little Havana, the area surrounding Little
Havana, and Hialeah. The greatest concentration was within the city limits of Miami, specifically
in Little Havana and this area accounted for 56% of the Cuban population. The areas
surrounding Little Havana were the home to close to one fifth of the Cuban population in the
greater Miami area, while Hialeah was home to 12% of the Cuban population. Of those Cubans
who had returned to Miami from resettlement, the greatest concentration could be found in the
area around Little Havana, where returnees constituted almost one third of the area’s Cuban
residents, compared to 26% in Hialeah and 25% in Little Havana.13
Clark’s data also suggested that an outward migration from Little Havana was a product
of increased stays by Cubans in the United States. Over 80% of the Cubans in the peripheral
area arrived in the United States prior to 1965, comparted to 70% in Hialeah and 63% of those in
Little Havana. The greatest concentration of post-1965 Cubans lived in Little Havana. Economic
pull factors likely played a part in drawing Cubans away from Little Havana. In the case of the
returnees, 22.7% of those living in Little Havana’s periphery reported that the creation of a
business or some other economic opportunity had drawn them to that area. There was also a
level of correlation between the spatial placement of the Cubans and their immigration and
naturalization statuses. Those Cubans in Little Havana’s periphery had the greatest proportion
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of citizens at 48% In Hialeah 54.5% of Cubans were residents, but only 23.4% had become
citizens, and in Little Havana almost half the Cubans were residents while only 26% had become
citizens.14 Without more data it is difficult to draw certain conclusions from the snapshot that
Clark presented of the spatial placement of the Cuban community in Dade County as the 1970s
began and the large scale migration from Cuba was ending. The available data does suggest that
as refugees transitioned into residency and citizenship and into greater affluence, many moved
away from the immediate vicinity of Little Havana’s ethnic enclave without straying too far from
the rest of their community.
By the mid-1970s, economic conditions for Miami’s Cuban population continued to
improve despite the shifting economic climate in the nation. A 1974 study by the Strategy
Research Corporation found that Dade County’s Latinos/as had nearly doubled their annual
income in four years and had become a “dynamic force in promoting the (county’s) economic
health.” The total annual income of this population had increased from $612,700,000 in 1970 to
$1,100,000,000 in 1974. The median income for Latino/a families had also increased from
$7,200 to $9,912 a year, and the unemployment rate for male household heads was 1.1%
compared to the 4.9% county-wide unemployment. While the study was not specific to Miami’s
Cubans, the city’s Latino/a population remained largely Cuban. The report also noted a
population increase almost 50%, going from 299,217 in 1970 to 448,200 in 1974. The Freedom
Flights had stopped in 1973 and the Strategic Research Corporation attributed a major part of
the population increase to the return to Miami of families that had been previously resettled to
other areas of the country.15
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Even as the economic fortunes of the general Cuban population and the other groups
from Latin America that called Miami home were improving, the community’s economic elite
were also growing more formidable. The 1970s were a particularly pivotal moment for
powerbrokers like former RECE member Jorge Mas Canosa. Mas Canosa was a veteran of
Brigade 2506, though he was part of one of the troop detachments that were not able to deploy
in Playa Giron. Upon his return to the United States he accepted the offer extended by the
Kennedy administration through the Cuban Revolutionary Council for brigade members to be
trained in and serve as part of the U.S. armed forces. He received his training in Fort Benning,
Georgia and earned the rank of Second Lieutenant in the United States Army. Sensing that the
United States was not fully committed to the Cuban cause, Mas Canosa left the armed services
and returned to Miami, where he was working as a milkman at the time of his appointment to
RECE’s slate of representatives.16
As a RECE representative, Mas Canosa had received a salary and worked to lobby
American lawmakers to advance the Cuban exile cause. He also showed a talent for fundraising.
Mas Canosa worked with paramilitary groups and was tasked with providing funds with which
paramilitary organizations like Comandos “L” could run commando style raids into Cuba,
maintaining a campaign of harassment against Castro’s regime. Mas Canosa left RECE in 1968
and returned to Miami to pursue new business ventures. That same year, a company called
Church and Tower, originally founded in Cuba by the Torres and Iglesias families, incorporated in
Miami. The company was to provide construction and maintenance services of telephone
infrastructure in the United States and the Caribbean. The division of resources and
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management staff between South Florida and the company’s other center of operations in
Puerto Rico led to severe financial losses for the Miami operation. In 1969, Mas Canosa was
offered half the shares of Church and Tower’s American operations if he could perform a course
correction for the company. Mas Canosa agreed and was sufficiently successful that by 1971 he
bought out the remaining shares from the original owners, becoming the sole owner of what
would become, in time, a multi-billion dollar technology and telecommunications company.17
Mas Canosa’s rapid rise in economic circles was not, by any means, typical of the Cuban
exile experience, but it was not unique. Other members of the community had become just as
ingrained in South Florida’s financial and business communities. This inclusion was such that by
mid-1973 a new exile periodical, a magazine called Bancos y Economia (Banks and Economics)
was created. While the magazine described itself as “The Interamerican Economics Magazine,”
editor Luis Fernandez Walpole chose stories that positively portrayed the economic contribution
of the Cuban exile community to South Florida. The first issue of the publication, dated June,
1973, contained articles that drew attention to particularly successful Cubans. The articles had
titles such as “Banks Run by Cubans Make Way in Dade County,” “Manuel Balado: An Exemplary
Cuban,” and the magazine was supported by advertising from multiple Cuban owned businesses
including radio station WFAB, “La Fabulosa.”18
The staff of Bancos y Economia sought to serve the larger Spanish speaking community
of South Florida and showed clear ambitions of finding an audience among Latin American
investors, but it always maintained a heavy interest in Cuban American affairs. The publication’s
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editors might run a cover story endorsing the candidacy of Puerto Rican businessman Maurice
Ferré, who would become Miami’s first Hispanic mayor and the first U.S. mayor born in Puerto
Rico. This would be immediately followed by a story entitled “Cuban Bankers in Miami’s Wall
Street.”19 It might also be followed by a full page pictorial of Carlos Arboleya, Jorge L. Martinez,
Orlando Baro, Carlos Garcia Velez, Daniel Loris, and Rafael Quintana with no other information
save for their professional affiliations and the title “Six Cuban Bank Presidents.”20 The focus on
Cubans who had reached high levels of success in Miami’s banking industry seems selfcongratulatory. The profiles of these figures and even the pictures of the Cuban bank
presidents, however, also served a purpose for aspiring small businessmen. While the vast
majority of exiles had had time to establish a work and credit history in the United States, the
practice of character loans, so crucial in the 1960s, had left an impression on the Cuban
community. While never stated outright in the pages of Bancos y Economia, these profiles could
serve as signposts to exiles reading the publication of which banks to patronize and which banks
might be more sympathetic in providing a loan. The focus on the top earning Cubans in South
Florida’s finance sector could be useful to exiles as individuals and small business owners in the
area.21
The economic contributions of the Cuban exile community, along with the need for the
Cubans and other Hispanics to navigate government services would become significant factors
in one of the most divisive issues of the 1970s in South Florida: bilingualism. Bancos y
Economia’s editor, Luis Fernandez Walpole, wrote a short note in 1973 entitled “Español, Idioma
Necesario” (Spanish, a Necessary Language). Fernandez Walpole argued that the constant
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growth of Dade County’s Hispanic population necessitated the presence of bilingual staff in
government agencies and in public services. He lamented the fact that in post offices, in the
Federal Building, and at the officers of Florida Power and Light, Hispanics were often met with
the phrase “I don’t speak Spanish.” “It is necessary in a city like Miami, as well as in Miami
Beach,” Fernandez Walpole wrote, “which are gateways for the communication with Latin
America that people who are in transit be waited on in Spanish.”22 Fernandez Walpole’s
justification for a bilingual system did not fit well with those services he mentioned. While some
of these services might be used by tourists or businessmen making temporary stops in Miami,
most of them were more closely associated with families and individuals living and working in
South Florida. Fernandez Walpole was using the economic argument based on Miami’s position
in relation to Latin America to give him and his magazine a measure of protection as he entered
a debate that was already raging in Dade County.
The previous year, a group of Cuban residents began a movement to have Dade County
officially declared bilingual. Supporters of the movement contended that such a move would be
beneficial for the county and that it would solve most of the serious problems faced by over
100,000 Dade County residents who spoke only Spanish. Cuban banker Bernardo Benes, one of
the movement’s organizers, charged that local government had failed the needs of this group
where others had succeeded. “On the one hand,” he told reporters, “you have private
enterprise accommodating the Spanish-speaking because there is a profit in it and then you see
tax-supported services are not available to the Spanish-speaking because government has not
made the transition to bilingualism.” Another member, lawyer Luis Botifol, used a similar
argument to that put forth by Fernandez Walpole. He stated that the possible legalization of
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two languages was meant as a positive addition and not an imposition on any other group. “I
think that rather than to say that Dade County would be pressured into coping with the bilingual
problem,” Botifol stated, “I would like to see our enlightened leaders face up to the many
advantages that passing a bilingualism resolution would bring about.”23
There was opposition to the resolution from the moment it was proposed, but others
saw it as absolutely necessary. Herald reporters tested the assertions made by the members of
CUBANOS by calling 83 taxpayer-supported agencies and asking in Spanish “Do you speak
Spanish, please?” He found that 13 of those agencies had bilingual personnel who could be of
assistance, 17 spoke Spanish but were “of no real help,” 28 spoke English but tried to help as
best as they could, and 25 who answered were curt and hung up. When Gomez called Hialeah
City Hall he found no Spanish speaking operators despite the high number of Cuban families in
the area. He had the following conversation with the operator who answered his call:
Operator: City Hall, May I help you, please?
Gomez: Si señora, usted habla Español, por favor?
Operator: (Indignant) Speak English.
Gomez: Me no speak English.
Operator: Well don’t call here if you can’t… (Operator hangs up on Gomez.)
While the Hialeah operator might have been particularly rude, the most problematic exchange
occurred when Gomez called the South Miami Fire Department and was told “I’m sorry, you
don’t understand me and I don’t understand you. There’s nothing I can do for you.” Gomez
contrasted these interactions with the steps taken by for-profit entities, mentioning the Spanish
language information hotline set up by Eastern Airlines and the bilingual crew of sales associates
at Southern Bell’s business office. When he questioned a Southern Bell spokesman about the
establishment of this team, the company’s spokesman stated that the Spanish speaking families
23
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in Dade County were in need of good service and he declared the practice to simply be “good
business.”24
The establishment of this good business practice required some prodding. Just the
previous year, Benes had contacted Southern Bell’s Florida management to address a company
policy which prohibited their staff to speak in Spanish.25 Benes and other Cubans addressed the
shortfalls of Southern Bell’s practices often, in an attempt to pressure the company into the
changes it would eventually make. This was the case when Pedro G. Mendive, Dean of the
Havana Bar Association (in Exile), spoke before the forum of the Community Relations Board of
Metropolitan Dade County. Mendive mentioned a series of advertisements run by Southern Bell
that emphasized how in an emergency Southern Bell’s telephone services would always help
customers get to the right people. This, Mendive stated, was not true. For non-bilingual Latin
Americans, both residents and tourists, Southern Bell would be of no help in an emergency.
Unlike other companies, such as the airlines operating in Miami, Southern Bell had no
competition and felt no need to reach out to the Spanish speaking population. Mendive
marveled at the fact that bilingual operators were available in Canada, Mexico, and before the
revolution in “old Havana. But never in the ‘gateway’ of the Americas. NEVER IN MIAMI!”26
Members of the Cuban community continued to pressure not only Southern Bell, but other
companies and entities in South Florida in an attempt to increase the availability of bilingual
services. By January of 1973, some in Miami’s Spanish language press were decrying any
restriction on the use of Spanish as a violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S.
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constitution.27 This emphasis on bilingualism illustrated not only the powerful drive toward
local activism of many of Miami’s Cubans, but it also illustrated their growing economic and
political clout. The solution they sought from local government would be recognition of that
clout.
On April 16, 1973, the Dade County Board of County Commissioners passed Resolution
502-73 declaring Dade County a Bilingual and Bicultural County. County Commissioner Harry
Cain called on Bernardo Benes to present the resolution after having worked with the
commission for almost a year in its creation.28 Benes addressed the commissioners and clearly
stated that voting for the resolution did not support any sort of progressive agenda, but rather
reflected Miami’s reality: “You are going to make official what is already a fact of life, that Dade
County is already a bicultural county.”29 The resolution declared Dade County “legally, morally
and historically obligated to aid our Spanish-speaking population in achieving the goals they
have traveled so very far to share,” specifically citing the difficulties the county’s Spanish
speaking population had in communicating with government agencies and their staff. While the
resolution stated that many among this population had retained the language and culture of
their native lands, the drafted language made it clear that this was not just a humanitarian
gesture, but recognition of something owed to the city’s Hispanic community. The resolution
read, “Our Spanish-speaking population has earned, through its ever increasing share of the tax
burden, and active participation in community affairs, the right to be serviced and heard at all
levels of government.” The Board of County Commissioners, which did not include a single
Latino/a, then voted unanimously, with one absence, to declare Dade County a bilingual and
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bicultural County where Spanish was to be considered the second official language and to create
a department named the “Division of Bilingual and Bicultural Affairs” under the office of the
County Manager to implement the resolution.30
The vote for the resolution was attended by a significant crowd of Spanish speaking
residents who celebrated the passage of the resolution, rising to a standing ovation when
Commissioner Harvey Ruvin answered “si” to the roll call vote instead of “yes.” While attendees
were excited about the outcome of the vote, officials were not certain what the ramifications
would be of the legislation they had just enacted. When asked what the resolution meant, its
sponsor, Mayor Jack Orr, confessed he really did not know. “But we’ll almost certainly have all
(street and office) signs printed in both English and Spanish,” Orr continued, “and have bilingual
people in all the government offices.” Many suspected that the resolution would be largely
symbolic, but it was a positive step for those who had campaigned for it.31 County officials
embraced the vote in good faith and took steps to carry out the resolution. By late May, a task
force of county employees had been created to plan and monitor the implementation of the
resolution. This task force consisted of five employees of Latin American background
representing some of the major groups in Dade County: three Cuban Americans, one Puerto
Rican, and one Mexican American.32
Not all Dade residents welcomed the passage of the resolution. The Herald’s editorial
board, for example, came out against the resolution two days after it passed. The
commissioners could still be made to understand the potential problems of the resolution,
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which the Herald saw as myriad. Embracing Mayor Orr’s uncertainty as a starting point, the
Herald speculated that the consequences could “prove costly in taxpayers’ money and in
community cohesiveness.” The editorial board acknowledged that both English and Spanish
were spoken in Greater Miami, and suggested that the residents who spoke each language had
been “getting alone well for years.” Whether the author of the editorial had forgotten the
Herald’s own reporting from the previous year or simply meant to gloss over it is unclear. What
was clear was that the newspaper objected to the issue of bilingualism being addressed through
legislation. “Why belabor the obvious,” the editorial asked, “by translating the de facto
situation into a de jure complication?”33 Benes responded to the Herald by affirming his believe
that the most important outcome of the resolution would be to “change the attitude of some
people in Dade County who are supposed to be servicing the total community and unfortunately
are not, thus causing serious harm to the Spanish-speaking population who need service.”34
While the bilingual ordinance appeared to be a definitive, if ill-defined victory for
Miami’s Spanish speaking population, the issue of Anglo-Cuban polarization became one of the
major political concerns of the 1970s in Miami and only intensified after the passage of the
resolution. Benes’s disagreement with the Herald was not the start of the division, indeed it
was not the first time that the banker and his allies had taken exception to the representations
of Cubans in Miami’s press. At a session at the second annual Cuban Medical Convention, held
at Miami’s Sheraton Four Ambassadors in July of 1970, the issue of media reporting on the
Cuban community was discussed on a panel featuring both Benes and Monsignor Bryan Walsh.
Benes took exception to the implication that the federal government was spending “fabulous
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amounts of money” on Cuban refugees. Benes did not offer any figures, but stated that based
on available data 40% of refugees did not cost taxpayers anything and only 50,000 of the total
refugee population were receiving any kind of financial aid.35
More problematic for both Benes and Walsh, however, were allegations by the press in
the weeks previous to the convention of the existence of a “so-called Cuban Mafia.” Benes
pointed out that the number of Cubans who participated in criminal activities was tiny when
compared to the sum total of refugees who had entered the United States after the
revolution.36 Walsh made mention of a recent article stating that 50% of all drugs in Miami
were being consumed by Cuban youths. The Monsignor sought to correct this notion by stating
that, to his knowledge, the use of drugs by Cuban youth was less than that by American youth.37
After the passage of the bilingual ordinance, Cubans and other Latinos reported that
anti-Cuban sentiment had reached an all-time high. When questioned by reporters, these
members of Miami’s Hispanic community did not mention any connection between the Cuban
community and crime in Dade County. Instead they listed the reasons for this animosity as “the
increased militancy Cubans are assuming in local matters especially when faced with
discrimination; a greater awareness that their presence is no longer temporary; envy or
resentment over their economic success and fear of being displaced by bilingual people.” There
35
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was also a belief that Dade County’s Liberals and Democratic political power structure were also
threatened by a population they saw as more conservative and more likely to register
Republican. When reached for comment by a reporter, Benes cautioned that polarization was
so bad that it might reach a point of open confrontation. Even as he made this dire prediction,
Benes highlighted the positive steps taken by County Manager Ray Good and Metro government
in general, noting that the percentage of Latino/as hired by the county had almost doubled in
two years from six to ten percent.38
Not all Cuban Americans were as conciliatory as Benes was, particularly when it came to
the Metro’s government and school systems. Seeing a need for activism on behalf of Miami’s
Spanish speaking community, several community activists created SALAD, the Spanish American
League Against Discrimination, in 1973. The intent of the organization was to stop what were
perceived as slanderous attacks against Miami’s Hispanic community as well as to ensure
greater participation in local politics and society. By 1975, SALAD was formally accusing the two
largest employers in the area, the public school system and Metro’s government, of unfair hiring
practices. The slow increase in hiring by these two entities, when compared to the significant
growth of Miami’s Spanish speaking minorities, led SALAD chairman Javier Bray to the
“inescapable conclusion” that the public sector was “systematically excluding and discriminating
against Latins.” SALAD members pointed to the Dade County school system’s own figures,
which showed that while 27% of the county’s students were of Hispanic origin, only 12% of
school administration staff and only 7% of teachers were Latino/as.39
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SALAD’s more confrontational style would continue to flourish as divisions became more
entrenched. Future SALAD president Osvaldo Soto entered the organization in 1977 and
focused on issues of Hispanic participation in community policing matters in the Miami Police
Department and Metro Law Enforcement. Soto recalled finding that there was one single
Hispanic police officer in Dade County. Soto approached Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre regarding
the lack of representation of Spanish speaking communities in the Miami Police Department.
Ferre and the city’s first African American City Manager, Howard Gary, then instructed Miami’s
chief of police to hire several Latino officers only to have the chief quit rather than comply. Soto
was proud of the increased Hispanic presence in MPD from that point on, but individually and as
a part of SALAD he continued to push for greater inclusion in the greater Miami area. Prominent
Latino/as came into conflict with the political structure of the city of Miami Beach because their
groups were unrepresented in the city’s governmental management structure. Soto and a
friend split the cost to have an airplane with a flying billboard to circle over Miami Beach with a
sign that read “Miami Beach = Hispanic Discrimination.”40
SALAD also came into conflict with Hialeah’s Mayor, Dale Bennett, when he made
comments to a Miami Herald reporter painting the Cubans in his city in a poor light. Bennett
claimed to know of hundreds of cases of senior citizens who were forced to move out of their
homes because of the Cuban influx. He then charged the Cuban community with wanting to
take over South Florida and accused those refugees who had not yet become American citizens
with delaying so they could retain their refugee benefits. Bennett also pointed toward the issue
of bilingualism as a flashpoint when he suggested that “the Anglos carry a grudge against the
Cuban businesses” because those businesses used Spanish language signs to advertise their
40
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establishments. Within days four hundred angry Latino/as were meeting to demand Bennett’s
resignation or apology, a demand supported by organizations like the Hialeah People’s
Association and SALAD.41
Miami’s American born residents had their own grievances against the city’s Hispanic
community, generally, and towards the Cubans, who still represented close to 90% of the
population specifically. One of the most significant grievances regarded the hiring of Spanish
speaking people in private industries related to Miami’s tourist industry. Calls of reverse
discrimination resulted from the increased need for Spanish speakers in department stores,
restaurants, hotels, and airlines.42 As Richard McEwen, the chairman and chief executive officer
of the Burdines department store chain indicated in a letter in support of bilingual education,
these types of industries required Spanish speaking staff because of the current economic
patterns in Miami. “Our Dadeland, Downtown Miami, Miami Beach, and 163rd Street stores do
an extensive business with Spanish speaking people not residing in the United States,” McEwen
wrote, “on some days perhaps fifty per cent of our Downtown store’s business is the result of
tourists’ purchasing in very large quantities.” He remarked that Costa Rica Airlines used to have
three flights a day carrying shoppers to Mexico City, but since the Cuban influx those flights now
went to Miami, where affluent tourists could shop in their own language.43 McEwen did not
offer exact figures in his letter, but in 1978 alone Miami saw 500,000 Latin American visitors
who spent, on the average, over $1,000 each in the city. “Cuban entrepreneurs and bilingual
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salesclerks,” read one report, “have helped shape the city into a full-blown Latin American
shopping mecca.”44
Despite the increasing importance of trade and tourism from Latin America to Miami’s
economy and the calls from business leaders for more bilingual staff, the issue of bilingual
education was controversial in the 1970s. When discussing the friction between the Spanish
speaking communities and the English speaking communities in Miami, one of the most cited
wedge issues was bilingualism in Dade County public schools. Opponents complained about
being forced to subsidize a program primarily for Cuban children through their taxes, insisting
the money could be better spent. Miami’s Coral Way Elementary was the site of the first
federally funded bilingual program in the postwar era when a bilingual immersion program was
created there in 1962.45 By 1975, of over 100 public schools in Dade County only four were
totally bilingual; students spent took half their classes in Spanish and half in English. Eight
others were nearly bilingual and the remaining schools had some bilingual program. Most had
classes including English for Spanish-speaking students, Spanish as a foreign language, and
Spanish for Spanish-speaking students. In late 1974, a member of the Dade County school
board named Linton Tyler put forth a motion that would have stopped any further expansion of
the bilingual program and instead would have intensified the English instruction of Spanishspeaking students. Tyler’s motion was voted down, much to the jubilation of the Cubans
attending the session, but the controversy over this particular policy did not cease after this
vote.46
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Tyler continued to argue that the bilingual education program was both expensive and
inefficient and that any expansion would simply compound the program’s failure. In response
to these assertions, Miami City Commissioner Manolo Reboso wrote Tyler and suggested that
there was a greater enthusiasm for the program than its critics suggested. Given that
enrollment in Spanish classes in the first through sixth grades was entirely voluntary, an
enrollment of 32,000 American children spoke “of enthusiasm and a great deal of interest on
the part of American parents who wish to improve the cultural and educational skills of their
children.” Reboso also pointed to statistics that showed how the longer English speaking
students had participated in the Spanish language courses, the higher their test scores in English
language reading tests were. Conversely, Spanish language students who participated in the
Spanish S class, the Spanish class for Spanish speakers, also had higher scores in English reading
skills tests. Reboso stated that he understood how such an expensive program could be hard to
justify in other Florida counties with fewer Spanish speaking students, but Dade County had
516,000 Spanish speakers and the city of Miami had a 54% Latin population. This demographic
reality made the program essential not only for the County’s Hispanic population but for its
English speaking population as well. If the program continued and improved, then American
children would be “adequately prepared through the school system to compete on an equal
basis with bilingual Latins in the job market and cultural differences will not be the source of
friction, misunderstanding and hostility.”47 Miami’s economy had changed so fundamentally
that it now seemed as if a lack of Spanish language skills was a greater hindrance than a lack of
knowledge of English.
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At the same time Reboso was sending a letter to Tyler in 1977, representatives of a
group of Anglo and Latino businessmen that included the presidents of Jordan Marsh, Burdines,
Southern Bell, and the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce of Greater Miami came before the
Dade County School Board and declared that knowing Spanish was an economic necessity in
Dade County. The group had been meeting since the previous year and had written a letter to
the School Board urging them to fully embrace bilingual education. At the time of the meeting
this group castigated the members of the board for not having made a greater commitment to
the program. Bernardo Benes, a member of the group, took it upon himself to do away with the
harmful myths surrounding bilingual education. The primary myth that needed to be eliminated
was that bilingual education was somehow unpatriotic. “It is less patriotic to have a black or
white child whose first language is English find himself without a job because the spot went to a
Hispanic child who speaks both languages,” Benes told the School Board.48
The advocates for bilingual education were ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the
School Board to make Spanish instruction mandatory for all students.49 This outcome was
problematic for many among Dade’s Cuban Americans, who saw it as a slight against their
community. Others were less troubled by that development. The Herald’s editorial board had
supported Tyler’s proposal from the outset, deeming it “A Sane Approach to Bi-Lingualism.”50
This opinion did not help the widening rift between the city’s largest newspaper and Dade’s
Cubans. The Herald fully recognized the reality of the changes to Miami’s demographics and the
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importance of the Spanish speaking market. This led to the creation in 1976 of El Miami Herald,
a Spanish language newspaper under the Herald’s corporate umbrella. The newspaper’s
editorial direction, however, left much to be desired to many in the Cuban community and El
Herald remained largely an appendage of the parent publication.
In 1978, the Herald’s executive editor, John McMullan attempted to address the
animosity between his newspaper and the Cuban community in Miami when he wrote a piece
entitled “Open Letter to My Cuban Friends.” McMullan reaffirmed his previously stated belief
that the Cuban community had enriched Greater Miami both culturally and economically. He
then sought to address a meeting held on August 3, 1978 where several Cuban American leaders
had gathered to discuss “so-called ‘unbearable insults’” to their community. McMullan reported
on the discontent expressed at the meeting, ranging from a sign printed on a street near Little
Havana that read “Speak English!” to the failure of the School Board to make bilingual education
mandatory to the perceived anti-Cuban slant of the Herald itself. He quoted an anonymous
Cuban friend who claimed that there were “those among us who are seeking to exploit
polarization: they forget that we came here as refugees and that many of us have become
successful in a way that we never dreamed because of the opportunity this country gave us.”
McMullan made it clear that he respected that Cuban friend and others like him, but he believed
it was time for them to act. “It is time for some of the silent majority among the Cubans to get
involved,” he declared, “the silent majority of decent law-abiding family-loving Cubans who
already contribute so much to this area.” To get involved meant to participate in every phase of
community life, not only in the area’s economy and cultural life.51
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McMullan accused the Cubans of being insular and of ignoring the plight of other groups
in the greater Miami area. Being involved, he wrote, did not mean “holding back or forming
Cuban-only organizations that will have the inevitable effect of furthering polarization.”
Reflecting on what he saw as the nation’s unfortunate history, McMullan noted that those who
had faced discrimination began to discriminate against others once they were assimilated into
power structures. He declared that The Herald was trying to carry out a responsibility to the
total community, “to our black, Anglo, Wasp, and Jewish populations, and to you new Latin
members as well.” This responsibility made it the Herald’s job to report “fairly” and “fearlessly”
in order to create an informed citizenry. McMullan was both defending his newspaper’s
perceived anti-Cuban bias and attempting to spur the creation of new leadership in the Cuban
community that would be more responsive to the Herald’s reporting. He admonished that too
many Cubans were holding back and letting the “opportunists” among them have too much
influence. At the same time, too few of the “responsible Cubans” were offering themselves up
for public office or were willing to become involved in the community at large. “No, mis
amigos,” he wrote, “we have reached a sad day in South Florida if a part of the community feels
that the only way to achieve desirable goals is through polarization.”52
Unsurprisingly, some Cubans were rather displeased with McMullan’s assertions about
the Cuban community and its role in creating polarization in Miami. One letter writer called the
editorial “patronizing in tone and accusing in insinuation,” because it implied that the Cuban
community or at least Cuban representatives were the major cause of polarization in the area.
“It takes a great deal of bad faith at best, and naiveté at worst,” wrote Julio Castano, “to make
this statement. This may sound paradoxical, but I assure you it isn’t—I’m accustomed to the
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Herald’s bad faith, naiveté would be novel.” Castano then accused the Herald’s editorials and
coverage of some issues of polarizing the larger community. He advised McMullan that the
needed to apply the same rule to his journalists that the Herald wanted to apply to others.
Furthermore, if the Cuban community had a leadership that was forced upon them by “the
Establishment,” and if this group was “getting uppity” then the blame should be shared, “since
many were hand-picked, nourished and forced on us by this Establishment.” Furthermore, if the
Cuban community’s political base was not up to McMullan’s standard, then their economic
based surpassed it. If their clout was not what he expected, then their “moral strength, again
surpasses it tenfold.” Castano asked McMullan to spare the Cubans his condescendence and
pontification because he was simply not qualified to make such judgments. If the chasm of
polarization was to be bridged then the Herald was well equipped to do its part. “I should not
solely be the burden of our Cuban community,” Castano wrote.53
McMullan’s letter also resulted in a scathing editorial from radio station W-QBA, “La
Cubanisima,” which declared the letter nothing more than a way to cover past and current
mistakes by the Herald. The editorial took the form of an open letter to McMullan, so he could
see that “some of us Cubans DO read The Miami Herald, though we may be in the minority in
regards to reading tastes and preferences.” La Cubanisima saw in the letter an old attitude of
the Herald’s, that Cubans should “Americanize to the point that they forget their culture, their
language, their customs and even the right to have a free homeland without communist
oppression.” They denied that there were such things as Cuban-only organizations, stating that
even the most militant Cuban exile organizations would gladly take on any American-born
recruit willing to help their cause in good faith. If such organizations existed, the editorial went
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on, it would only be because of years of isolation and discrimination of their community by a
group of Americans collectively called “the Establishment,” working under the “absurd thesis of
‘take over,’” the idea that the Cubans wanted to take all political power in Dade County for
themselves.54
The Miami Herald, an organization near and dear to McMullan’s heart, was a part of the
Establishment, the editorial indicated. The newspaper was called “The Miami Herald,” after all,
a city composed of 60% Spanish speaking people, most of them Cuban. How many Cubans were
on the upper echelons of the Herald’s management? “What is the answer…” asked La
Cubanisima, “ZERO… NONE…? Could we not say then that the Editorial Board of The Miami
Herald is an organization made up solely of ‘non Cubans’?” How could the Herald truly claim to
serve the entirety of the community if 60% of that community was unrepresented in their
Editorial Board? “Would it not be better and more representative,” the editorial asked, “to call
your newspaper ‘The Collier County Herald’ or ‘The Boca Raton Herald’… instead of ‘The Miami
Herald’?” The editorial also claimed that the electoral system in the county was biased to the
point of being nearly unconstitutional and that that seemed to suit the Herald just fine. It
recalled that in a recent election, when a Cuban candidate for county commissioner was
defeated by the African American incumbent in a tight election, the Herald had run headlines
declaring the victory of black votes over Cuban votes. How, then, could McMullan speak about
polarization?55
McMullan most likely expected this exact reaction from outlets like WQBA. The Herald
was seen by many in the Cuban community as an antagonist long before it was published.
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McMullan, however, was part of a “Non-Group” of Cuban and Anglo leaders who were seeking
to address issues of polarization in Miami.56 This group sought to improve the relations
between the Cuban American community and other groups in the area. The problem of
polarization was not so easily resolved, and it would continue well into the 1980s when the
battles over bilingualism and the place of the Cubans in Miami would reach a feverish pitch. The
individuals who comprised the “Non-Group” and others like them could not tackle this issue
without greater centralization. The Cuban community was also rife with its own cleavages along
political and generational lines. These divisions would shape the way in which Miami’s Cubans
would relate to one another and how they would project the local economic and political power
they had garnered since 1959 in their dealings with the federal government that was once their
patron.

One of the most significant divisions within the Cuban community was between those
who chose to become American citizens and those who had not yet chosen to do so. While an
increasing number of Cubans were becoming Cuban Americans during the 1970s, this decision
was not without controversy. Despite the adoption of the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966, the
number of Cubans in Dade County who had become citizens remained relatively low. In 1973,
Juan Clark found that U.S. citizens constituted 36.4% of the Cuban population, while permanent
residents made up 45.2%, and those with refugee status came to 18.5%. When he polled those
Cubans who had not become American citizens, his respondents fell into three categories in
regards to plans to become naturalized citizens:
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No plans to become a citizen
Does not know
Planning to become a citizen

20.6%
35.3%
44.1%57

Becoming an American citizen allowed Cubans to have a say in the politics of their adopted
home and allowed them greater agency in ensuring that the economic and social gains made by
their community would be solidified. A majority of Clark’s respondents, however, either did not
know if they would become American citizens or had absolutely no plans to do so. Ever since
the path to citizenship was opened for the exiles, the debate about whether or not to embrace
that path had raged within the community, both in private spaces and in the media. Those who
were opposed to becoming citizens often complained about their children being made to pledge
allegiance to the U.S. flag in school. “Many Cubans believed that becoming an American citizen
meant assuming a new identity, emotionally erasing any memory of life prior to taking the oath
of citizenship,” writes historian María Cristina García.58 For many Cubans, to become an
American citizen meant to abandon the cause of a free Cuba in favor of their adopted home.
This was the same sort of issue of divided loyalties that had so pained Pedro Pan children in the
previous decade; the fundamental question of whether loyalty to one’s adopted home meant
disloyalty to the nation of one’s birth.
As the 1970s wore on and more and more Cubans chose to become American citizens,
the divide between those who sought to embrace citizenship and those who did not was often
generational. When questioned about the greatest challenge to the Cuban community in
Miami, Bryan Walsh suggested that it was the fact that Cuban children were not “Cuban in the
sense that their parents were Cuban. Neither are they American in the sense that American
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children are. They are a mixture of both cultures.” He warned that the reaction of the Cuban
community to this fact would decide if there would be conflict or a drawing together of the best
of both cultures.59 This did not always mean that Cuban children were more inherently
Americanized than their parents. The debate of whether to become an American citizen or not
was part of a larger debate within the Cuban American community about what it meant to be
Cuban. “College students were particularly caught up in this debate over identity and national
allegiance,” writes García. These college students had often left Cuba as teenagers and in their
negotiation of both cultures were keenly aware of their liminal placement. These students often
joined organizations that took a sterner line regarding issues of identity and nationality. Some
among them “became more staunchly nationalistic than their parents, and they castigated the
community for forfeiting its ideals.”60
Other Cubans saw no intrinsic problem with becoming American citizens. Some
professionals in fact saw immense benefits in becoming citizens, which was often a necessary
step in returning to their chosen fields. Others simply had resigned themselves to a lengthy
stay in the United States and had developed a loyalty towards their adopted home which they
did not see as incompatible with their loyalty toward Cuba.61 The tension between parents and
children in the Cuban community over citizenship and the opportunities it presented was a
common enough situation to be portrayed in the popular, Miami-produced situation comedy
¿Qué Pasa, U.S.A.? Conceived by Professor Manuel G. Mendoza and brought to the screen in
1977 by Luis Santeiro, ¿Qué Pasa, U.S.A.? was the first bilingual situation comedy produced in
the United States and the first situation comedy produced for the Public Broadcasting Service.
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Set in Little Havana, the show portrayed the everyday life and struggles of a multigenerational
Cuban family in the United States. The series won six regional Emmy awards, nine special
awards from the Association of Critics and Commentators on the Arts, and was named “Freshest
T.V. Series” for 1978 by Nuestro magazine. Despite being about a Cuban family and entirely
bilingual, the program’s appeal went beyond South Florida and other areas with high Latino/a
populations. ¿Qué Pasa, U.S.A.? was shown by 126 PBS stations in 34 states, covering most
major television markets and several smaller ones. The program was successful enough to
warrant a limited partnership between Santeiro and United Cinema Enterprises in the early
1980s to explore the possibility of producing a film entitled Family Secrets, which would have
had similar storyline using many of the same actors from the show in new roles.62
Between 1977 and 1980, ¿Qué Pasa, U.S.A.? detailed the comedic adventures of the
Peña family, composed of the Spanish speaking grandparents, the bilingual parents, and the
mostly English speaking children, living in the United States and facing situations common to
immigrants from Latin America and specific to the Cuban community. The show’s pilot, “La
Fiesta de Quince” (Sweet Fifteen), introduced the format of the show where characters
communicated with one another freely using both English and Spanish. To make the show
accessible to English speakers, the creators gave Carmen, the Peña daughter and only member
of the household to be born in the United States, a friend named Sharon. Sharon was a dumb
blonde stereotype who spoke no Spanish and could be counted on to ask questions about what
was going on in any Spanish only exchange. The program illustrated the way in which the Peña
children straddled both cultures. In the pilot episode Joe, the Peña’s son and eldest child, is
described as a “Kissinger Cubano” because of his attempts to join the “cool kids” club at school.
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Joe is upset because his sister Carmen is getting a “fiesta de los quince,” which she refers to as a
“sweet fifteen,” to her father Pepe’s exasperation. Joe believes that this party will ultimately
ruin his chances to join the club. Joe goes on to explain the difficulties of the Cuban American
identity: he feels pushed and pulled from one culture to the other. He is Cuban at home and
American at school. When his grandfather claims that things were not so difficult in Cuba, Joe
accedes that things might have been better there, but they all needed to adjust to a new
reality.63
In the eleventh episode, entitled “TV Interview,” Joe is interviewed by a local television
reporter seeking to talk to a Cuban student about how they felt in the United States. Upon
hearing the news his son is going to be on television, Pepe proudly exclaims that only a few
years back they came to this country as refugees, as “nobodies” but now his son would be on
television. When asked by the reporter if he felt Cuban or American, having been born in
Havana but having lived in the United States since the age of three, Joe responds that he feels
“pretty American… but then I also feel very Cuban.” Joe gets into trouble with his family when
he mentions there is a certain amount of culture shock in going from interacting his American
friends to interacting with his Cuban grandparents. He states his grandparents are having
problems not only to living in the United States, but “adjusting to life in this century!” Joe then
follows up his description of his parents being very grateful to the United States with a
statement about how they are always complaining that the country is a real mess, prompting
Pepe to exclaim “Mañana mismo nos deportan!” (We’ll be deported tomorrow!) Joe then
magnifies the blunder by stating that his parents are relatively progressive, stating that most
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Cuban parents seem like broken records going on about how much better everything was in
Cuba.64
Pepe threatens to sue the television station after a neighbor informs him that Joe has
been deemed a shame to the Cuban community and that a petition is being passed around
demanding the family move out of the city. This prompts the reporter to offer a follow-up
interview to the entire family and to a suspicious Sharon who rightly notes that the reporter just
wants her to be a token for his “inter-cultural pals” angle. True to form, more mishaps arise
when the follow up interview occurs, as when Pepe openly states to the reporter that before
the Cubans arrived, Miami was just a country village. As the family negotiates the usual cultural
and generational shenanigans, the episode takes a humorous look at other issues, from the
mentioned insistence of everything having been better in Cuba, to the irate American born
neighbor who is “sick” of having to deal with Cubans who live nearby. In the end, the script calls
for the family’s close ties and ability to forgive one-another any transgression to be illustrated
through their communal watching of the news story in the episode’s final scene.65
Not all conflicts could be resolved so easily. This was well illustrated when the show
tackled naturalization. The program’s 15th episode, entitled “Naturalization,” starts with Pepe
explaining to Carmen that the home improvement projects he is engaging in are not meant to
signal any permanence in Miami, “Nosotros estamos en Miami de pasada” (We are just passing
through Miami) he tells her. Juana, Pepe’s wife finds a bottle of champagne as she cleans out
items from the kitchen cabinets. Pepe explains that he had purchased the bottle in 1962 and he
continues to save it for their return to Cuba. Conflict arises when Joe comes home and recounts
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how he has been told that many college scholarships require applicants to be citizens. As a
minor he needs one of his parents to become a citizen first, which Pepe refuses to do saying he
is not ready to become a “gringo.” Carmen notes that she is an American citizen, but Pepe
insists that her birth in the United States was an accident; she was meant to be born in Cuba.
Father and son clash over the desire to become an American citizen until Pepe tells Joe that he
is a traitor, “a traitor to the name of José Manuel Peña,” his name and that of his father,
grandfather, and great grandfather before him.66
Pepe becomes even more agitated when Adela and Antonio, his wife’s parents, reveal
they have also decided to become American citizens in order to gain the vote. Joe notes that
Pepe is always going on about how people have not say under communism, but as long as Pepe
does not have a vote he does not really have a say in the United States either. Juana informs
Pepe she will help Joe get a scholarship, even if it means becoming an American citizen. Later
Juana and Joe write and perform a song, “Y Vamos Caminando” (And We Walk On), which
encapsulates the conflict:
Juana: A donde van las costumbres
me tengo que preguntar,
supongo que el tiempo las cambia
como cambia la orilla del mar,
los viejos las cultivan,
los jóvenes buscan razón,
y lo que una vez fue exilio
se convierte en emigración.
Joe:

66

(Where do customs go?
I must ask myself,
I suppose time changes them
as the shoreline changes,
the elderly cultivate them,
the young seek a reason,
and what was once exile
becomes immigration.)

How can I yearn for what I hardly knew?
How can I feel the same way you do?
I don’t remember what I didn’t live.
What I never had I cannot give.
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Juana: Y vamos caminando
el tiempo va pasando
los niños van creciendo
los viejos muriendo
y los soñadores—se van cansando.

(And we go walking
and time goes on
children grow
the old die
and the dreamers—grow tired.)

Joe:

You miss the past and want a world that’s gone.
There’s nothing there for me and I must move on.
and try my best to find a way
to live in the world we have today.

Both:

Y vamos caminando
el tiempo va pasando
los niños van creciendo
los viejos muriendo
y los soñadores—se van cansando.67

The episode closes with a discussion between Pepe and Juana where she asks him if he really
means that he will never become an American citizen. Pepe tells her he never said that, but as
he holds his champagne bottle he states that if he ever becomes an American citizen he will buy
another bottle, the one he has is for Cuba. The original script called for Juana to lightly knock on
Pepe’s head to indicate that he’s cabezon, stubborn, before ending the episode with a kiss
between the couple. The version that made it to air, however, saw Pepe leave the room after
telling his wife the bottle of champagne was for Cuba and Juana looking after him before moving
to a different part of the house herself.68 The ending which was broadcast reflected the more
somber tone of ultimately making the decision to become an American citizen. Naturalization
was an issue that illustrated the tensions within the Cuban American community, between
embracing the exile dream of a post-Castro Cuba and becoming full members of American
society. It could become a source of division between families and friends and between those
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Cubans who sought an investment in their immediate future and those who clung to an
idealized past they hoped would be the basis of an eventual future on the island.
Even those who chose to make the transition and become American citizens were often
plagued by doubts about the decision and nostalgia about Cuba. On July 4, 1978, 2,141 new
citizens took the Oath of Allegiance in a mass naturalization ceremony at the Miami Beach
Convention Center. Following the ceremony one Cuban woman explained the mixed feelings
the ceremony brought about. “This is a day of great joy, but also of great sadness for me,”
Normal Suarez de Alvariño told a reporter, “But in the end, we have to think of the future,
because the past is gone.” These new Cuban citizens sought to fully participate in and embrace
their adopted country while still holding on to their roots. Another new citizen expressed her
joy at becoming an American, but remarked sadly that during the ceremony she thought quite a
bit of her Cuban homeland. When asked for the reason they became American citizens,
respondents provided largely practical reasons. Some explained that citizenship brought about
full rights and participation in American society, with the right to vote coming to the forefront.69
While a significant portion of the Cuban community had not yet chosen to take the step
toward citizenship or were actively antagonistic to the choice, there were many who were
seeking to start on the path toward citizenship. Despite the passage of the Cuban Adjustment
Act almost a decade earlier, by the mid-1970s some politically powerful exiles had grown
concerned that bureaucratic roadblocks were slowing down the process of exile stabilization,
often by years. In advance of a meeting in December of 1975, the Florida chairman of the
Republican National Hispanic Assembly, Jose Manuel Casanova, wrote a letter to President
Gerald Ford regarding the plight of these refugees. Casanova stated that Cuban refugees living
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and working the United States that had been trying to become residents and hoped to become
citizens had been delayed by periods of three to four years. Casanova assumed that “reduced
staffing and some feet dragging” by the Immigration and Naturalization Service was to blame. It
was in both the best interest of the United States and the Cuban American community that the
refugees “be absorbed at an accelerated rate into the mainstream of the American system.”
The Republican National Hispanic Assembly recommended that the President issue an executive
order to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to expedite the method of processing U.S.
residence applications of Cubans living in the United States as well as those of Cuban U.S.
residents seeking citizenship. The president was also asked to promote legislation to
automatically move Cuban refugees already living in the United States to resident status with
minimum paperwork.70
The Ford administration was under pressure from the Republican National Hispanic
Assembly on other issues at that very moment, including greater participation by Hispanics in
positions of authority in the federal government.71 Casanova was also seeking a firm statement
that would “end speculation on coexistance [sic] with the Cuban communist government within
the foreseable [sic] future.”72 With an election year looming, President Ford instructed his staff
to investigate the exact nature of these delays and what could be done about them through
executive action. Within a week of the meeting between the President and the Republican
Hispanic National Assembly, the administration had established that “the point at which our
Cuban friends are experiencing some difficulty is in obtaining a Permanent Resident Alien visa.”
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Despite the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act, which guaranteed the Cuban refugees
approval for their permanent resident status without having to apply from outside the country,
the refugees were still subject to the limitations on such visas established by congress. Each
year a maximum of 120,000 visas were available to people born in Western hemisphere
countries, which were provided on a first-come, first-served basis. 73 This limitation was creating
a backlog among the refugees attempting to establish their residency of 70,000 applications.74
President Ford sought a solution he could enact in order to gain the solid support of
RHNA, but officials in the administration were skeptical about the power of the executive
branch to affect the backlog. James Cannon, director of the Domestic Council, was insistent that
because the limitation was a matter of law, there was little to be done without Congress
enacting new legislation.75 By February 1976, the administration sought to issue an executive
order that would ensure that Cuban adjustments did not count against the Western hemisphere
quotas and requested a legal opinion from the Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Legal
Counsel, Antonin Scalia.76 While awaiting the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion, the president
instructed the Attorney General to take any necessary action, administrative or legislative to
assure that Cuban refugees could attain permanent resident status without delays due to the
immigration quota system.77 In August of that year, Scalia produced a twenty-three page legal
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opinion stating that it was within the law and the powers of the executive to order a change of
policy by the Department of Justice.78 Prompted by the determined legality of the change in
policy, the Immigration and Naturalization Service announced in September that Cuban refugees
would no longer have to compete for places within the Western Hemisphere quota.79 Coupled
with the removal of the policy-level obstacle, the Ford administration also provided additional
manpower to the Miami offices of the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau. Other INS offices
handling a backlog of Cuban cases would not immediately receive an increase in manpower,
despite similar backlogs.80 This is unsurprising, given that the original request had come from
politically power and well connected South Florida Cubans.
The Ford Administration was particularly keen on courting the Cuban American political
leadership in South Florida in the run-up to the 1976 presidential election. In December of
1975, within a week of Casanova’s request to the White House, Ronald Reagan publicly met with
deposed Panamanian President Arnulfo Arias and with members of the Cuban exile community.
Reagan used this opportunity to establish his foreign policy bona fides by allying himself with
Arias and against Omar Torrijos in the U.S.’s conflict with Panama over the Canal Zone. It also
served as an opportunity for Reagan to back the cause of a post-Castro Cuba and potentially win
the support of the Cuban American community in Florida.81 Ford had some cause to be
concerned about obtaining this group’s support. Earlier in the year the President had made a
statement indicating his administration would maintain a hardline stance against Castro’s
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government. Less than a week later, however, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared his
support for lifting the Cuban embargo if the rest of the Organization of American States voted in
favor of this action.82 While Ford would win the nomination in 1976, he lost badly among Cuban
Americans in Florida’s Republican primary, obtaining only 29% of the vote to Reagan’s 71%. By
April of 1976, Ford’s campaign was concerned about the 50,000 votes that Carter could take
from Ford because of a lack of attention to the Cuban community. “Recognizing CubanAmericans is of premier importance,” wrote President Ford Committee member Ed Debolt.83
DeBolt’s efforts to gain the Cuban vote as a deciding factor in the coming electoral contest
would be for naught.84 Gerald Ford lost Dade County, the state of Florida, and the Oval Office in
the 1976 presidential election.
The aims and policies of Ford’s successor, Jimmy Carter, would expose and exacerbate
another major fault line within the Cuban American community. Carter was a controversial
candidate among Cuban Americans. During the campaign, he had stated that American
relations with Cuba might be improved “on a measured reciprocal basis.”85 There had been
discussions of coexistence with Castro’s regime during the Ford Administration. Jose Manuel
Casanova had written a position paper arguing against any sort of coexistence with Cuba on
behalf of the Florida members of the Republican National Hispanic Assembly and the Dade
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County Republican Executive Committee. Casanova argued that if, in spite of the Cuban
Republican arguments against it, the federal government decided that coexistence was to exist,
it should “only be on our terms.” Those terms were tantamount to a capitulation to the exiles
by Castro:
1. If Castro frees all political prisoners under supervision of the Red Cross
(including 1000 U.S. citizens).
2. If Castro declares himself publicly against all subversion in the Continent
and vows not to support guerilla groups.
3. If all Russian, Chinese and foreign troops leave Cuba.
4. If free elections nationwide are conducted, with participation of Cuban
refugees, and supervised by a satisfactory international body.
5. If free exit and access to Cuba by nationals as well as citizens of foreign
nations are guaranteed.86
Casanova’s position ran directly opposed to any of the Castro regime’s interests. He and those
Cuban Americans aligned with him were making a clear statement that they would not consider
any sort of rapprochement with Castro’s government. This sentiment had long been mutual.
Since the start of the exile, Castro had taken every available chance to loudly denounce the
gusanos, the worms, as he called those Cubans who had left after the revolution. As late as
1975, he had indicated that the exiles would never be forgiven for deserting their homeland and
that they would never be allowed to return to the island.87
The extreme positions represented by Castro and Casanova did not encompass all
Cuban Americans or all Cubans. For some young exiles, the tension between their adopted
home in the United States and their need to assert their Cuban roots led to new directions in
Cuban exile politics. One group, Agrupacion Abdala, grew out of groups of young Cubans on
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college campuses seeking to maintain cultural ties with one another. They challenged the
abandonment of democratic principles by many exile organizations in their struggle against
Cuba’s revolutionary government. Criticizing ties and support of rightist military dictatorships
like that of Chile’s Augusto Pinochet. Other groups of young Cuban Americans had been
radicalized on college campuses by the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. These groups
sought to reconnect with their Cuban roots by lobbying the Cuban government and United
Nations officials to allow them to return to the island for visits. This lobbying helped bring about
changes in Cuba’s visitation policy. Castro’s government first allowed those who had emigrated
from Cuba prior to 1959 to visit, as many of them had been sympathetic to the revolution. In
the mid-1970s, the Cuban government removed the visitation restriction from those exiled
Cubans who had been under the age of eighteen at the moment they left the island, and
granted visas first in small numbers then in larger blocs to allow for visits by Cuban exile youth
groups. These visits were controversial on both sides of the Florida straits. Cuban parents often
vehemently opposed their children’s return to Cuba. Visiting students were told to tell Cuban
locals they were Puerto Rican because of the high politicization of the exile in the revolutionary
discourse.88
The issuing of these visas was a sign of a measured, gradual thawing of relations
between the United States and the Cuban government that had begun during the Ford
administration. The election of Jimmy Carter had a significant impact on this thawing as his
commitment to human rights led him to seek out improved relations with Latin America, a
region riddled with repressive dictatorships. In the view of one scholar, this commitment would
be exploited by Castro, who used the issue as “a wedge to attempt to end the economic
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embargo and restore diplomatic relations.”89 After Carter took office in 1977, the United States
and Cuba took a step towards the resumption of normal diplomatic relations through the
establishment of interest sections in Havana and Washington.90 This establishment of relations
was approached cautiously by both governments, neither wanting to appear weak before the
other. Federal officials were also concerned about the possibility of upsetting the Cuban
community in the United States. Soon after Carter’s inauguration, officials sought out Miami
Mayor Maurice Ferre and long-standing Cuban American Democrat Alfredo Duran and asked
them for advice on the issue. Duran advised them that the Cuban community would be divided
on the issue. “Some would react adversely to normalization efforts claiming that the pace will
be too rapid and leave outstanding issues unresolved,” noted a report of the meeting, “others
will see in normalization a means to reunite families and improve the care of Cuban aged and ill
in both countries.”91
Duran further cautioned them that a normalization of relations with Cuba could cause
an increase in the already existing problem of terrorism in Miami.92 While paramilitary
organizations had remained active in their attempts to disrupt Castro’s government through
raids in and around Cuba, the years after the end of the Freedom Flights saw a marked increase
in the violence perpetrated by exiles upon other exiles and upon those who they saw as
enemies to their cause. Between 1973 and 1977 Cuban exile organizations and individuals,
including Alpha 66 and Omega 7, had attempted or successfully executed 92 bombings.93 Soon
after Carter’s inauguration, Dade County Mayor Steve Clark and other local government officials
89
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signed a letter to President Carter asking for immediate investigation into the terrorism
occurring in Dade County. The Justice Department had also received requests from U.S.
Attorney Bob Rust and U.S. Senator Dick Stone of Florida asking for FBI assistance with the issue
of terrorism. While this was seen as a significant problem by the people of South Florida, the
Justice Department indicated that FBI involvement was unlikely due to the lack of jurisdiction.94
In order to get as much support for the potential normalization of relations with Cuba,
members of the administration sought to meet with potential allies in the Cuban American
community. In late 1977, Alfredo Duran and the White House attempted to organize a meeting
between National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and “several younger and more
progressive Cuban-Americans.”95 Members of the administration also received news from
Bernardo Benes that he had been approached by members of the Special Forces of the Interior
ministry of Cuba while on a trip to Panama in August of 1977.96 Benes had ties to the White
House due to his close ties to the Carter campaign, for whom he had served as Latin
coordinator.97 Benes was unsure as to why he had been approached, but it has been suggested
that it was done because of his closeness to the Carter administration, his high public profile in
Miami civic activities, and because the Cuban government wanted “persons sufficiently idealistic
to act as go-betweens Havana and Washington,” who could also work discretely without news
leaking to the rest of the Cuban community.98 With the approval of Washington, Benes began a

94

Jim Purks to Jack Watson, January 31, 1977, Folder ST 9 1/20/1977—8/31/1978, Executive, Box ST-7,
States-Territories, Subject File, White House Central File, Jimmy Carter Presidential Papers, Carter Library.
95
Robert A. Pastor to Zbigniew Brzezinski, October 8, 1977, Folder 4, Box 11, Staff Material: North/South,
Carter Library.
96
Levine, Secret Missions to Cuba, 4.
97
Ibid, 81.
98
Ibid, 5.

200
series of behind the scenes negotiations, returning to Cuba after 18 years in exile and meeting
with Fidel Castro several times.
Benes’s trips and other back channel negotiations led to solid plans, implemented in
1978, to serious discussions between the Cuban government and the American government
about greater rapprochement. The Cubans sought to appeal to Carter’s interest in human rights
by suggesting his government release political prisoners for certain concessions from the U.S.
government. American officials were cautious and sought to understand the Cuban approach
and the mixed signals they were getting, but hoped to also obtain a reduction of the Cuban
presence in Angola. Internal communications within the Carter administration show that
American officials believed Castro had four main reasons to pursue a relationship with the
United States outside of the normalization of relations, a lifting of the trade embargo, and a
withdrawal from the Guantanamo Bay naval base. A normalization of relations with the United
States would both strengthen the Cuban economy and reduce its dependence on the Socialist
bloc. On the diplomatic front, the Americans believed Castro wanted to gain leverage in his
relations with the USSR and to bolster his appeal as a non-aligned leader. These moves could
also improve his relationship with and influence over the Cuban American community. The
most significant effect of renewed relations with the United States would have been
psychological. If in the eyes of most Cubans, officials argued, the revolution was only legitimized
by Castro moving away from the U.S.’s “pater” figure, then “by the logic of a lingering
paternalism, his revolution can only be considered complete when the U.S. accepts it.”99
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By September of that year, negotiations had slowed to a crawl due to Castro’s
commitment to his operations in Africa. Castro sought to outmaneuver the reluctant American
officials by circumventing them and holding a press conference in front of Cuban exile
journalists in which he invited the exile community to enter into a dialogue with the Cuban
government on issues including the fate of political prisoners and a possible family reunification
program. Castro was careful to refer to the exiles not as gusanos, but as “the Cuban community
abroad.” As such he authorized Benes to bring to Havana a group of Cuban Americans to discuss
those issues in November of 1978. Castro was eager to tap into the significant economic
resources of the exile community and to offset the international criticism of Cuba based on its
human rights record. The Carter administration sought not to publicly involve itself with the
dialogue beyond what was absolutely necessary, but it was pleased with Castro’s release several
political prisoners before the arrival of the dialogue group. National Security Advisor Brzezinski
qualified it as “another significant human rights accomplishment for this Administration,” in an
internal White House memorandum.100 Castro’s invitation was unexpected, most of the exile
community was not aware of the secret negotiations that had been occurring between the
United States and the Cuban government and the sudden conciliatory gesture was both
surprising and controversial, causing significant division within the Cuban American
community.101
Some were very supportive of the news and its possibilities. Alfredo Duran spoke to
administration officials and conveyed his enthusiasm about the prisoner release and urged them
to move forward with normalization as a way to increase American influence over Castro. He
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also suggested to them that Carter’s policy on Cuba was having a positive effect on the swing in
support from the Republican to the Democratic Party for the Cuban community in Florida.102
Others were eager to go even further than the Carter administration or than the larger group of
negotiators in creating greater ties to Cuba. The members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, the
name taken collectively by a group of Cuban American youth who had previously visited the
island through the easing of visa restriction, would seek to pursue a more radical agenda that
included the right of repatriation, the right to study in Cuba, the release of political prisoners,
and other suggestions.103 Many others were quite eager to see the results of the negotiations,
hoping to see family members they had left behind years (if not decades) before.
Others directly opposed any possibility of negotiating with Castro. Groups like Alpha 66
publicly sought to form a coalition to draft a document explaining their view that any
negotiation with Castro was antithetical to the cause of a free Cuba. This caused some division
even among those who normally supported Alpha 66. One woman wrote the leaders of the
organization and explained that if the exile community refused to enter into a dialogue with
Castro then it was giving him the entirety of the power in making the decision on whether or not
to release the political prisoners being held in Cuban prisons. To refuse to negotiate would
create a vacuum that would necessarily then be filled by the U.S. government, which would act
in its own best interests toward a normalization with Cuba and with less regard for the exiles
and the political prisoners. By refusing to negotiate, they were playing right into Castro’s hands.
“I want to state here,” she wrote, “that to refuse to negotiate with Castro at this moment is
equivalent to POLITICAL SUICIDE by the exile.” It was easy to deny Castro the dialogue to retain
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one’s dignity, but that dignity would be better served through political action in the service of
the larger cause.104
The trip was a controversial subject for the Cuban American community, but it went on
as scheduled. The dialogue took place over two sessions held in November and December of
1978 as 140 Cuban exiles returned to Havana for the event. Political scientist Maria de los
Angeles Torres, then a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, met Cubans from throughout the
United States representing a broad range of political factions and social backgrounds.105 While
Torres was fascinated by this diversity, Benes’s memories of the discussions and of this diversity
of thought and background were mostly negative as he witnessed how “delegation members
divided into factions, suspicious of one another.” In one particular incident, Benes had his
conversation with a group of Protestant ministers interrupted when he was roughly shoved by
one of the men accompanying another delegation member.106 Benes was already feeling
pressure for his role in the dialogo before he went to Havana with the delegation and before the
extent of his involvement in back channel negotiations with Castro was revealed. He carried
with him to Cuba photographs of a group of about twenty organized picketers, including Alpha
66’s Andrés Nazario Sargén, who began to protest in front of his bank, Continental National
Bank of Miami, on a daily basis. Castro, he remembers, laughed hysterically when he saw the
photos. Benes, however, was not amused, telling Castro, “it may seem humorous for you in
Havana, but it is not humorous to have this every day in front of your office.”107
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The talks resulted in agreements including the release of over 3,000 political prisoners,
permission for current and formers prisoners to immigrate to the United States with their
families, permission for those with family in the United States to leave the island, and
permission for exiles to visit Cuba.108 Although these developments seemed promising, they
served to enrage a significant section of the Cuban American community. Many of Little
Havana’s periodiquitos lashed out at the possibility of any form of normalization of relations
with Cuba. In early 1979, a new periodiquito launched and declared itself to be “with Cuba and
against the traitors.” Latigo (The Whip), was named after the biblical passage where Jesus
expelled the money lenders from the temple. It declared that Cuba was not negotiable, and
that between the exile community and Fidel Castro there was “a sea covered in bodies, a prison
full of pain and a national slavery, that no one can erase.”109 In February, Latigo denounced the
“infiltration” of the Cuban exile community by Castro sympathizers and agents who sought the
dialogue with Castro. It also castigated President Carter, the “champion of ‘human rights,’ who
sees traits of kindness and generosity in the Beast of Birán.”110 The following month the
newspaper published an open letter to Jimmy Carter from the Movimiento Revolucionario Frank
Pais, an exile organization that opposed any dialogue with Castro. The letter indicated that the
authors spoke out as members of a community that had demonstrated its ability to work and
build up economic strength and to improve cities like Miami, while the president’s foreign policy
sought to engage with Castro’s “murderous regime.”111
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Upon returning to the United States many of the dialogueros found themselves
ostracized from the communities and groups they had helped build. Bernardo Benes’s role in
dealing with Fidel Castro was revealed by a Washington Post article that recounted how he had
been approached by Cuban officials in Panama and how he and Castro had worked behind the
scenes before the announcement in September of that year. Even before the article was
published, Benes was already receiving death threats from different exile organizations.112
When in March of 1979 Benes sent a plea in English and Spanish to all of Continental National
Bank’s customers for employment accommodation for the arriving political prisoners he was
met with significant backlash. He was called a traitor and a communist, had his life threatened,
and found that none of his powerful friends in Miami stood up for him. He was, suddenly, a
pariah.113 Benes even found himself the target of a failed assassination attempt in March of
1980.114
Organizations like Alpha 66 aided in ostracizing him from Miami’s Cuban community.
Alpha 66 founder Antonio Veciana had publicly identified Benes as a de facto agent of the State
Department and not an infiltrator employed by Castro before the dialogueros traveled to
Havana.115 This, however, was too fine a point of distinction for the organization. In an
interview given much later, Veciana’s co-founder Andrés Nazario Sargén stated that he had no
personal dislike for Benes and that he was acting in the interests of the U.S. government, but
that regardless he was the enemy, “he is a traitor.” Domingo Moreira, who would be a founding
member of the Cuban American National Foundation in the following decade, stated that Benes
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being shunned was to be expected. “His motives could have been humanitarian, but he was
authorized by the Carter administration to suggest there would be policy changes that would
alleviate tensions with Cuba,” Moreira indicated, “this was unacceptable.”116
While Benes found himself ostracized from the Cuban community and even the Anglo
business community with which he had had so much contact in Miami, he did not lose his life.
Throughout 1979, the exile organization known as Omega 7 claimed responsibility for more than
twenty bombings of the homes and businesses of dialogue members and for the assassination
of Carlos Muñiz Varela, a twenty-six year old member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade. “Members
of the Antonio Maceo Brigade lived in constant fear,” wrote Maria de los Angeles Torres, “we
were afraid that the events we sponsored would be bombed.”117 Even under threat of death
Benes and other Cuban Americans sought to continue the dialogo. A second group of 168 exiles
returned to Cuba, but little of consequence was accomplished due to mutual mistrust and a lack
of follow-through on the part of a Carter administration that was internally divided on the
question of Cuba.118
Benes remained undeterred in trying to facilitate the arrival of the political prisoners
Castro had released to the United States. In September of 1979, he and Alfredo Duran again
contacted the Carter White House in an attempt to secure 5,000 parole visas for the former
political prisoners. Despite the agreements reached during the dialogo, the U.S. government
had been proceeding very slowly in processing the entry of the political prisoners. Benes and
Duran insisted that the United States had a moral responsibility to the prisoners because most
of them had served long sentences as a result of their involvement in anti-Castro operations
116

Quoted in Levine, Secret Missions to Cuba, 135.
Torres, In the Land of Mirrors, 100.
118
Levine, Secret Missions to Cuba, 136-139.
117

207
sponsored by American intelligence agencies in the 1960s.119 Officials within the Carter
administration saw value in the proposal; it was “a way for the Administration to ‘declare
victory’ on the human rights issue.” It also made economic sense. With the Cuban Refugee
Program ending, the federal government was not eager to take on another charge. Duran and
Benes were willing to commit the Cuban American community to finding jobs and handling
resettlement on their own.120
Within months, however, the Carter administration and the Cuban American community
would be faced with a much larger refugee challenge. After years without any large scale
migrations from Cuba, a massive new wave of refugees would soon be landing on the coasts of
South Florida, once again testing local, state, and federal authorities. This new wave would also
test the Cuban American community in new ways, exposing even more divisions within the
community, forcing them to defend their accomplishments to the city and to the country, and
putting many of them at odds with a new generation of refugees who did not resemble them or
the Cuba they remembered.
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CHAPTER 5—“WILL THE LAST AMERICAN TO LEAVE MIAMI PLEASE BRING THE FLAG?”: THE
MARIEL BOATLIFT, LOCAL POLARIZATION, AND THE POLITICS OF IMAGE IN MIAMI, 1980-1982
“They were like wolf packs running loose in the streets—hordes of crazy men with
tattooed arms, and loaded guns in their belts,” read the Reader’s Digest piece published in
December of 1982, “the vast majority of Cuban-Americans, honest and hard-working refugees
called them escoria, scum.”1 The article, entitled “From Cuba with Hate,” was a scathing
indictment of the newest wave of refugees from Cuba, those who arrived during the Mariel
boatlift, between April and September of 1980. These new refugees, the marielitos, were part
of the most intense period of refugee migration from Cuba to the United States. While the
article’s author, Peter Michelmore, asserted that the vast majority of refugees from Cuba were
“honest and hard-working,” the piece started with a graphic description of the murder of 19
year old Claribel Benitez, a “well-brought-up Cuban American girl” shot during an attempted
carjacking. The mortally injured Benitez gave a description of the strangers who attacked her to
the police. “Marielitos,” the girl whispered, “Three Marielitos…” Before her death Benitez
repeated the world marielitos several times and “to those who heard her, the word needed no
explanation.”2 Michelmore went on to describe how the administration of President Jimmy
Carter had been duped by Fidel Castro, who “set among an open society a vicious new criminal
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force.” What Castro had unleashed upon the United States was an “outlaw invasion” that had
not “been recognized, or confronted nationally.”3
The Reader’s Digest article was simply the latest indication of the significant blow to the
Cuban community’s prestige in the United States following the Mariel boatlift. Just three
months before, during a visit to Miami, the State Department’s coordination of refugee affairs,
H. Eugene Douglas, said of Cubans that “of all nationalities, they are ranked at the bottom.”4
The Miami Herald’s editorial section ran a piece on the negative press the refugees of the Mariel
boatlift were receiving across the country and described how, “like a festering sore, the black
legend of Mariel continues to spread across the United States.”5 It was not surprising, then, that
when news of the Reader’s Digest article broke in Miami, many Cubans reacted with anger. Eloy
Gonzalez, secretary of the Latin Chamber of Commerce, described the article as “an abuse and
an exaggeration.” Michelmore defended himself by claiming that the article made it clear he
was writing about a small group among the refugees, but others were concerned about the
overall effect. “People will draw an image of all Cubans from this description,” said Lucrecia
Granda, Secretary of the Spanish American League Against Discrimination.6
Not all Cuban Americans had this reaction to the article. Herald columnist Roberto
Fabricio found that the reaction of many leaders in the Cuban American community to the piece
had been unjustified because they had not read it. While Fabricio had shared the concerns of
these leaders about a negative portrayal of part of the community reflecting badly on the whole
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community, he found that in the Reader’s Digest piece Michelmore had just stated the facts.
While he believed that the estimate that criminals constituted 20% of the 125,000 refugees who
came to the United States during the boatlift was exaggerated, Fabricio stated that Michelmore
squarely laid the blame of the crime wave on Castro and the criminals themselves and should
thus be applauded by the Cuban American community.7 Honest Cubans should not be
concerned with the portrayal of those Cubans who broke the law and who had been sent to the
United States by Fidel Castro to sully the larger community.
The Mariel boatlift was an important opportunity for escape for thousands of Cubans
who were disaffected with the Castro regime and for Cuban Americans who desperately wanted
to be reunited with friends and family still on the island. Conditions in revolutionary Cuba
caused severe discontent among a significant sector of the country’s population. Faced with an
image crisis on an international scale, Castro established conditions for the boatlift and played
on the discontent of his own population and the desires of the Cuban exiles in the United States.
This, in turn, presented a significant challenge to the federal government, to local authorities, to
many Miami residents, and to the image of Cuban Americans in the United States. The reactions
of the Carter administration, black and white Miamians, and the Cuban American community to
the boatlift and to the new refugees only widened the already existing divisions in the city.
Throughout the tumultuous year 1980 and the two years that followed, these reactions focused
influence that the Cuban American community had been accruing for decades and created a
powerful political lobby that sought to control the community’s image and to influence
American foreign policy towards Cuba.
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On April 1, 1980 a bus crashed through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana.8
The institution of a more liberal policy by the Peruvian government regarding Cuban asylum
seekers at the embassy prompted driver Héctor Sanyustiz and five others to commandeer a bus
on the afternoon of the first. As Sanyustiz made a dangerous turn toward the embassy gate, the
bus came under fire from the Cuban troops assigned to embassy security. Despite the obstacles
and the gunfire, the front third of the bus entered the grounds of the embassy and allowed the
asylum seekers to move into sovereign Peruvian territory.9 This was only the latest in a series of
similar incidents. By March 1980, nearly thirty Cubans had crashed vehicles against the gates of
the embassies of Peru and Venezuela.10
This incident differed from previous incidents because it resulted in a fatality. A twentyseven year old Cuban guard assigned to the Peruvian embassy was caught in the crossfire when
his fellow guards opened fire on Sanyustiz’s bus, prompting a stand-off between the guards and
the Peruvian embassy staff providing asylum to the group from the bus.11 This stand-off would
become a full diplomatic incident as the Cuban government demanded the return of the asylum
seekers and the Peruvian government refused.12 On April 4, the Cuban government removed its
protection from the embassy by removing the compound’s gates and the barricades that
protected them, as well as the Cuban security guards assigned to the mission. By the following
day, 2,000 Cubans had entered the grounds of the embassy after hearing assurances from
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Cuban government officials that all but the 25 who had entered the embassy by force would be
allowed to leave the island if they were granted visas by foreign nations.13 By April 6, 2,000 had
become 10,800.14
Desperate asylum seekers refused to leave the embassy grounds for fear they would be
arrested and would not be allowed to return. The embassy staff, completely unequipped and
unprepared to provide for this number of people were completely overwhelmed. Cuban
security forces provided some food for the asylum seekers, but the nearly 11,000 people on the
embassy grounds had to subsist on rations meant for 2,500. Unsanitary conditions due to lack
of appropriate bathroom facilities compounded the lack of food and water and resulted in
widespread suffering of dehydration, sunstroke, and gastroenteritis. The international press
extensively covered the events at the Peruvian embassy, embarrassing Castro’s government. In
response, the Cuban government went on the offensive against the asylum seekers.15
Cuba’s state newspaper, Granma, referred to the refugees as “delinquents, social
deviants, vagrants, and parasites.”16 A new term came into use when discussing the refugees on
the embassy grounds: the asylum seekers were escoria, society’s scum.17 Those seeking to leave
were from class backgrounds that the revolution had sought to help, but government officials
explained that even in a socialist society there existed underdeveloped groups of “lumpen
proletariat” who undermined the revolution and who sought to leave Cuba for purely economic
reasons.18 The Cuban government’s propaganda push even included claims that there had been
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a reduction in crime of 55% since the asylum seekers had been residing on the embassy
grounds. The start of the crisis had even produced a useful martyr in the form of Pedro Ortíz
Cabrera, the guard killed in the crossfire, who became a symbol of the loyal Cuban citizenry who
stood in opposition to the escoria so eager to desert the revolution.19
The Cuban government came to an agreement with several nations, including the
United States and Peru, regarding the fate of the embassy refugees. It was agreed that 3,500
would go to the United States, 3,500 would be dispersed in eight other nations, and the rest
would be temporarily taken to Costa Rica to await resettlement to other countries. 20 The plan
was implemented on April 16. Flights to Costa Rica drew particular interest from the
international press, which was on hand to document the elated reactions of the refugees upon
reaching Costa Rican soil. The interviews conducted by international journalists with those
Cubans arriving in Costa Rica painted them as ordinary men and women seeking to leave a
repressive regime and stood in direct opposition to the Cuban government’s description of the
asylum seekers as the dregs of society. Castro accused the governments of the United States
and Peru of using the Costa Rican way station for propaganda purposes against his regime.21 To
counteract this perceived disadvantage, Castro unilaterally halted the airlift and declared that all
flights carrying the refugees would have to go directly to the countries in which they were to
settle. Foreign diplomats in Cuba speculated that Castro was attempting to keep international
attention not on the exiting refugees, but on the massive March for Solidarity scheduled to take
place on April 20 in Havana.22 This prompted the Costa Rican government to offer asylum to all
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the Cubans at the Peruvian embassy and to appeal to the Cuban government to allow the flights
to resume.23 Castro would not yield. He intended to pressure Peru and the United States. In
the midst of an election year, the Carter administration rejected this change of policy.24
The Cuban government then changed tactics once again, bypassing the American
government and announcing to Cubans living abroad that they could use boats to pick up those
wanting to exit the country through the port of Mariel on the outskirts of Havana.25 Cuban
Americans, who earlier in the week had been planning on launching a small flotilla with supplies
for those trapped at the Peruvian embassy, seized on this opportunity. By April 21, Granma
announced that a flotilla of some fifty lobster boats had left Florida to begin the transport of
those Cubans seeking to leave, with the first two already having arrived at Mariel. Granma’s
editorial announced that the state was not opposed to the boats taking away those who wanted
to leave and that they would not be received “with cannon fire because they are coming in
peace."26
The first two boats returned to Key West with some forty refugees, causing a one State
Department official to call the effort “unlawful and unhelpful.” Officials were concerned that
more Cuban Americans would travel down to Mariel and return with boatloads of new refugees
and tried to discourage this.27 Officials were right to be concerned about the number of Cuban
Americans heading to Mariel growing significantly. Within four days of the arrival of the first
two boats the New York Times described Mariel harbor as “a floating city of more than 1300
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boats.” Upon arrival the crews were approached by immigration officials seeking identification
and lists of relatives the exile boats sought to bring back to the United States. In addition to the
family members and friends the exiles sought to bring back to the United States, Cuban
authorities also forced each boat to take on additional passengers. The Cuban government then
took the opportunity to sell fuel and supplies to the boats. The large number of boats and the
exchange of goods led a triumphant Granma to declare that the U.S. blockade was broken.
“There is a great demand for Havana Club rum,” wrote the Communist Party newspaper,
“everyone agrees that the Bacardi they sell in the United States is absolutely worthless.”28 Even
as the Cuban government dealt with exiles eager to bring their families to the United States, the
state’s media proceeded to mock both the U.S. government and militantly anti-Castro members
of the exile community like the Bacardi Company’s Bosch family. Despite these jabs, exile
community’s enthusiasm for the boatlift resulted in 6,333 new Cuban arrivals in the United
States between April 21 and April 30.29
As the exodus began, it was soon joined by more and more individuals and families who
had not been a part of the embassy crisis. Heads of household would often apply for permission
to leave the country in secret and would keep that decision quiet for fear of being targeted by
their neighbors. Even after the decision had been made to leave the country and the families
had been registered as having the desire to leave, however, there was no guarantee of an exit.
Families could be taken to a staging area in Havana where they would be left to wait for days.
The would-be refugees needed to remain attentive to the instructions and calls of the Cuban
authorities as those who were called and who did not report after the call were simply left
28
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behind. In order to avoid this, Cuban American fashion designer Juan Carlos Piñera recalls that
his parents took to sleeping in shifts to avoid the possibility of being left behind while the whole
family slumbered.30
In the case of eight-year-old Lissette Mendez, it was her mother who chose to leave the
island when the opportunity came. Mendez remembered being one of the few Cuban Jews still
living in Cuba by 1980. Her father had been absolutely devoted to the revolution, but upon his
death her mother had decided to leave the country. Young Lissette was told that they would
soon be leaving the country, but that she had to keep this fact a secret. She almost exposed the
plan when she began trying to give her toys away to those children who were her friends. When
the time for Mendez and her mother to leave their home came, however, secrecy was quickly
discarded. Officials arrived and publicly informed them it was time to leave. At that moment,
all of Mendez’s neighbors gathered to yell and throw refuse at both mother and daughter.31
This type of public rejection could easily escalate into violence and led to other
traumatic experiences. Volunteers who worked with incoming refugees reported that many of
the new arrivals were injured as a result of government encouraged repudiation.32 When Niza
Motola and her family left their house, her neighbors were chanting “Escoria! Gusano!” Some
resorted to calling her mother a whore and throwing sticks at her family. Motola, also eight at
the time, was unsure as to what was happening. Motola’s uncle saved the young girl from a
member of the crowd who went to physically assault her. Even after reaching the relative safety
of the bus that would take them to the harbor, young Niza was further traumatized by the
treatment her family received from the Cuban government. The men were separated from the
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women and every single person was strip searched and had their money and jewelry taken
away. “Watching my mother be strip-searched was something that has taken me years to be
able to talk about,” Motola recounted years later.33
Those citizens leaving Cuba as part of the boatlift were forced to sign documents
confessing to social deviancy and crimes against the state. This created a false record of crimes
never committed by the migrants, but which fit the Cuban government’s preferred image of the
boatlift. In an effort to reinforce this narrative and to rid the country of problematic individuals,
the Cuban government added convicted criminals to the general population of the boatlift.
After the end of the boatlift it was determined that some 26,000 of the Mariel entrants had
criminal records. Of these 26,000, however, only 2,000 had committed serious felonies, while
many others were jailed under lesser crimes ascribed to them by Cuba’s ley de peligrosidad (law
of dangerousness).34 An oral history project undertaken as part of an English instruction
program for the new refugees revealled that the crimes for which the refugees had been
convicted varied greatly. Some were convicted of purchasing food or clothing on the black
market, others for selling items or materials without permission, still others had been political
prisoners or had been imprisoned for offenses like vagrancy and fighting. With sentences
ranging from thirty-one days to forty years, the ley de peligrosidad was particularly useful for
incarcerating “practically anybody for any simple misdemeanor in which the person might be
considered a public menace.”35
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For some, the inclusion of the prisoners was an added layer to the traumas of leaving
Cuba. Niza Motola’s recalled that her bus to Mariel was stopped at a prison and loaded up with
prisoners on the way to the port.36 For the prisoners themselves, the opportunity for release
was made all the more precious by the conditions in Cuban prisons. Former prisoners described
dirty, overcrowded facilities where 125 prisoners could be crammed into a space designed for
25 people. Stories of prisoners sleeping on the floor, not receiving sufficient nutrition, and being
abused by their captors were common among the refugees released from Cuban prisons.37
Some prisoners actively sought the chance to participate in the boatlift, even at the risk of their
own lives. Daniel Benítez was serving a sentence at Sandino Prison for food theft when he
entered his name in a list of those seeking to be included in the boatlift. When his name was
not called for release, Benítez and twelve other inmates began a hunger strike. After 19 days
without food, the strikers received a visit from the superintendent and were allowed inclusion
into those immigrating to the United States.38
In addition to prison inmates, the Cuban government also sought to rid itself of
homosexuals in what Historian Julio Capó Jr. has called “a clear episode of the Castro regime’s
‘institutionally promoted homophobia.’” During a speech at Havana’s José Martí Revolution
Square on May 1, 1980, Castro furthered his narrative of the Mariel exiles as the lumpen of
Cuban society and specifically made reference to homosexuals as part of that category, making
eference to “limp wrists.”39 Homosexuality had technically been decriminalized in 1979, but the
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ley de peligrosidad left homosexuals vulnerable if they defied the “norms of socialist morality.”
This often led to arrests based on perceived effeminacy and on congregation with other
homosexuals.40 Cuban homosexuals were encouraged to leave the country, with some sources
reporting that incarcerated homosexuals were threatened with the addition of years to their
sentence should they resist joining the boatlift.41
Some of the refugees who took part in the boatlift also suffered from a variety of
conditions including mental illness, chronic illnesses, and mental and physical disabilities. Some
1,500 refugees had mental health problems or intellectual disability, including 500 who needed
institutionalization and 500 who were placed in halfway houses in the United States. While
exact numbers are not available, estimates put the number of refugees with chronic medical
problems including substance abuse, tuberculosis, or cardiovascular disease at 1,600.42
These various groups converged on Mariel harbor and found themselves distributed
among the boats which had arrived from the United States. Boat captains and the exiles who
hired them often waited for several days while immigration officials went over the list of family
members they wanted to bring back to the United States. Crews passed the time by eating and
drinking. Eager to take advantage of the large demand for supplies, Cuban authorities raised
prices on seemingly everything, even ham sandwiches and fresh water. Originally, government
boats sold ham sandwiches for a dollar, but they soon increased the cost to three dollars and
then to five. A gallon of fresh water cost three to five dollars and the bottles of Havana Club
that Granma had boasted about had a going rate of $85.43 One captain, Mike Howell, had a
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confrontation with immigration officials when he asked for a tally of refugees on board his boat
and received a list of three hundred—rather than the expected twenty-five!—names.44
Ultimately, Howell left Cuba without the people he had sought to ferry back to the United States
but agreed to take on the women, children, and elderly from a stranded ship. He further agreed
to tow that ship, filled with what he thought were dangerous looking men, to international
waters to get the help of the U.S. Coast Guard.45
The passengers and crew of Howell’s ship, the Mañana, engaged in a dangerous and
crowded crossing with the hope of arriving in Key West. They were far from alone in facing the
sea voyage with strangers foisted upon them by the Cuban government. Caridad Morales
rented a 25-foot boat to sail down to Cuba in an attempt to get her relatives, the Caballero
family, back to the United States. For Morales to bring José and Gricel Caballero and their two
daughters Elizabeth and Judith back to Florida, however, their small vessel was forced to take on
an additional eighteen passengers.46 Larger vessels were also filled to dangerous levels during
the boatlift. One refugee, Tomás Díaz, recalls making the trip on a ship called the Hill David.
The vessel was only made for 150 people, but Cuban officials loaded 350 refugees into the ship.
The waters were rough for the Hill David’s crossing. The refugees started collecting dark coins
and Díaz, an Afro-Cuban, was asked to throw them into the ocean as an offering to Cuba’s
Patroness, Our Lady of Charity of El Cobre.47 The overcrowding only compounded the danger as
many of the boats rented by the exiles were barely able to get to Cuba, much less return
overloaded with refugees. The crossings often ended not with the boats reaching Key West on
their own power, but instead having to be brought into shore by the Coast Guard.
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For most of the refugees, the boatlift represented the hope for a new life. Others were
forced to participate. Regardless of the end result, the trials and tribulations that accompanied
the journey to Mariel and the subsequent sea voyage took their toll on most of the would-be
migrants. Once they reached the United States, the new refugees would face all the same
challenges their predecessors had encountered but without the comprehensive system of aid or
the positive reception of the U.S. government or the American people in general. For the
Cubans that participated in the boatlift, the label of marielitos would not only indicate the
circumstances by which they arrived in the United States, but it would carry negative
associations that would follow them as a stigma for years to come.

Despite new legislation meant to streamline the admittance processes for refugees, the
Mariel boatlift presented a major policy challenge to the Carter administration. Earlier in the
year, the president had signed the Refugee Act of 1980 into law. The Refugee Act was the
product of almost two years of work and negotiation between members of Congress, the INS,
the Departments of Health Education and Welfare, State, and Justice, and the White House. It
redefined “refugee” as a victim of “persecution, or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion,” without linking the persecution to a particular geographical region or political
ideology.48 The Act also authorized the admission of fifty thousand refugees a year who could,
after one year, with INS oversight gain permanent resident status. This number could be
adjusted through Congressional consultation and approval in case of a large scale emergency
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situation.49 Despite being designed for an emergency situation in which the United States would
be the country of first asylum for large numbers of refugees, the legislative structures of the
Refugee Act of 1980 could only serve as far as they were put into use by the Carter
Administration.
On May 3, President Carter told the League of Women Voters in Philadelphia that the
Cuban refugees would be welcomed with “an open heart and open arms.”50 The White House’s
National Security team was less effusive. It was concerned about the crisis not only because of
the volume of refugees, but also because it saw it as falling outside the scope of the Refugee Act
and existing international conventions. It also set a dangerous precedent. Unlike other refugee
situations, the Mariel boatlift involved “a country, i.e. Cuba, expelling its people to the United
States.” Although the travel by exile Cubans to Mariel to bring back relatives and other refugees
to the United States was in violation of U.S. immigration laws, the federal government found
itself in a dilemma. It could not stop American boats from picking up and depositing Cubans on
U.S. shores. “Our national conscience rebels at the thought of turning these people away,”
wrote White House aide Robert Pastor, while also mentioning the commitment made by
President Carter in Philadelphia. Despite the moral certitude in admitting those refugees who
were fleeing Castro’s government, Pastor worried that many among the boatlift Cubans were
“hardened criminals” and that allowing the Cuban government-mandated boatlift in direct
violation of U.S. immigration statutes would serve as an invitation to other countries to
“replicate Castro’s strategy.” Pastor suggested several strategies to put pressure on Cuba’s
government and create a normalized flow of refugees for the years that followed. The U.S.
Congress could, for example, increase the number of Cuban refugees allowed in the United
49
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States for the year 1980 from 19,500 to 75,000, and to 50,000 for subsequent years, suggesting
that this strategy would further destabilize Castro’s revolution.51
As a result of these concerns and in an attempt to further foreign policy aims the
administration sought to reframe the welcome extended by President Carter to the Cuban
refugees “in the context of an orderly flow.” As such, it sought to reduce the boat flotilla by
convincing the Cuban-American community of the dangers of the unorganized boatlift and of
the government’s intention to regularize the flow of refugees. This would be combined with
what the administration defined as “modest” enforcement of U.S. laws, including fines and
citations but few seizures of boats and no attempts to block boats seeking to travel to Cuba.
These strategies proved ineffectual as the Cuban American community did not take the U.S.
government at its word and the enforcement of the law had led to few fines being levied, with
none being collected, and only nine seizures by the second week of May. The flow continued
and federal officials estimated that by mid-May approximately 50-55,000 Cubans would have
arrived in the United States as part of the boatlift. This was not likely to change as national
security officials assumed that the boatlift would continue “as long as Cuban-Americans believe
they can return with long-separated family members or until they are assured that an
alternative transport system is in place.”52
The federal government was growing concerned about the increasing evidence of
“undesirables” in the boatlift, including “hardened criminals, the mentally ill, the retarded and
persons who are diseased.” This concern was shared by members of the Cuban American
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community because of the growing backlash among non-Cuban Americans.53 The head of the
Cuban Affairs desk at the State Department, Myles Frechette, described how the administration
sought the community’s help in stemming the flow of refugees. “It was the first time the U.S.
government had reached out to the Cuban-American community,” recalled Frechette. Deputy
Secretary of State Warren Christopher invited several Cuban American organizations to
Washington in an attempt to gain their help in stopping the boatlift. “The meeting,” Frechette
described, “was just a disaster because each group was pushing its own agenda.” 54 Without a
decisive leadership, the Cuban American organizations succumbed to in-fighting along wellestablished fault lines. The administration was put in a difficult position by this outcome. The
organizations were unable to provide aid to the federal government as a united front that might
have stemmed the tide of the boatlift. Carter, however, was facing re-election at the end of the
year and risked the ire of the Cuban American community if he engaged in more restrictive
action.
Equally problematic for Carter’s political prospects were the accusations that the
administration’s handling of the boatlift was encouraging illegal immigration. By mid-May,
veteran New York Times reporter James Reston opened an article by stating that the “United
States Government has clearly lost control of its immigration policy.” Reston held that the
Cuban refugee influx was simply a particularly dramatic example that the United States was
unable to protect its borders or enforce laws against illegal immigration at a time of high
inflation and unemployment. While previous forms of illegal immigration by Mexicans and
other Latin Americans, who made contributions to the U.S. economy, were generally ignored,
the Mariel crisis could not simply be overlooked. In Reston’s mind, Mariel posed a fundamental
53
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question as to whether the federal government had any sort of policy to deal with the problems
of immigration into the United States. While he conceded that the human tragedy of the event
was obvious, he pointed that out that Fidel Castro had a policy, he was “exporting his failures.”
Neither the White House nor Congress could say the same. Unrestricted immigration, further,
could create a crisis spurred by bilingual education’s establishment of “separate but equal”
educational systems. The boatlift represented a problem of image at a time in which diplomatic
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were on the rise. Because the United
States had not been defending its borders and enforcing its immigration laws, “this latest
invasion of the Cubans in the weekend boats has not only hurt but even mocked the authority of
the White House.” 55 Even when the Carter administration attempted stricter enforcement of
laws preventing travel to Cuba, this had little effect. By the time the U.S. Coast Guard
established a control net over South Florida’s waters, government reports quoted estimates that
about 1,000 boats remained in Cuba, ready to return. This delay in establishing control
rendered the administration’s actions moot to restrictionists as it allowed for as many as 50,000
refugees to arrive to the United States without a single new vessel approaching Cuba.56
Carter’s political problems with the massive influx of Cubans were compounded by the
increasing presence of Haitian “boat” people in South Florida, a phenomenon that had been
growing for some time. During the 1970s 55,000 Haitians had immigrated to the United States
through legal means. Many of them were attempting to escape the repressive government of
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. In addition to the legal immigration by Haitians, some 30,000
others attempted to enter the United States without following regular immigration procedures.
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This wave of asylum seekers posed a problem for the U.S. government because, unlike the
Cubans, the Haitians were fleeing an allied government. As such, less than one hundred
Haitians were granted asylum in the United States throughout the 1970s.57 Some allies of the
Cubans admitted the greater difficulties faced by the Haitians based on the political orientation
of the regime they were fleeing. “If Duvalier were a Communist,” one county official stated,
“the Haitians wouldn’t have any problems.”58 Although the amount of Haitians arriving on
American coasts were not on par with the numbers of Cubans arriving as part of the Mariel
boatlift, or even with the peak Cuban migrations of the 1960s, they represented another
significant challenge to policymakers and led to the creation of the Haitian Processing Center in
Miami in March of 1980. By the end of the year, federal authorities estimated that 12,000
Haitians had sought asylum in the United States in the previous twelve months.59 These refugee
influxes became two sides of the same coin in the eyes of the federal government and became
linked in its bureaucracy with the establishment of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force as the
coordinating entity for dealing with the refugees.
The political problems for the Carter administration and for the refugees were only
made worse by the public image that the new exodus was assuming. Where previous waves of
Cuban refugees received a warm welcome from the national media, often driven by the work of
the public relations officials of the Cuban Refugee Program, the marielitos received a very
different reception. Early on, media outlets like the Chicago Tribune encouraged the arrival of
the refugees embracing the types of narratives that older exiles had encountered during the
1960s. “So give us your bums, Fidel,” wrote the Tribune’s editor in late April, “send them
57
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throughout the hemisphere and the world. They certainly make better exports than your
revolution.”60 Editorials in newspapers throughout the United States, including the Wall Street
Journal and the Washington Post, urged the federal government to provide the refugees with
humanitarian assistance.61 This trend did not last.
On May 11, 1980 the New York Times ran an article on the boatlift entitled “Retarded
People and Criminals Are Included in Cuban Exodus.” The article’s author, Edward Schumacher,
reported that out of 30,000 refugees some 9,000 were friends and family of Cuban Americans,
and the rest came from among the 10,000 Peruvian embassy refugees and from those whom
the Cuban government called scum. In fact, the piece claimed, Cuban soldiers were loading
refugees onto vessels in Mariel harbor “in a major effort, discussed openly by Cuban officials, to
rid the country of criminals, mentally retarded people, delinquents and others the Government
calls ‘scum’ by sending them to the United States.” Schumacher reported on a group of four
“apparently retarded” people huddling on a ship called the Valley Chief. One young man in the
group was asked if he came from prison or a mental institution and responded by mumbling
“embajada,” embassy, but he was unable to produce the safe-conduct pass provided to and
tenaciously held on to by Peruvian embassy asylum seekers.62
On the pier, the reporter came into contact with a group of prisoners and ex-convicts
who had been instructed by Cuban authorities to state they were from the embassy so they
could avoid detention upon arriving on American shores. One of them, thirty-year-old Pedro
Palmeri, had been imprisoned for six years for the theft of a government owned vehicle he
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claimed he only lent to friends. After being arrested again for fighting with a police officer, he
was offered the chance to leave Cuba for the United States. Palmeri claimed he was not given
much of a choice. “I knew they would make it hard for me if I didn’t go,” he explained, “It was
an easy choice to make anyway. This whole country is a prison.” Schumacher acknowledged
that the some of those who had been imprisoned had been detained for crimes more political
than common. Some Cuban-Americans defended the criminals and ex-convicts because of
political convictions and often those who had committed petty crimes. Food rationing by the
Cuban government, they argued, had forced many of the convicts to steal to feed themselves
and their families. Other Cuban Americans were not as forgiving, fearing that there would be
political and social repercussions in the United States. The piece quoted Antonio Aguacio, a
New Jersey longshoreman who told Schumacher that the U.S. government should “screen out
the misfits and send them back.”63
This prompted some Cuban Americans to take it upon themselves to combat this
stereotype. When she read a piece in the U.S. News & World Report that expressed concerns
over the impact that the boatlift would have on an ailing American economy, Olga Vives of Mt.
Prospect, Illinois felt she needed to respond. Vives wrote a letter to the publication’s editor and
invoked the history of the United States of offering refuge “to the oppressed, the sick and the
poor.” She argued that the country had a moral obligation to come to the aid of the Mariel
refugees. She recounted how her own family had arrived in the United States in 1961,
“penniless and destitute, emotionally shattered over the loss of our country,” and how they had
been given a chance to rebuild their lives. Why could the United States not give the same
welcome to these new refugees from Cuba? The Mariel Cubans, she argued, were fleeing
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oppression; trying to survive. “Has the nation gotten smaller,” Vives asked, “or have the hearts
of the American people become less accommodating?”64 These negative perceptions persisted
as efforts by Cuban Americans like Vives were drowned out by the increasingly negative
perceptions in the media and among members of the Cuban community in the United States.
Some remember this as a victory for Fidel Castro. Cuban American lawyer Rafael
Peñalver considered this a public relations coup for the Cuban regime. “What Castro achieved
was that the world, instead of talking about the desperation of the Cuban people to leave
Cuba,” Peñalver argued, “was talking about the criminals who had arrived through the Mariel
boatlift.” The crimes of the felons included in the boatlift by Cuban authorities had the effect of
staining the image of the overwhelming majority of the boatlift Cubans, who were “seeking
liberty, decent people, working people.”65 The actual number of hardcore criminals among the
Mariel refugees received a disproportionate amount of attention when compared to the total
numbers of the migration. While the hardcore felons “constituted less than 4 percent of the
total number of entrants, they commanded almost all of the media attention.”66
Aside from the presence of prisoners, homosexuals, and the mentally ill, the social
characteristics of the vast majority of the refugees who arrived in the United States as part of
the Mariel boatlift were different from those of the refugees who arrived in earlier waves.
There was a significant number of Afro Cubans participating in the boatlift, larger than in any
previous wave. Although there were a number of artist and intellectuals who also fled Cuba at
this time, these refugees were largely male and working class. U.S. census data shows that

64

Olga E. Vives to editor U.S. News & World Report, May 6, 1980, Folder Mariel Boatlift—Clippings,
Vertical File, CHC.
65
Rafael Peñalver. Interview with author. Digital recording. Coral Gables, Florida, March 14, 2013.
66
García, Havana USA, 65.

230
about 25% of the early Cuban immigrants had a college education, compared to 7% of the
Mariel Cubans. Nearly 70% of the marielitos were blue-collar workers. Some scholars have
suggested that many of those who sought to travel to the United States as part of the boatlift
were disenfranchised by the lack of opportunity for advancement in Cuba, both politically and
economically. Older generations of Cubans, those who had built the revolution, retained high
posts in the country while the young were often forced to bear the brunt of Castro’s military
adventures in Africa and Latin America. “Moreover, in the years prior to el Mariel, Cubans lived
through some of the leanest years of the revolution,” writes sociologist Silvia Pedraza, “housing
shortages were severe; food was insufficient and controlled by la libreta, the strict ration book;
unemployment and underemployment were chronic; and a vast black market developed in
which most participated.”67 Unlike the extensive professional and business experience
represented by the refugees of earlier migration waves, the skillsets and experiences brought by
the marielitos did not present a potential economic asset for the United States.
The federal response to the refugees, in terms of material advantages provided, was
also significantly different from that received by the earlier waves of refugees, in large part
caused by the massive and disorganized form of the migration. By the time that the federal
government took any real notice of Florida’s refugee problem in 1960, the migration had been
ongoing for nearly two years and the problem had become so massive as to have the Red Cross
rebuff Tracy Voorhees’s suggestions that the organization take the lead in deal with the crisis in
Miami. The original crisis became a chronic problem that needed to be handled by welfare state
structures acting on behalf of the interests of the national security state. The sudden
appearance of thousands of refugees on American soil in a matter of days presented an
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immediate challenge and proceeded at a rate that dwarfed any previous period of Cuban exile
migration. The response to the boatlift was immediate, but as multiple, competing layers of
federal bureaucracy sought to respond to the crisis and the policymakers navigated the dangers
posed by the boatlift to their political prospects, the single-mindedness and purpose of the
response in the early 1960s was absent from that of the Carter Administration. Critics and
observers equated this aimlessness with confusion and a lack of leadership. “President Jimmy
Carter was totally unprepared for it,” Myles Frechette remarked on the twenty fifth anniversary
of the boatlift, “and I don’t think anyone is going to give him high marks for the way he handled
it.”68
From the early days of the Mariel migration, various federal agencies found themselves
at odds as to how to best deal with the influx and how to best work in concert. In late April,
officials from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and from other government
agencies responding to the arrival of the marielitos were surprised when the Federal Emergency
Management Agency unveiled plans to open a processing center for the Cuban entrants. They
were surprised not only because they had to learn about this through a press conference held
by FEMA coordinator Tom Casey, but because they had had a meeting with Casey just one hour
before the conference.69 Regardless of these communication errors among federal agencies,
FEMA took over operations at the facility in Key West that had been receiving the Mariel
entrants since the start of the refugee flow and the HEW operation at the county fairgrounds in
Tamiami Park, west of Miami proper. It also designated Eglin Air Force base, located in the
Florida panhandle as a processing center for up to 5,000 refugees and prepared to close down
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the Tamiami operation in favor of a new facility on the closed Opa Locka Naval Air Station, long
proposed as a destination for Cuban immigrants by Dade County citizens and officials.70
On some levels, the problems and their responses were very similar to the issues faced
two decades before, simply on a scale so large that the federal response could only handle
immediate necessities instead of longer term outcomes. The need for military bases and large
scale processing centers came from familiar problems related to the Cuban exile. By May 2,
federal officials reported that housing had already become a significant problem in the Miami
area. “Most available housing has been utilized and we are beginning to hear stories of people
being temporarily housed in converted dog kennels, etc.,” wrote Miami’s HEW coordinator
George Putnam. The problem, he went on, would only get worse as the refugee flow was
expected to continue.71 Hospitalization costs and medical supplies for the refugees had to be
dealt with as officials needed to provide medical aid to incoming emergency cases and those
afflicted by tuberculosis and mental health issues. This led to a temporary arrangement by
which Florida’s state government covered the refugees’ medical costs and were then
reimbursed by federal authorities.72 Officials were forced to first contend with the most basic
needs of the refugees before they could even consider the effects that the influx would have on
Miami.
The federal government’s ability to meet the needs of the refugees had also changed in
the two decades since the original refugee crisis. The Cuban Refugee Program had, for all
intents and purposes, ceased to exist at the end of the previous decade. Some among the
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Cuban American community who worked in cooperation with the federal government sought to
have the CRP refunded and restarted to deal with the Mariel entrants, particularly as the
populations in the processing centers swelled. Members of the Junta Patriotica Cubana,
including Manuel A. Varona, argued that a reinstated Cuban Refugee Program would be cheaper
for the federal government in the long run than the response they had witnessed thus far.
Drawing parallels between the boatlift and the arrival of the earlier waves of refugees in the
early 1960s, the Junta declared that “only a special program of exception such as the previously
used Cuban Refugee Program, can do the job.”73 The ubiquity and the effectiveness of the CRP
in the larger refugee experience were still present in the minds of the more established Cuban
Americans. If it worked two decades before, surely it could work again.
The federal government, however, was not in a position to recreate the massive federal
expenditures of the original CRP and to multiply them by the much larger numbers of refugees
arriving on American shores each day. Officials in charge of the emergency response to the
crisis often had to deal with problems stemming from the economic recession that the country
found itself in and the decreasing prominence of welfare state funding aimed at helping
impoverished populations. When the Department of Agriculture decided in early May that
Cubans would be eligible for food stamps if they registered for work, officials were concerned
that a “crisis in funding for the food stamp program has to be resolved (for anyone Cuban or
non-Cuban) to receive food stamps in June and beyond.”74 The Cuban Refugee Program had
been a foreign policy initiative couched in terms of and developed within the context of a robust
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welfare state. That state still existed, but its priorities had shifted to different sectors of society
and in combination with a weak economy it resulted in a response to the refugee flow that was
far more in line with traditional avenues of refugee management. Instead of an open door
policy with a voluntary registration element for those refugees seeking aid, the 1980 response
was characterized by universal registration and the opening of new processing centers and
refugee holding facilities in Miami’s Orange Bowl and military bases such as Fort Chafee,
Arkansas and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.75
While the federal response to the refugee wave ran smoothly by providing basic
amenities and health services to the marielitos, there were problems that arose from this
massive effort. Attempts to transport, process, house, and treat such significant numbers of
people sometimes led to health hazards, accidents, or violence. There was a significant
outbreak of diarrhea and vomiting in the Orange Bowl holding center that authorities suspected
might have resulted either from food contamination at the Key West facility or from a “change
in the water system.”76 Two refugees suffering from leprosy were scheduled to be transferred
from Key West to a hospital in Louisiana to be treated, but instead were mistakenly sent
elsewhere and had to be tracked down by federal authorities who ultimately found them at the
Opa Locka facility.77
Refugees who suffered from mental illness or intellectual disabilities were particularly
vulnerable to systemic problems stemming from public health and immigration structures that
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were not prepared to deal with them. Refugees with mental health problems who were in need
of long term institutionalization became a concern of Health, Education, and Welfare officials
because their needs were simply not being met. These individuals were being “passed back and
forth between holding areas and the local psychiatric clinics and hospitals.” This posed logistical
problems for refugee transportation, but it also posed a danger of their medical care “falling
between the cracks.”78 This system of part time care led to at least one refugee injury. On
Saturday, May 17th three refugees, two women and one man, were transported to a Miami clinic
to be treated for mental health issues.79 That evening, the three refugees were standing outside
the clinic awaiting evaluation. It was then that the male refugee began brandishing a knife he
had somehow obtained and was thereafter shot by a police officer. The refugee was wounded
and admitted into the hospital for treatment.80 The report did not list the patient’s motivations
or medical history, but the fact that he managed to obtain a knife at a federal holding facility, a
hospital, or in transit indicates that concerns over refugees “falling through the cracks” were
well founded.
Despite these difficulties and the increasingly negative image of the marielitos in the
national media, there were some people both in Miami and outside of Miami, Cuban and nonCuban who welcomed the refugees and sought to lend them and the federal government a
hand. New York City Mayor Edward Koch contacted FEMA and offered between 300-400 city
apartments for Mariel Cubans, to be sponsored by the city’s Cuban community.81 Voluntary
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agencies like the Church World Service once again provided their services in the resettlement of
Cuban refugees. They helped match refugees with offers of sponsorship, even in the case of
“problematic” or “undesirable” refugees. CWS served as the intermediary by which gay
organizations like the Metropolitan Community Church, for example, could identify sponsors
and work towards resettling gay Cubans without willing sponsors.82 The federal government
also received the help of another veteran of the Cuban refugee effort of the 1960s as Monsignor
Bryan Walsh and Miami’s Catholic Charities aided immigration authorities in ensuring the
wellbeing of unaccompanied minors among the marielitos. Walsh helped provide bilingual
social workers to manage the young refugees.83 Officials even theorized that a South Florida
facility for the foster home placement of unaccompanied minors could be established under
Walsh’s supervision.84
Those who were most welcoming of the marielitos were those established Cuban
Americans who sought to be reunited with friends or family, or who suddenly and surprisingly
found themselves reunited with those they thought long lost. Miami police officer Pablo
Camacho migrated to the United States at age twelve, twenty years prior to the boatlift, leaving
behind the grandmother who helped raise him and other family members. By 1980, Camacho
was a police officer assigned to Little Havana and his origins and experiences made him a natural
candidate for an assignment dealing with the Mariel refugees at the Orange Bowl. Authorities
wanted order kept within the temporary holding center, but they also sought to prevent
incidents triggered by eager Cuban Americans who came to the Orange Bowl hoping to catch a
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glimpse of someone they knew. Camacho was tasked with keeping the refugees from spilling
over the chain-link fence once they spotted long lost relatives. In that capacity he witnessed
firsthand the emotional intensity of those moments of reunion. “I saw six-foot tall men crying
over finding relatives,” Camacho told a Miami Herald reporter, “Some were bleeding from the
hands from trying to reach over the fence.”85 What was for the refugees and their relatives an
emotional, even sublime, moment soon became a matter of routine for officers like Camacho
who could appreciate the emotion of the moment but who had a responsibility to maintain
order and prevent injuries.
It was in the middle of one such routine task that the impact of the boatlift hit Camacho.
He boarded a bus to give a group of arriving refuges the same statement of welcome he had
given to dozens of other groups before them when an old woman stood up and burst into tears.
Clara Camacho Valmana had not seen her grandson Pablo in the twenty years since she had sent
him to the United States. In the intervening years she had seen her husband, her son, her
daughter-in-law, her grandsons, and other relatives leave the island. She had kept up with her
family’s lives from afar, and even learned of her husband’s death from a radio announcement
on Miami’s WQBA. Pablo Camacho had given his grandmother’s name to friends in the Cuban
American community in hopes that his grandmother and his aunt, his last relatives still on the
island, might find a way to join the rest of the family in Miami. Despite Camacho’s hopes, he
could not know that Clara had managed to make her way to Miami aboard a ship called the
Georgia Cracker. She had lost Pablo’s telephone number when she was searched by Cuban
soldiers at Mariel. Unsure of how to find her grandson, Clara was unexpectedly and tearfully
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reunited with Pablo when he welcomed her bus to the holding center, causing jubilation inside
the bus.86
The hope for family reunification and for the chance to embarrass Castro’s government
by supporting those escaping revolutionary Cuba drove an outpouring of generosity and aid
from many in Miami’s Cuban American community. Spanish-language radio stations in the area
broadcast appeals for aid which resulted in large amounts of food, clothing, and funds being
donated. Many Cuban doctors volunteered their services in order to provide free medical care
to the refugees. The Cuban exile owner of the Everglades Hotel, Juvenal Pina, temporarily
allotted 350 rooms in his hotel to house 450 refugees and charged severely reduced rates or
nothing at all.87 A telethon on Spanish-language television raised $2,000,000 for the
marielitos.88 While there were some divisions within the community on how to best respond to
the boatlift and to the presence in the city of the new refugees, Miami’s Cubans provided
significant private aid to the refugees in an effort to supplement a federal response that seemed
anemic compared to that of decades past.
Despite the fact that the response from the federal government towards the marielitos
was different from that received by the exiles of the 1960s and early 1970s, their treatment
from the federal government was seen as markedly better than that afforded to the Haitian
refugees. A coalition of Haitian advocates, including religious groups and minority Democratic
politicians, had been attempting to get better treatment for the refugees for years before the
boatlift, but Mariel “presented them an opportunity to point out the hypocrisy of American
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refugee policy.”89 Unlike the refugees coming from Cuba, when questioned, most Haitian
refugees denied that they were fleeing political repression by the Duvalier government. There
was a widespread belief among the refugees that if they sought political asylum and were
deported back to Haiti they would be imprisoned or killed. Because of these assertions and
because the federal government was hesitant to provide asylum to people fleeing an allied
state, immigration officials deemed the refugees economic rather than political casualties.
Haitian refugees were thus ineligible for work permits, government aid, and other benefits.
This lack of benefits was compounded by the fact that the established Haitian community in
Miami was smaller, 30,000 compared to 400,000, and less affluent than the city’s Cuban
community. “Haitians can only envy the political and economic influence of the Cubans, who
have been generally credited with reviving Miami’s economy,” declared the Wall Street Journal.
Even as the Haitians lacked the political clout of the Cuban Americans, they sought to have the
legal status of the refugees amended in federal court.90 When U.S. District Court Judge James
King came to a decision in the summer of 1980, he declared that the INS “had looked only to
deport the Haitians rather than considering the facts of each application, committing ‘a
wholesale violation of due process.’”91
Haitian advocates and leaders often showed frustration, mistrust, or anger when dealing
with the federal government, particularly the Cuban Haitian Task Force. When officials from the
Task Force spoke to Father Jean Juste of the Haitian Refugee Center, a small operation in Little
Haiti that provided information to refugees about their legal rights and immigration procedures,
they explained that he did not “vent any anger” toward the organization. Juste did note, that he
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had not received any financial support from the federal government. Haitians had a difficult
time gaining access to the halls of power where decisions about their destinies were debated
and resolved. If they were there, they were “usually mopping the floors rather than making
decisions.”92 Despite these feelings of his community being marginalized, Juste was open to
more dialogue with members of the Task Force.
These same officials were greeted with more distrust when they met with Rulx Jean
Barte. Jean Barte, described as a “very frank and outspoken young Haitian,” was the director of
the Haitian American Community of Dade County. The HACAD provided primary health care,
assistance with employment, translation, emergency aid, education and referral services to the
Haitian community. The organization had been forced to cut back on some of its programs due
to lack of funding. Jean Barte was described as being “highly suspicious of the intentions of the
Cuban Haitian Task Force and of the ‘real’ purpose or rationale for attempting to establish or reestablish communication with the Haitian community.” The Task Force had a history with the
Haitian community that fueled Jean Barte’s suspicions. The CHTF only contacted Haitian
agencies when they had a problem they could not solve or there was a crisis. The Task Force,
further, did not consult the community when reaching decisions regarding the handling of
Haitian refugees, nor did it keep the community apprised of those decisions once they had been
reached. Like Juste, Jean Barte pointed out that the lack of Haitian staff within the Task Force at
the decision-making level. He charged that there was a “racist and discriminatory attitude” that
kept Haitians from being included in the management of the crisis and kept all the high ranking
positions within the Task Force staffed by Americans or Cubans. It was his desire to see Haitians
receive equal and fair treatment in regards to the Cuban population, but he placed little trust or
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faith in the Task Force. Officials described Jean Barte as “very tough and direct,” and suggested
that with “concrete assistance rather than promises” he could be persuaded of the Task Force’s
sincerity in its concern for Haitian refugees. “He will be watching what we do rather than what
we say,” they stated.93
It was not only Haitian leaders who were critical of the administration’s perceived
favoritism. Members of the African American community in South Florida, and throughout the
country saw uneven treatment and often agreed with the assessment of many Haitian refugees
that racial motivations drove these inequalities. Established African American leaders, despite
showing displeasure, were more open to communication and cooperation with the federal
government. After a meeting with black community leaders, representatives from the private
sector, and elected officials with President Carter, William R. Perry Jr., president of the Greater
Miami Branch of the NAACP, conceded positive changes in regards to the refugees. “It was very
rewarding to note his move towards assuring justice in the treatment of Haitian refugees,” Perry
noted, “especially in comparison to the treatment granted Cuban refugees.”94 The city’s African
Americans were no strangers to frustrations related to Cuban refugees and Cuban Americans,
particularly in relation to city, state, and federal authorities. By the time of Mariel, the
inequalities that had helped feed the discontent and the 1968 Liberty City riots had become
structural and ingrained in the way the city functioned and in its race relations. In 1980, the
median family income for an African American family in greater Miami was $11,356. The
median income for Hispanics was $14,491 and $16,616 for non-Hispanic white Miamians. This
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led to significant disparities in the poverty rates in the city. The rate of African Americans living
under the poverty level was 26.4% in 1979, compared to 14.8% for Hispanics and 8.6% for nonHispanic whites.95
The influx of Cuban refugees and other groups from Latin America and the Caribbean,
combined with highway construction which had displaced a significant number of families from
traditionally African American Overtown, had also created an oversaturated housing situation in
Liberty City and Brownsville. The population of these two communities had risen rapidly from
48,024 in 1960 to 76,064 by the 1970s.96 A report provided to the federal government in late
May of 1980 by Florida International University Professor Marvin Dunn and his research
assistant Andrea Loring revealed that members the black community in these areas were also
automatically assigned higher risk categories regarding the procurement of business, home, and
automobile insurance. Dunn and Loring explained that the prevalence of this practice, redlining,
had been established through an investigation of by the office of the Florida State Insurance
Commissioner. The report also described how low income residents rarely qualified for lines of
credit with banks and had to deal with individual businesses that would lend them money at
very high rates. The economic boom in the city of Miami had also affected low income citizens.
As large commercial interests expanded toward low income areas, owners were often forced to
sell and renters were often forced to move as these lower income areas became gentrified.97
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To make matters worse, the heavy investment from Latin America rarely made its way
into African American areas. “You can look at the skyline and see cranes everywhere except
over the black community,” said Miami city attorney George Knox, one of a few African
American officials in the city.98 An official in the Department of Housing and Urban
Development clarified that differences like the influx of Latin American money and the presence
of the increasingly strong Hispanic community in the city did not prevent a “striking similarity”
to other cities in that the African American community was in last place in the economic
mainstream. The only difference was that it lagged behind both the Hispanic and white
communities. “The problem is compounded with some 35,000+ newly arrived Cuban and
30,000+ Haitian refugees competing for already scarce public resources,” the report went on,
noting also that frustrations arose from “the perceived quickness with which some Cuban
refugees are able to enter the healthy economic mainstream.”99 African Americans frustrations
with the rapid rise of the Cubans became particularly sharp when some local employers began
requiring job applicants be bilingual at a time in which the rate of black unemployment was
three to four times that of the overall area and where black youth unemployment varied
between 45-85% depending on the season.100 This continued a pattern of economic
disenfranchisement and of stagnation in the growth of political power in favor of new
immigrants that had become integrated into life in Miami.
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A study conducted in late 1978 found that nearly two thirds of African Americans in
Miami agreed with a survey question that read “Cubans get better treatment than Black people
in this country.” Over 70% of African American respondents to the study agreed that “Cubans in
Miami have taken over most of the jobs in the tourist industry that used to be reserved for
Blacks.” Responses to these statements by other groups in the city illustrated different
perspectives on the realities of living in Miami. Hispanic respondents overwhelmingly disagreed
with both statements. White respondents largely agreed with the first statement, and either
had “no opinion” or agreed with the second. The study called for more study of these tensions,
but the results were found to “clearly substantiate the view that Blacks in large numbers feel
alienated, exploited and discriminated against, while Whites and Latins essentially dismiss the
validity of those feelings.”101 The competition for social and political power and economic
advancement in Miami had led to a deep polarization that kept adding to the pressures in the
city’s race relations.
Tensions between the African American community and other groups in the area
became explosive after the resolution of the Arthur McDuffie case. On December 16, 1979,
McDuffie, an African American insurance executive, was pursued through the streets of the
greater Miami area by at least a dozen police cars following an alleged traffic violation on his
motorcycle. At the end of the pursuit, McDuffie was viciously beaten by up to a dozen police
officers wielding heavy flashlights. The beating left McDuffie with an open head injury that
killed him four days later. While the officers attempted to make it appear as though McDuffie
had been injured after losing control of his motorcycle, the physical evidence disproved this
claim. At the trial of the five officers charged with his death, Dade County’s chief medical
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examiner, Dr. Ronald Wright, testified that McDuffie’s wounds were consistent with someone
who fell down a four story building and landed head first onto concrete. He also stated that
McDuffie’s brain damage was the most severe he had seen in the course of the 3,600 autopsies
he had participated in or observed throughout his career. Two officers were given immunity
and along with other witnesses testified that McDuffie had been beaten. The seven week trial
of the officers accused of McDuffie’s death concluded on Saturday, May 17, 1980 when an allwhite jury who exonerated the five defendants of all charges after only three hours of
deliberations.102 News of the acquittal spread fast and resulted in the start of several days of
rioting that resulted in ten deaths by the end of the first night.103
While the rioting was sparked by the McDuffie acquittals, the discontent that led to the
riots came from longstanding grievances. At the end of the year, the Miami Herald explained
that the riots occurred not only because of McDuffie’s death and the acquittal of the police
officers in his case, but because, “in the 12 years since Miami’s first black riots in 1968, the
fundamental causes of blacks’ seething discontent had barely been addressed, much less
corrected.”104 These fundamental causes were often linked to the Cuban presence in Miami by
rioters and other observers. There was, in fact, a direct connection between the Cuban
presence in Miami and the McDuffie case as one of the policemen acquitted by the jury was a
Cuban American. News reports indicated that some African Americans had bitterly commented
that Cubans had “become so assimilated into American society that they now were joining
whites in brutalizing blacks.”105 To many of Miami’s African Americans, the presence of Miami’s
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Cuban Americans and their status in the city were intrinsically linked to the subordination of the
black community by non-Hispanic whites and by the police.
Following the riots, a story in the Wall Street Journal quoted a black youth counselor,
not “exactly your typical race rioter,” who had joined with others to throw stones at white
motorists. “I get jibe from whites on the job, crap from Cubans, and when I come home, I get it
from the police,” the man explained, “I’m convinced this is the only way we can get justice.”106
The 1980 riot, then, became a release of frustrations that had been building for years and which
were affecting Miami’s African American community at large. The widespread nature of these
frustrations and the embrace of this open rebellion against the city’s status quo are made
evident by the participation of a significant portion of the black community in these areas. It is
estimated that 26% of the population in the affected areas participated in the rioting, compared
to participation rates between 12-15% in the Detroit and Newark riots in 1967.107
The riots ultimately lasted three days and left fifteen dead and nearly four hundred
injured. Property damage after the riot was estimated at $100,000,000, most of which had
been targeted against businesses owned by Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites.108 The
consequences for the affected communities would last far longer than three days, but so too
would the political fallout for the Carter Administration. African American community leaders,
both locally and nationally, would be extremely critical of the federal government’s response to
the riot, with Jesse Jackson comparing it negatively to the response to the eruption of Mt. St.
Helens and to the Mariel boatlift. The White House was reluctant to declare the situation a
disaster for fear that it would encourage other disenfranchised African American populations
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around the country to initiate their own rebellions as a way to get federal aid into their
communities.109 Carter’s problems would continue as officials visited Miami in the months after
the riot and reported they were “deeply concerned” about the situation in the city, which they
characterized as “extremely volatile.” “Although we have tried to separate the problems,”
stated one report, “it is apparent to me that the impact of the influx of Cuban and Haitian
refugees is inextricable from the plight of the indigenous Blacks largely concentrated in Liberty
City and Overtown.” Like the African Americans in these areas, federal officials came to
recognize that the advantages accorded to Cuban refugees in the previous two decades and the
recent influxes of refugees from Cuba and Haiti had exacerbated black unemployment and had
“engendered a high degree of bitterness.” While the problem was recognized, the official who
filed the report had no recommendations on how to resolve this divide beyond recommending
that the refugee influx and the civil disturbances be regarded “as two elements of the same
problem.” 110
African Americans were not the only Miamians displeased with the new influx of
refugees. While some non-Hispanic whites had been upset about the arrival of previous waves
of Cuban exiles, the Mariel boatlift was particularly upsetting for many because of the sheer
volume of refugees arriving in such a short time. The month of May alone saw a total of 94,181
Cubans arriving in the United States, a total larger than any previous year of migration. By the
end of June, the U.S. Coast Guard’s operations had significantly reduced the number of boats
moving from the United States to Cuba and the entry of Cubans into the United States, but the
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total number of Cuban arrivals had risen to 115,436.111 When the Cuban government finally
closed the port of Mariel on September 25 and the last boat docked in Key West four days later,
the total number of refugees from the boatlift was over 124,000.112 While 62,541 marielitos
were placed in the camps created by the federal government while they awaited sponsorship
offers, the majority of the other refugees streamed into Miami at an unprecedented rate. Due
to the housing shortage in Miami, many of the Cubans who could not get immediate
sponsorship, but who authorities did not consider dangerous or suspicious, were housed in
“tent cities” in parks and under expressways. The largest of these tent cities was erected under
Interstate 95, to the east of Little Havana. 113
Situated next to the Miami River, the Riverside Park Tent City had a Cuban refugee
population in the hundreds which varied based on the resettlement of residents. By August 5,
1980, the camp had a population of 600 refugees, with 300 already having been resettled since
the establishment of the camp. The population of the camp was overwhelmingly male; one
report estimated that only fifty women resided there. When officials from the Cuban-Haitian
Task Force visited Tent City they found that only three families resided in the camp, with a total
of seven children all living in the same tent. Residents complained about mosquito infestations
coming from the river and from stagnant water accumulating in the southwest corner of the
camp. Others complained about the lack of sheets, soap, and towels. Because residents were
allowed to leave and the camp could be visited by friends and acquaintances, however, some
residents had bene able to obtain televisions, mattresses, and other supplemental furniture.
Refugees were provided breakfast and dinner and were given food stamps that they might
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procure their own lunches. While jobs were scarce in Miami, refugees were able to place job
applications with the Florida State Employment Service. Other services were provided by
volunteer agencies and Cuban American organizations.114 Resources would only become more
strained as the City of Miami estimated that more than 3,000 refugees passed through Tent City
in the month that followed.115
While Tent City was established by the federal government it presented the Cuban
Haitian Task Force with a potentially dangerous situation. One disgruntled official angrily
reacted to public statements made by CHTF Director James Giganti to the press where he
speculated about the dissolution of Tent City. He called public discussion of the camp’s options
“ill-advised,” describing the situation with the population there as “already tense, if not
explosive.” He explained that headlines regarding the possibility of the population of the camp
being moved around dramatically increased tensions among an unhappy population and that
news needed to be disseminated among the camp residents by trusted sources, not the news
media.116 Beyond the possibility of violence from residents, the camp was an embarrassment to
both the federal government and to local authorities. It was so significant an embarrassment to
these entities that opportunistic entrepreneurs sought to “solve” the problems of local and
federal governments. This was the case, for example, when a real estate broker by the name of
Frank A. Vianello wrote Assistant City Manager Cesar H. Odio with an offer for a property “large
enough, rural enough, and yet, near enough” to house the refugees away from the city’s
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center.117 The visible presence of the camps was a significant problem, as it exacerbated the
anger of city residents against the refugee groups.
The Wall Street Journal reported that even before the refugee influx began, radio talk
shows had “been abuzz with Anglos expressing anger about how quickly Miami has changed
from an Anglo tourist resort to a major Latin city, where virtually no English is heard in many
sections.” The arrival of the refugees groups, however, brought about a particularly harsh
backlash against both Cuban and Haitian refugees that was often racialized and tinged with
xenophobia. One Miami resident named Richard Rosichan who lived near Little Haiti wrote of
houses with garbage strewn lawns crammed with Haitians. Rosichan claimed that his children
had found a “ritually slaughtered goat” near some railroad tracks, before declaring that it was
“grossly unfair that one small area of one city should bear almost the entire burden of one of
the most impoverished, unhealthy and unskilled wave of immigrants ever to cross our shores.”
The perception of the refugees as unskilled parasites was not uncommon, nor was it new, but it
was particularly prevalent during the boatlift. “The U.S., South Florida, and Broward County
have enough parasites already without bringing them over,” one resident told the Miami Herald
after hearing that a refugee processing center would be opened in an abandoned missile base in
Miramar, north of Miami. Residents in the area were particularly concerned about the
possibility of the refugees being housed there, believing they would “bring with them
tuberculosis, venereal disease and other ailments.” The Mariel and Haitian influxes only
exacerbated the anger of Miamians over the changes in their city. Officials were less hyperbolic,
but just as concerned about the effect of the refugees on the city and its resources. One of
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Miami’s city commissioners, the Cuban-born Armando Lacasa noted that Miami was quickly
becoming “the refugee capital of the Americas.”118
While officials in Miami were concerned, officials in the city of Miami Beach were more
vocal, in large part because Cuban Americans had far less clout in that city. In late July of 1980,
for example, Miami Beach’s Mayor, Murray Meyerson, wrote a letter to President Carter asking
for aid. Meyerson described an “intolerable situation” that had been created by “pouring more
than 100,000 people into a community which has no housing surplus, no job surplus and limited
welfare reserves.” He described how hundreds of refugees had been “jammed” into
substandard housing by well-meaning private charities and public agencies “with a month’s rent
paid and no hope of future funding for shelter, food, clothing or medical care.” The refugees, he
explained, had bene reduced to “extremities of poverty.” These extremes often drove the men
among the refugees to turn to crime. He claimed that among the refugees there was a
percentage that, “under the Castro regime, lived by their wits or outside the law.” This had
resulted in a crime wave, noting that the crime rate in his city had risen by at least 30%,
including rapes, armed robberies, and assaults over the previous 90 days. He pleaded with the
president for help, claiming that many of the city’s residents lived in fear and its law
enforcement agencies were swamped. Murray explained that “simple humanity and a proper
regard” for the refugees and the welfare of the citizenry made it imperative that the President
declare a state of emergency in Dade County.119
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Internal communications in Miami Beach’s city government revealed that in order to
deal with the increase in crime, an additional twelve officers per shift were needed on an
overtime basis. This would result in $150,594.20 added to the city’s budget every 30 days.120
Police overtime was necessary, city officials explained, because of the concentration of
“undesirables” in Miami Beach, one of the areas with the largest concentration of elderly
persons in the nation. These individuals presented a constant danger to life and safety. “The
psychological fear that pervades this elderly and senior group is real, pervasive and appalling,”
wrote City Manager Harold T. Toal. To reinforce these claims Toal included a comparison of
statistics for the same week in September in 1979 and 1980. To date in 1979 there had been
229 robberies, 147 aggravated assaults, 15 rapes, and 6 homicides. By the same date in 1980,
there had been 446 robberies, 279 aggravated assaults, 51 rapes, and 9 homicides.121
Miami Beach officials sought to show federal authorities the palpable fear among the
city’s elderly residents and forwarded the minutes of a City Commission meeting attended by
several hundred elderly citizens in a letter to Congressman Claude Pepper and other federal
officials. During the meeting, Nina Rosenberg, a Miami Beach resident of thirty-five years,
recalled how beautiful and peaceful the community was. This had changed. “It’s became just
one big prison,” Rosenberg stated, “We are locked in in our apartments.” She told the audience
that she had been mugged at 10 am the previous week by a man who had threatened to cut her
face and that many people present had had similar experiences. It was then that she explained
she did not have a problem with all refugees, only the criminals among them:
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Now, we understand that there are refugees that are fine people. We
sympathize with them. We’ve got to help them. We don’t mind to pay taxes
extra to feed them, to shelter them but there are undesirable elements that
when we see them and they turn back and hit us and mug us and rape us and
are ready to kill us, well this is too much and this we cannot take.
Rosenberg explained that she too had once been an immigrant, but that she had come to the
United States as a teenager and had worked twelve hours a day for $5 a week. The difference,
she declared to applause from the room, was that nobody had put her in a hotel and given her
food and “shelter and money and everything.” She reiterated that there were good people
among the refugees, but residents were being mugged for drug money, and the neighborhood
Synagogue, barber shop, and stores had all been vandalized. Now it was the residents of Miami
Beach who would be exiled from their homes, but they had no place to go.122
Rafael Peñalver, who would go on to provide legal representation for many marielitos,
saw the issue of crime among the refugees as a natural consequence of their entry situation.
Miami was in shock over the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees who did not speak the
language and did not have jobs, many of them having no family support. “Any city you did that
to would have a problem of people turning to crime to survive,” Peñalver reasons. While Miami
Beach city officials emphasized the more heinous crimes committed as part of the crime rate
increase in South Florida, a significant number of the crimes that were committed were aimed
at ensuring the survival of a refugee or a family of refugees. While petty larceny was one of the
crimes that increased significantly, some of the offenses were drug related. In 1980, Miami was
a major point of transit for the drug trade from Latin America into the United States. An influx
of penniless, jobless refugees provided a pool of potential employees for Miami’s drug runners.
The refugees often worked as mules and couriers for the drug trade. Refugees would be offered
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as little as $100-$200 to transport a package from one part of the city to another. Many were
caught, helping to drive up the crime rate, and found themselves facing drug trafficking
charges.123
Fear of the danger and criminality surrounding the Mariel refugees spread well beyond
South Florida. This was illustrated by the uproar surrounding the consolidation of the different
holding camps into a single facility at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas starting in August, 1980. As the
boatlift wound down and winter approached, officials sought to centralize the management of
those refugees that were still being held at camps and who had not received sponsorship by
moving all the refugees to Arkansas due to the milder weather when compared to other holding
facilities. Officials recognized that there were negative connotations to Chaffee and a feeling
that the refugees would be going to a more “penal” environment. Likewise, refugees feared
losing those friends they had made at their camps and that their records would be lost in the
move and they would be themselves lost, in a bureaucratic sense.124 Even before consolidation,
rumors and fears surrounding the camp and its population were common in Arkansas. The
Arkansas Gazette, for example, ran a story in July of 1980 about a supposed cult called “The
Way” being established in Fort Chaffee.125 A report on operational issues at Fort Chaffee stated
that security had been a major concern for the communities adjacent to the military base and
for the State of Arkansas.126 When the plan for consolidation had been announced by the
federal government, the state’s young governor, Bill Clinton, issued a press release in which he
acknowledged that the plan reflected a “genuine concern and effort” to provide adequate
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security for both the refugee population and the citizens of the surrounding community.
Despite these good intentions, he and his staff had nineteen points of contention with the plan
and seven further suggestions to ensure that the safety of the surrounding communities. These
included the presence of military personnel when new refugees arrived at the camp, an increase
of the camp’s border patrol to at least twenty officers, patrols around the fence surrounding the
refugee, and a regular headcount to ensure accountability.127
The federal officials in charge of Fort Chaffee’s population often shared the concerns
about the potential danger the refuges posed outside the camp. A confidential, internal
memorandum numbered the camp’s population at 1,600 by June of 1981 and described the
residents in racialized terms and in terms of their records or difficulties. Single black males
between the ages of 18 and 55 were said to comprise 95% of the population. Few had any job
skills and “the vast majority have a prison record or psychiatric history.” They estimated that 55
women remained in the camp, were between the ages of 18 and 35 and were black. Finally, six
unaccompanied minors also resided at Fort Chafee despite being in the United States for over a
year. Two were “psychotic,” two “retarded,” and two needed to be placed in a “structured
psychiatric half way house,” the report noted. This population profile, officials explained,
“certainly indicates why Fort Chaffee poses a prime security risk.” The refugees’ profile was
compounded by factors including the “frustration with the monotony of camp routine,
uncertainty over the future and knowledge gleaned from the media that policy regarding them
is muddled.”128 These conditions drove some into requesting release or return, as when one
resident asked to be sent back to Havana where he had family, or, barring that, that he be
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transferred to a psychiatric facility in New Orleans.129 Frustrations had already boiled over
earlier in the year when, over two days in April, portions of the refugee population rebelled
against federal authorities. This disturbance resulted in seventy injuries to both residents and
camp personnel, including five hospitalizations, and an estimated $72,763 in damages.130
Surrounding populations, however, were never forced to deal with mass escapes endangering
their communities that some had feared.
While crime had been on the rise in Miami before the Mariel boatlift, the increase in
crime, real or perceived, had created a culture of fear in the city and around the refugees. The
Miami Herald reported in November, 1980 that in the previous two years 70,000 Miamians had
purchased handguns. Over 40,000 of those guns had been purchased in the previous year
alone.131 There were those who did not believe that laying the blame of the city’s ills at the feet
of the Mariel refugees was either fair or productive. In a letter to the Herald in late December,
Monsignor Bryan O. Walsh commended the paper on bringing attention to the plight of 1,761
Cubans still being held in federal detention facilities under suspicion of being “hardened
criminals send to this country by the Cuban government.” The continued detention of these
individuals was extremely problematic to Walsh, particularly because those held for “exclusion
hearings” were not considered to be entitled to due process by the federal government. “This is
of doubtful Constitutionality, to say the least,” Walsh wrote, “and in itself may be a violation of
human rights.” This did little to enhance the image of the United States as a defender of basic
human rights. While he understood the temptation of looking for an easily identifiable cause for
the increase in crime and that the Mariel refugees made a handy scapegoat, actual statistics
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regarding the number of marielitos in Dade County jails were not available. It was not enough
to provide estimates without any hard facts when impugning a whole group that just happened
to be politically convenient. Mariel refugees were a particularly convenient scapegoat, Walsh
reasoned, because they were “the only one that can provide the excuse for getting more
Federal dollars.” Authorities needed to provide factual information instead of estimates, or they
ran the risk of further polarizing the community.132
Despite the efforts of Walsh and other voices of reconciliation, Miami was more
polarized than ever before. The newest wave of refugees drove a wave of xenophobic fears of
cultural displacement, disease, crime, and economic loss that drove polarization between a
significant part of Miami’s non-Hispanic whites and the city’s immigrant populations, both new
and established. This helped the fortunes of an inchoate English-only movement in South
Florida. While similar movements would arise in other areas of the United States in later years,
the historic bilingual ordinance of 1973 had become the target of the opponents of bilingualism
in Dade County. In 1980, an organization that called itself Citizens of Dade United introduced an
ordinance prohibiting “the expenditure of any county funds for the purpose of utilizing any
language other than English or any culture other than that of the United States.”133 The new
ordinance would not repeal the 1973 bilingual ordinance, but it would remove any and all
county funds for bilingual county services. The drive for signatures to put this ordinance on the
ballot was led by a woman named Emmy Shafer, a Holocaust survivor who had come to the
United States after the Second World War at age 16. Shafer longed for Miami “the way it used
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to be.” She described the Miami of the past as “unbelievable. Friendly, no problems. You
didn’t feel you were in a foreign country.”134
Eduardo Padrón, chairman of the Spanish American League Against Discrimination,
claimed that the push to repeal bilingualism in Dade County came as a shock to the Cuban
American community. “They have seen themselves as great contributors, and all the statistics
show that,” Padrón said, “all of a sudden that feeling of not being wanted, not being
appreciated, hurts.” Despite the divisions between Miami’s Cuban and African American
communities, this ordinance was staunchly opposed by black leaders. The Greater Miami
chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People passed a resolution
noting that the statement implied that “the only culture that should be promoted is that of the
dominant group, the North American white group.” Elements of Miami’s business community
also opposed the proposal as part of a group called Together for Dade’s Future. The Greater
Miami Chamber of Commerce spent $75,000 campaigning against the proposed ordinance.
Despite this resistance, there was significant support for the Citizens of Dade United. A public
opinion poll conducted in the months before the election showed that 62% of voters polled
approved of the proposal and that the heaviest support came from Jewish voters and senior
citizens, who favored the proposal 4 to 1. When those polled were informed that if the proposal
passed storm evacuation notices would not be printed in Spanish and that hospital emergency
room switchboards would not have Spanish speakers available, however, support for the new
ordinance dropped to 49%.135
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The day before the election, the Miami Herald declared that the city was sick. The
disease that had left Miami “disoriented, in agony, and in danger of destroying itself,” had been
born of fire and water. “The fire of Liberty City and the water of Mariel have left Miami
faltering, uncertain and divided, at the most crucial point in its history.” The only solution was
for all Miamians to come together and prevent the city’s collapse with joint action. It was time
to see if the city that had “once assimilated 600,000 Hispanics—and became an international
financial center because of it—will now in its frustrations let ‘Hispanic,’ and especially ‘Cuban,’
become four-letter words.” While the editorial did not make specific mention of the ballot
proposal, it made it clear that Miami’s Cuban community was fearful of backlash and rejection,
much of it driven by the boatlift.136
The ballot proposal passed and became a new county-wide ordinance. There was
confusion among county officials about the full implications of the new ordinance. The county
maintained bilingual support for emergency services, but it stopped translating general
documents and notices into Spanish. While the effects of the new ordinance were not clear,
detractors were disturbed by the vote and found it polarizing. “It was a racist vote,” said
Monsignor Walsh, “The effect of the ordinance might be minimal… but the support of it by so
many Anglos clearly indicates a resurgence of strong anti-foreign feeling regardless of the very
positive economic impact of bilingualism here.” Other opponents hoped the alliance made
between the Hispanic community and the African American community might be “the beginning
of a majority black-Latin coalition that could become a power in the local government.” The
same election saw the first Cuban-American elected to countywide office when Paul Cejas won a
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seat on the school board with African American support.137 The election had proved to be a
major victory for the English Only movement. This encouraged the return of Citizens of Dade
United, who, in 1988, pushed an English Only amendment to Florida’s state constitution. That
state-wide measure passed by 84%.138
The animosity aimed at the Cuban American community and to Hispanics in general did
not dissipate as the boatlift ended. As time went on, the outward signs of the refugee influx
began to dissipate. Tent city disappeared and the marielitos became less identifiable from other
Cubans and other Latin American immigrants in the city. The increasing presence of other
groups in the city only exacerbated the anger that many non-Hispanic whites felt. Some, in fact,
found labels that defined them by their not being Hispanic problematic. One irate Herald reader
was offended by the newspaper’s use of the term “non-Latin white.” This was “the most
offensive term I can think of for Americans.” The reader, Mary Ellen Higgin, found this to be a
sign of reverse discrimination and an insult that would only add to the fires of polarization.
“How can you expect this county to ever be together,” Higgin asked, “when you insult the
people who were born here, and who built this city?”139 Another reader argued that “the real
refugees” were not those who had fled politically oppressive regimes, but rather those South
Florida residents leaving to seek a better life elsewhere. Those who felt that the good life they
had once known would never return, decreed Fred Moffet, those were “the real refugees of
South Florida.”140
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The feeling that South Florida’s “Americans” had been made refugees by the recent
migrations and that they had been victimized by groups, that had taken their city from them,
became a common one in the early 1980s. Bumper stickers reading “WILL THE LAST AMERICAN
TO LEAVE MIAMI PLEASE BRING THE FLAG” were a common sight in the city. They became so
prevalent, in fact, that the Herald’s executive editor, John McMullan wrote a piece about how a
lot of Miamians had had it “up to here” with the stickers and the people who placed them on
their vehicles. McMullan had had enough of “homegrown American bigots” who thought
themselves to have some exclusive franchise on the United States or any of its cities. “Spare me
any more dim-witted Anglos who can’t speak acceptable English themselves complaining
because signs that may save their lives are also written in Spanish,” McMullan wrote. Even as
he took others to task over overt discrimination he also admitted he was rather fed up with
newspaper editors like himself who should speak out more often, but did not. Until more open
communication could bridge the gap between the polarized groups in the city, McMullan
indicated he wanted a replacement bumper sticker, one that read: “WILL THE LAST BIGOTS
PLEASE LEAVE.”141
McMullan also explained in his comment that the “saddest local story of a globally sad
week” was the formation of a Cuban American group in Miami that felt it had to “campaign to
correct the Cuban refugees’ image.”142 McMullan was referring to the creation of a committee
of prominent Cubans calling their organization Facts About Cuban Exiles, or FACE. FACE
members expressed significant concern about the impact a negative conception of Cubans had.
“We, as Cubans, face one of the greatest problems in our long exile journey—that of
misrepresentation to the rest of the world and of division among ourselves,” explained
141
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newspaper executive and FACE organizer Sam Verdeja. Media representation had become a
significant problem which had made marielito a dirty word. For many Cuban Americans this had
become offensive, “an affront to their pride.” These prominent Cubans were proud of their
individual achievements and they were proud of Dade County’s majority Cuban Hispanic
community, which had a combined annual income of $6,500,000,000. It was an impressive
achievement and they sought to defend it. “I’ll be damned if I let anybody spoil it,” said banker
Carlos Arboleya.143
Arboleya and his fellow FACE committee members were not alone in defending their
community in the face of unfavorable portrayals in the media and the anger and resentment
from other groups. Many had fought against what they saw as a negative portrayal when the
producers attempted to bring the filming of Brian De Palman’s Scarface remake to Miami. The
film, starring Al Pacino as Tony Montana, told the story of the violent rise of a Mariel refugee
from common criminal to international drug trafficker and of his grisly end at the hands of his
former allies. The film’s content, understandably, elicited some strong negative reactions from
the city’s Cuban community. Even as producer Martin Bregman threatened to move the film’s
production elsewhere, Miami City Commissioner Demetrio Perez Jr. prepared a resolution to
deny the production the permits necessary to film on city property and on city streets. Bregman
was puzzled by the reaction from the Cuban community. He was not making a film about
Cubans in Miami, but a movie about a single gangster. “The movie has more crooked Jews than
crooked Cubans,” the producer stated. Further, he suggested that the movie would not give
Miami or Dade County a bad image. After all, “it already has that image.”144
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While Perez framed his objection in terms of the possible danger to the city in terms of
public relations in a letter to the Herald’s editor, others were more direct in their defense of the
Cuban American community itself.145 Herald staff writer Guillermo Martinez argued against the
filming because it could only further perpetrate a prevalent, and very often mistaken,
stereotype about marielitos. Martinez recounted how after taking pictures of a crime scene
where a deranged individual had murdered eight people and fled on a bicycle before being killed
himself, a photographer exclaimed “it has to be a Mariel refugee… who else would be crazy
enough to kill eight people in cold blood and then try to escape on a bicycle?” The murderer
was eventually identified. He was not a marielito, he was not even Latino, but the stereotype
about the Mariel refugees made more than one person conclude that this mentally-ill man had
to be one. The stereotype was “so prevalent that when Hollywood decided to recast the
gangster film classic, Scarface, there was never a doubt that the protagonist, the villain, had to
be a Mariel refugee.” Hollywood was both reacting to the stereotype and helping to perpetuate
it. Miami’s economy did not need the money that the production would bring if it damaged the
image of Miami’s Cuban community. What the Cuban community needed was an organization
of Cubans “similar to the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith—who will act in a responsible
and nonpolitical manner to make sure that Cubans are not gratuitously insulted or
slandered.”146
Other Miami Cubans, and their allies, took to writing letters to the Herald to express
their displeasure with the filming of Scarface because of the harm it would bring to the
community’s image. James Kassir wrote that the movie would only “hurt the image of hard-
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working Cuban-Americans.”147 Another reader attacked the Herald editorial board’s choice of
justifying the making of the film on economic reasons, stating the offending the sensibilities of
any ethnic group was un-American, regardless of the profit or justification.148 Ana F. Crucet
declared that she and her fellow Cuban Americans would not “stand by and let Hollywood
propaganda make us the object of ostracism and stereotyping as criminals by other ethnic
groups.”149 Edgardo O. Meneses addressed “the Anglos who want to sell the image of their city
for a measly $10 million,” and reminded them that tourism in Miami and Miami Beach had
already suffered significantly in the previous two years. Further, he asked why Hollywood did
not make movies about Cuban freedom fighters instead of gangsters.150
Letters against the production of the film or in support of it became a fixture of the
Herald’s letters page during August and September of 1982. They were, in fact, so prevalent
that they became the subject of parody. Fort Lauderdale resident Stu Schneider wrote the
Herald’s editor a letter in mid-September in which he described himself as being “shocked,
appalled, and disgusted” about plans to shoot the film Jaws III in Key West. “Not all sharks are
man-eaters, just a minority,” wrote Schneider, “but, as usual, Hollywood has decided to focus on
a few bad apples that ruin the whole batch.” He went on to suggest that unless filmmakers
intended to treat sharks fairly, they should not be allowed to film in South Florida. “Some things
are more important than money,” he concluded, “What’s next, Attack of the Giant Oysters?”151
Where many in Miami were offended by the possibility of the movie being shot in their
city, neighboring Miami Beach rushed a resolution to welcome the filming of Scarface to their
147

James Kassir, “Movie will hurt,” letter to the editor, Miami Herald, August 9, 1982.
F. Mennitto, “Offensive move,” letter to the editor, Miami Herald, August 14, 1982.
149
Ana F. Crucet, letter to the editor, Miami Herald, August 27, 1982.
150
Edgardo O. Meneses, letter to the editor, Miami Herald, September 4, 1982.
151
Stu Schneider, “Can the Film,” letter to the editor, Miami Herald, September 16, 1982.
148

265
city.152 Only two scenes of the film were shot in South Florida, both of them in Miami Beach.
The film was filmed mostly in Los Angeles with Pacino in the lead and former ¿Que Pasa USA?
star Steven Bauer as his best friend and lieutenant Manny Ribera. While those opposed to the
film’s shooting in Miami ultimately won the day, they were unable to change the story’s content
or characterizations. Their image problems would only be compounded as the Reader’s Digest
article “From Cuba with Hate” was released later in the year.
The response of the Cuban American community to the marielitos’ reputation in the
national media and in Miami must be understood in the context of the politics of
respectability.153 While members of the community had to recognize that there were hardened
criminals among the Mariel Cubans, they were also compelled to explain that the established
Cuban American communities in the United States, as well as the vast majority of the marielitos,
were good, honest people. As such, they were forced to place as much distance between
themselves and those who had committed offenses in an effort to salvage the reputation of the
larger community, reinforcing the positive accomplishments of the Cuban migration and the
relatively easy assimilation of most Cuban refugees into the city’s economic life.
During the boatlift and in the years immediately after, Miami’s Cubans and those in
other communities became keenly aware that, as the Wall Street Journal pointed out in 1980,
political gains had not followed the Cubans’ economic success. Prior to the boatlift, only 26% of
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Hispanics were registered to vote in Miami.154 This had produced vulnerabilities that left them
with limited clout in local and national politics and which were identified and exploited by their
enemies. When Emmy Shafer drove the repeal of the bilingual amendment in 1980 she claimed
that the Cubans got their own way in everything because local politicians were for sale and they
quickly forgot that “the English people are the ones that vote.”155 In the aftermath of the
boatlift, the referendum that eliminated official bilingualism in Dade County, and years of bad
publicity many Cubans were calling for change and organization, for the political and social clout
to match the community’s standing in South Florida. Mariel set the stage for the next phase of
Cuban American political activism and for a decade in which the local power that the community
had accrued would be projected out nationally and internationally. Cuban Americans would see
the significant power of their community to influence larger trends and events, but they would
also be faced with the limits of that power.
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CHAPTER 6—“A CRISIS IN CLOUT”: THE MATURATION OF CUBAN AMERICAN POLITICS, THE
CUBAN LOBBY, AND THE LIMITS OF INFLUENCE, 1982-1995
Federal authorities and rioters watched each other tensely through the fence around
the federal detention center in Oakdale, LA on Sunday, November 29, 1987. Nearly one
thousand Cuban detainees had risen up in revolt on the night of Saturday, November 21, after
news that a series of deportations would follow a new immigration agreement between the
American and Cuban governments. The rioters set parts of the prison on fire and took hostages
using homemade weapons.1 Tensions escalated after a second group of Cuban detainees rioted
and took the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia the following Monday.2 As both parties
waited for any signs of change, a helicopter owned by the federal government flew over the
facility at a low altitude in an attempt to gain the attention of the prisoners. When the
helicopter landed outside the perimeter of the detention center, two figures emerged and
boarded a convertible jeep. The vehicle was driven by an FBI agent and it had been ready and
waiting since the helicopter left England Air Force Base in neighboring Alexandria, Louisiana.
One of these men, Cuban American lawyer Rafael Peñalver, occupied the front passenger seat of
the vehicle and directed the driver as the jeep started to make a slow circuit outside the
detention center’s double chain-link fence.
Standing at the back of the jeep was Agustin Roman, the auxiliary bishop for the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Miami. As the slow circuit continued, more and more prisoners began
1
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to follow the vehicle on their side of the fence until a massive crowd of them came to a stop
within view of a stage that authorities had set up for the bishop.3 “This is a moment of peace,”
Bishop Roman told the detainees, “I want you to release the prisoners who are in your custody
and I want you to demonstrate to the world the good will that every Christian should have in his
heart.”4 Even as the bishop appealed to the Christian morality of the detainees, he also assured
them that the agreement he and Peñalver had helped negotiate with the federal government
was binding and would provide the fair system of hearings the rioters had demanded. To the
astonishment of many, the rioters proceeded to lay down their arms on the detention center’s
yard and set about releasing the 26 hostages they had been holding.
The hostage situations in Oakdale and Atlanta were separated from the Mariel boatlift
by more than seven years, but they were the direct result of the policies and attitudes formed
during the boatlift and in its aftermath. In the years following the Mariel boatlift, the Cuban
American community became more involved than ever before in American politics at the local,
state, and national level. Many Cuban Americans would achieved significant “firsts” as they
were elected to office in Dade County and beyond. This was also the time in which a powerful
political lobby, the Cuban American National Foundation, was created by a group of powerful
Cuban Americans in order to secure the community’s political power, safeguard its image, and
shape polices according to the foundation’s worldview. The marielitos became more and more
integrated into Miami’s society and culture in this period, even as the city gained notoriety in
American popular culture that promised, or perhaps threatened, that it was the “City of the
Future.” At the same time, those Cuban refugees who had committed offenses or were seen as
3
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a liability by many of the newly empowered Cuban Americans were underserved by those that
might best advocate for them. The detainee riots in Oakdale and Atlanta and their resolution
sprang from attempts by some powerful Cuban Americans to retain the power and influence
they had gained by serving the best interests of the United States’ government.
The years following the resolution of the hostage situations in Oakdale and Atlanta
forced the Cuban community to react to a rapidly changing geopolitical situation even as it
attempted to influence the outcome of events. The fall of the Soviet Union created a sense of
hope in many of Miami’s Cubans. The end of Fidel Castro’s regime appeared to be at hand. The
community redoubled its efforts to affect American policy toward Cuba in an effort to hasten
Castro’s downfall. American politicians at all levels sought the approval and support of the
powerful Cuban American lobby. The limits of the community’s influence would be tested by a
new migration crisis that arose and fundamentally altered the United States’ open door policy to
Cuban refugees. For the city of Miami, the end of the Cold War would have to wait until 1995, if
not until much later, as the Cuban presence had fundamentally changed the face of the city.

In the aftermath of the Mariel boatlift and the English Only vote in Dade County,
members of the Cuban American community began to discuss the future. A year before the
creation of Facts About Cuban Exiles, another organization began to take shape as influential
Cuban Americans came together to discuss what could be done to advance the interests of their
community in the United States and abroad. A group of wealthy Cuban American businessmen ,
many of whom had been Bay of Pigs veterans, came together to establish the Cuban American
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National Foundation (CANF) in 1981.5 By the late 1980s, CANF described itself as “an
independent, non-profit institution providing information on the economic, political and social
welfare of the Cuban people, both on the island and in exile,” adding that the organization
supported the concept of “a free and democratic Cuba.” In pursuit of its mission, CANF
supported “a general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Cuban
concern, to fight bigotry, protect human rights, and promote cultural interests and creative
achievement.”6
One of the Foundation’s founders and its long-serving chairman, Jorge Mas Canosa,
recalled that when the organization was coming together its founders drew a parallel between
the Cuban American position in 1981 and that of Cubans in 1933. Mas Canosa made allusion to
the 1933 revolution and to how it put Cuba on a path to economic prosperity, telling those at
the meeting that by 1958 the country was incredibly wealthy among countries in western
hemisphere, but that politically it was plagued by corruption and oppression. He compared
post-1933 to the situation of the Cuban Americans in the United States in 1981: the Cuban
community was economically advanced but it was not politically powerful or sophisticated.
“Same faces, same language, same thing about we talking in Spanish all the time, listening to the
same radio stations, being perceived as a bunch of terrorists, right wingers, incapable of taking
care of ourselves,” Mas Canosa said about the public perception of Cuban Americans, “therefore
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we deserved Castro, [as we were] a bunch of fanatics that saw communists all around.”7 The
community needed to fundamentally change the way in which it was seen by the larger public
and they needed the power to influence that perception.
The problem, as Mas Canosa saw it, was that politics was a dirty word to the “best”
Cubans; those who had proven themselves in the field of business. Mas Canosa believed that
successful businessmen needed to get involved in politics because of their approach to problem
solving. He believed that those who had a “pragmatic approach” should put away ideological,
dogmatic views and enter the public arena. They needed to “try to grow as people and bring
some maturity to what I thought at the time was a very amateur, very green, very inexperienced
approach to Cuba and Cuban politics,” recalled Mas Canosa, “and that’s how the Foundation
was created.”8 This focus on bringing the “best” Cubans to politics created an oligarchical
structure. To be a CANF trustee, Cuban Americans needed to contribute at least $5,000 a year
to the Foundation. A higher tier of directors required an annual payment of $10,000 a year.9
Mas Canosa would later state that he contributed an average of $50,000 a year to the
foundation.10 This placed the management of the organization in the hands of those Cuban
Americans who were most affluent. Only those who qualified for directorship were allowed to
vote on foundation matters. Among these wealthy Cubans the directorship was exclusively
male until 1990, at which time only three of its sixty six directors were women.11
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CANF established a principal base in Washington, not Miami, as Mas Canosa was of the
opinion that they needed to “take the fight out of Calle Ocho and Miami Stadium and into the
center of power.” No longer should Cubans concentrate on commando raids. Instead, they
should focus on influencing public opinion and governments.12 Mas Canosa also believed that
the creation of CANF had provided a safer outlet for the energies and frustrations of the Cuban
American community. Referring to the factionalism that existed within the Cuban community in
1980 and 1981, he made allusion to the violence being perpetrated by members of the Cuban
American community amongst themselves. In Mas Canosa’s estimation, CANF served as an
instrument by which the energies of his community could be refocused and channeled more
positively:
We made an effort to show [the Cuban American community] that there were
other civilized ways to struggle for the democratization of Cuba, like creating
Radio Marti, lobbying in Washington, doing an international effort to
delegitimize Castro for his violation of human rights. And I think when you look
back into history, during the last 15 years of assistance[sic] of the CubanAmerican national foundation, the bombings stopped and the killings also came
to a halt.13

The late 1970s and the early 1980s were a time of significant violence by Cuban American
groups. This violence did not suddenly end with the creation of the Cuban American National
Foundation. Bombings in Miami continued until at least 1983.14 Mas Canosa’s assertion that
CANF’s creation did bring about a new outlet for the energies of anti-Castro Cuban Americans is
correct. As CANF gained influence, however, many would begin to question whether it was the
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natural result of those energies or if it was a group of powerful Cuban Americans coopting the
energies of their community for their own particular vision through superior influence in
American politics and a carefully controlled message.
CANF and its political action committee, the Free Cuba PAC, were modelled after the
Jewish lobby that sought to influence U.S. policy related to Israel, particularly the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee.15 In order to successfully lobby Washington, Mas Canosa copied
the structure and tactics of the most successful foreign policy lobbying group in existence.16
“Deeply, I admire Israel deeply,” he stated. CANF’s directors made contributions to politicians
who supported the organization’s stance regarding Cuba. Mas Canosa strenuously argued that
the foundation did not make political contributions, stating that CANF did not “get involved in
any type of partisan politics.”17 CANF did not make donations directly. Instead, they were made
through the Free Cuba PAC. Between 1983 and 1988, the Free Cuba PAC contributed more than
$385,000 to candidates and sitting congressmen, both Democratic and Republican.18 State and
federal officials from Florida like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Senator Connie Mack,
and Governor Lawton Chiles often received CANF’s aid. The Foundation’s support extended
beyond Florida and Florida’s delegation to Congress, and was often provided to friendly
politicians like New Jersey Representatives Bob Menendez and Robert Torricelli and Senator
Ernest Hollings of South Carolina. These politicians provided support and political influence for
the Foundation, just as the Foundation and its members made significant campaign
contributions.
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To receive this support, however, an elected official needed to embrace CANF’s
ideological standing in regards to Cuba’s government. “I will say that the most important
consideration for us to support any politician,” Mas Canosa stated, “is how they—how he stands
or she stands, regarding the Cuban issue.” The support of CANF, its directors, and its political
action committee could often gain the organization significant political allies out of candidates in
tight races. The 1988 Senate Race in Connecticut, for example, saw the Free Cuba PAC support
Joseph Lieberman over incumbent Lowel Weicker Jr. because Weicker stood in opposition to
CANF’s ideology on Cuba.19 Lieberman went on to win this first election to the Senate by a
margin of less than one percent and remained a steadfast ally of CANF and its politics. “He’s
been a friend of the Cuban cause,” CANF executive director Joe Garcia said in 2000, “we have no
questions where Joe Lieberman stands.”20
While CANF sought to influence American policy toward Cuba, there were internal
struggles from the start. When the organization started, the Foundation’s board named Frank
Calzón CANF’s first executive director. Calzón had lobbying experience, having been the director
of On Human Rights, a group that publicized human rights violations in Cuba and lobbied
Congress against Castro’s government. Mas Canosa and Calzón reportedly clashed over
differing visions of where the Foundation’s energies and resources should be focused. While
Calzón wanted to continue mounting pressure on Washington to affect Cuba policy, Mas Canosa
became increasingly embroiled in intra-communal disputes in Miami and broadened the
Foundation’s foreign policy focus to include other issues less directly related to Cuba. Calzón
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resigned and was replaced by José Antonio Font, who would, in turn, resign himself, protesting
Mas Canosa’s “dictatorial style.”21
The Cuban American National Foundation and Mas Canosa developed a significant
following among Cuban Americans. The organization gained contributions from more than fifty
thousand members. Beyond the large contributions made by the Foundation’s directors and
trustees, the majority of donations made by common Cuban Americans were much smaller.
Foundations as small as $10 a years were known to be made by people who trusted the
Foundation and sought Castro’s ouster. Many of his supporters regarded him as “the most
powerful and influential leader to emerge in over thirty years of exile.” Some of his supporters
in Little Havana referred to him as “Señor Presidente.”22 Mas Canosa’s reputation, his legend as
a powerful figure both in exile politics and in American politics grew significantly. In a profile on
Mas Canosa in Esquire, writer Gaeton Fonzi suggested that the simplest description of CANF’s
leader, that he was the most powerful Cuban exile in America, was like saying Michael Jordan
was the best basketball player in Chicago.23
A significant part of Mas Canosa and CANF’s rise to prominence was Ronald Reagan’s
election to the presidency in 1980. Some scholars have suggested that CANF was, in essence,
the creation of conservative Republicans who stated that a powerful conservative political lobby
was needed in Washington and who had been keeping an eye on the Cuban community since
1980.24 María de los Angeles Torres has called into question CANF’s supposed political
neutrality, particularly during the first decade of its existence, noting that the goals and projects
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for which it lobbied “closely resembled many of Reagan’s own priorities.” She notes, for
example, that CANF became an instrument by which public support could be provided to the
Contras in Nicaragua. “The way to Havana begins in Managua,” Mas Canosa repeatedly stated
during the 1980s. In return for the support of CANF and other sectors of the Cuban exile and
Cuban American community, the Reagan administration embraced a harder stance toward
Cuba. Reagan took such measures as the 1982 restriction of travel to Cuba, established under
new regulations prohibiting the transfer of American currency to the island. While exceptions
were made for academics, professionals, and Cuban exiles with families still on the island, the
adoption of these regulations established the first travel restrictions during peacetime in
American history.25
Mas Canosa presented the relationship between CANF and the Reagan White House
differently. In an interview in 1993, the CANF chairman stated that if not for the Foundation,
the Reagan administration would have moved toward normalization of relations with Castro’s
Cuba as the Carter administration had. The United States and Cuba would have had full
economic and diplomatic relations by the early 1990s and Cuba under Castro would be enjoying
some relative prosperity. “I think that we made the contribution to assist the Cuban people in
their struggle for democracy and freedom,” opined Mas Canosa, “and that is probably the
biggest achievement of the Cuban American National Foundation.” In his estimation, the
closeness between CANF and the Reagan White House was a testimony not to the organization’s
subservience to a conservative Republican agenda but to their own successful tactics. After all,
what other organization could boast to have had the President of the United States at one of
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their banquets a mere two years after its inception? “We didn’t realize how powerful we could
be,” the CANF chairman said of the Cuban American community.26
The relationship between CANF and the Reagan White House was very much like that
between other lobbying groups and presidential administrations. The needs of the Foundation
coincided with Reagan’s conservative politics and his hawkish stance toward the Soviet Union.
As such, the goals and purposes of the lobby and of the White House often intersected but
rarely overlapped completely. When Reagan was greeted by an ecstatic crowd in Little Havana
in 1983, he was given a warm introduction by Mas Canosa, who dutifully endorsed Reagan’s
policies toward Central America. Mas Canosa, however, went further and urged the president
to abolish any agreement that existed with the Soviet Union stating that the United States
would not invade Cuba unless Soviet nuclear missiles were present on the island. Whether Mas
Canosa truly believed this was a viable strategy, or that the president would even respond, did
not stop him from gaining political favor from a crowd of potential constituents watching him
make a direct request from the Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed forces. Reagan, in turn,
did not address this request, but capitalized on the fervor created by his presence and Mas
Canosa’s introduction to denounce the “Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis” that threatened the
hemisphere with a “new colonialism.”27 Both men benefited from shared interests and
audiences even as they diverged at different junctures.
One of the earliest shared successes of CANF and the Reagan Administration was the
creation of Radio Martí. Named after Cuban Patriot José Martí, Radio Martí was intended to
serve as a pro-democracy, anti-Castro voice that could be transmitted directly into Cuba as
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counterprogramming to the Cuban government’s state-run media. Funded by the U.S.
government, Radio Martí attacked and determined to destroy the Castro government’s
“information monopoly.” CANF’s proposal was submitted as a bill by Senator Paula Hawkins of
Florida. Political observers did not expect the bill would meet with much success. Quite simply,
Radio Martí did not seem necessary. Cubans on the island already had access to Miami radio
and its myriad of anti-Castro stations and viewpoints and to the Voice of America. Senator
Christopher Dodd of Connecticut stated that regardless of how one argued for it, Radio Martí
was still “baloney.” Mas Canosa, CANF, and Radio Martí also faced opposition from the State
Department’s U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which had made an agreement regarding the
release of political prisoners and an orderly emigration process in the aftermath of the Mariel
boatlift. Section Chief Wayne Smith was concerned that Castro would cancel the recent
agreement if the Radio Martí bill was passed and signed into law. 28 Smith was right. When
Radio Martí started operations in 1985, Castro cancelled the immigration accord that his
government had arrived at with the United States in 1984.29 Smith resigned his post.30
Once Radio Martí was signed into law, President Reagan appointed Jorge Mas Canosa
and other Cuban exiles to the board of directors of the station. On Cuban Independence Day,
May 20, 1985, Radio Martí made its first broadcast from a facility in Marathon Key, Florida.31
Along with news programs, Radio Martí also broadcast entertainment programming that
included salsa and romantic music, American rock ‘n’ roll and a radio soap opera. It also sought
to influence minds in Cuba through fair reporting. Where Miami’s radio stations called Fidel
Castro “the tyrant” and referred to Nicaragua’s government as the “Sandino-Communist
28
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government,” Radio Martí adhered to the Voice of America’s rules and had to strive for fairness
and impartiality. Thus, when it spoke of Sandinista leader and president of Nicaragua Daniel
Ortega it referred to him as “the head of the Nicaraguan government.”32 While members of
Miami’s broadcasting community were uncomfortable with the new station’s “middle ground”
and the tone it took in its reporting, they were still supportive of the work that Radio Martí was
doing. “When Radio Marti says that Cubans die in Angola, adjectives are not essential,” said
WRHC president Salvador Lew, “truth defeats all Communist governments.”33 The creation of
the station was also portrayed as a great success for Cuban Americans in the United States,
particularly as a symbol of greater political maturity and a growing appeal to politicians of
different political leanings in the United States. “By being able to relate to conservatives as well
as liberals, we have substantially changed our image,” Mas Canosa told the Miami Herald when
asked about the lobbying efforts that brought about the creation of Radio Martí.34
Despite the controversy surrounding the creation of Radio Martí, the station was lauded
for the quality of its broadcasts. The New York Times admitted that despite its original concerns
about the station, Radio Martí had “avoided propaganda and supplemented, not duplicated,
commercial Spanish-Language broadcasts from Florida.”35 The conservative Washington Times
called it an “unprecedented challenge to communism,” and noted that the station’s news
broadcasts were “scrupulously fair and accurate.”36 The Washington Post reported that by all
accounts, the station had done “a first-class job” of winning a significant Cuban audience,
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forcing Cuba’s state-run media to compete with it, and “avoiding the more conspicuous
sinkholes of émigré politics.”37
Within five years of the station’s foundation, however, Mas Canosa was embroiled in a
public scandal over the perceived introduction of Cuban American politics into Radio Martí’s
operations. By 1989, Mas Canosa and CANF pushed for the establishment of a television station
counterpart to Radio Martí, TV Martí. Despite the success of Radio Martí, the idea of TV Martí
met with resistance. Critics suggested that unlike the successful radio broadcasts, the television
broadcasts would be of poor quality and easily jammed by Castro’s government. Others warned
that the Cuban government would (understandably) see it as a sign of aggression. Finally, there
were those who suggested that it was wasteful to spend taxpayer dollars broadcasting American
sitcoms dubbed into Spanish.38 Some, like Radio Martí director Ernesto Betancourt, argued that
TV Martí might bring about retaliations against the radio station and that the intended funds
should be funneled into the already existing and successful enterprise.39
Betancourt’s criticisms were not well received by Mas Canosa. On March 6, 1990, on
the eve of TV Martí beginning a set of test broadcasts to Cuba, Betancourt wrote a ten-page
memorandum to his superiors at the U.S. Information Agency. The document described "a
series of bizarre incidents" that made him believe Mas Canosa was attempting to engineer his
removal from Radio Martí. Mas Canosa was chairman of the presidential advisory board that
recommended policy for Radio and TV Martí. According to Betancourt, Mas Canosa had
complained to the Foundation’s directors that they had “lost control” of Radio Martí and they
had pressured the station to increase coverage of their organization in their broadcasts. Within
37
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two days of Betancourt sending his memorandum, he was informed that he was being
transferred out of TV Martí’s directorship to another position. While Betancourt’s style had
been described as autocratic and he had had several disputes with station staff, he was also
credited with having kept the station independent and free of exile politics. "I believe Mr.
Betancourt was very intelligent in how he handled these kinds of things," said former CANF
executive director Frank Calzon, "until now Radio Marti has been operated as an independent
station."40 Within days of his allegations leaking to the press, Betancourt was ordered to clear
his office and told he had been placed on administrative leave. Staffers at Radio Martí reported
that Betancourt was charged by his superiors with “waging war for three days against the
USIA.”41 Mas Canosa took to the Herald’s opinion page to declare victory, noting that
“Betancourt’s power grab failed.”42
Media outlets, both liberal and conservative, were less effusive about the removal of
Betancourt from Radio Martí’s leadership and Mas Canosa’s role in it. The same day the Herald
ran Mas Canosa’s piece, the newspaper’s editorial board admonished that, regardless of what
had happened between CANF, USIA, and Betancourt, it was more important than ever that the
federal government salvage the integrity of Radio Martí. The newspaper saw a serious conflict
between the Foundation’s nature as a political lobby and the station’s legal and moral mandate
to be “scrupulously objective.” Where CANF had started as an “anti-Castro informational
clearing house and political action group,” it had recently “taken on the coloration of a future
political party in a post-Castro Cuba.” Calling Mas Canosa’s desire to become president of Cuba
after Castro’s fall a “matter of record,” the Herald declared that the “linkage between a Federal
40
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agency and the politically ambitious head of a politically active foundation should be severed.”
This was unacceptable in principle, and it was damaging to the one thing Radio Martí could not
afford to lose: its credibility.43
The Washington Post made it clear that this sort of back-room politics could not come at
a worst time. The Post was disturbed by what it saw as “minimal denials of political influence”
by the Voice of America and the United States Information Agency. TV Martí’s legality was
already coming under question, for it to “start up just as its radio counterpart comes under a
political cloud” was inappropriate.44 The most strident attack against Mas Canosa and his
influence at Radio Martí came from journalist Georgie Anne Geyer, whose accusations of
malfeasance against the CANF chairman did not stop at maneuvering to have Betancourt
removed from the station. She accused Mas Canosa of being “so impudent in his actions that he
even made a deal between the pending TV Marti and Channel 23 in Miami to broadcast to
Cuba.” Mas Canosa made this deal on behalf not of TV Marti, but of the Foundation. “So he,
and not the appropriate American officials,” Geyer charged, “already has negotiated what could
be TV Marti’s first broadcast to Cuba.” Mas Canosa was dangerous to Radio Martí because he
would cost the station effectiveness and help consolidate Fidel Castro at a dangerous time by
reviving fears of American meddling. Before this could happen, however, Geyer suggested that
Radio Martí would simply be destroyed as the American people and Congress would refuse to
keep spending $13,000,000 a year on Radio Martí and another $16,000,000 on TV Martí to
support the ambitions of one man and his foundation. If “Mas and company” took over at the
station, Geyer warned, “all that integrity and care will go down the drain, since to all intents and
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purposes Mas’s foundation has now become a political party already making plans to take
power in some dreamed-of, nonexistent Cuba.”45
Mas Canosa reportedly admitted that he was interested in being the first democratically
elected president of a post-Castro Cuba.46 He objected, however, to claims that his work with
CANF was driven by this desire. When asked during a deposition if this motivation being
ascribed to him was harmful, Mas Canosa insisted that it was. “To say I’m doing this because I
have the political ambition to become president is in a sense, to taint the struggle for the
democratization of Cuban that I have been involved in, since I was 15 years of age,” Mas Canosa
stated. He reiterated that he pursued his work with CANF because he believed in democratic
values and because he believed that the Cuban people deserved a democratically elected
government, respect for human rights, a free market economy, and to live in peace, democracy,
and prosperity.47 His critics, however, did not often believe his motivations to be so noble. His
detractors gave him names such as “Señor Mas y Mas” and “the Godfather.”48
While CANF would continue to be a controversial organization for the remainder of Mas
Canosa’s tenure as its chairman and beyond, there were initiatives that the organization
undertook that strayed from its more overtly political actions and sought to aid the Cuban
community in the United States and abroad. This was the case when, in 1988, CANF pioneered a
new form of private sector cooperation with the United States government in the area of
refugee resettlement. The previous year, the Department of State, the Office of the U.S.
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, and the Immigration & Naturalization Service had created, by
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presidential order, the Private Sector Initiative (PSI) program. The PSI program was established
around the idea that private sector groups could work to secure stateside sponsors,
employment on arrival, and provide further assistance to arriving refugees to become
“productive members of communities and with appropriate medical care coverage so they will
not access public assistance.” The program fit well with the larger drive for smaller government
and non-governmental solutions of the Regan Administration, particularly as all “reasonable
costs” of the refugee admissions were to be privately sourced. Between June of 1988 and the
end of 1991, CANF’s PSI program provided the resources with which 7,000 Cuban refugees were
resettled in the United States. Literature on the program boasted that it had represented “an
impressive net savings of between 35 to 50 million dollars to the U.S. taxpayer.”49
CANF did not deal directly with the Cuban government while it operated its PSI. Most of
the refugees who arrived as part of this initiative arrived from third countries where they had
often been living for years. Refugees came to the United States under CANF sponsorship from
over twenty countries including Costa Rica, Panama, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Canada, Haiti, Mexico,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic.50 What was perhaps most significant about this
new wave of arrivals was that many of them were reaching the end of a journey that had started
almost ten years before at the time of the Peruvian Embassy Crisis and the Mariel boatlift.
These first arrivals were among the many thousands of Cubans who had gone on to third
countries believing that they would be staying there only briefly before moving on to the United
States. “These are the first of the forgotten,” wrote Miami News columnist Bonnie M. Anderson
about those who had expected a brief stay elsewhere, an expectation that became “a cruel joke
49
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of destiny.” Anderson credited the Foundation for the emotive reunions that took place in
Tamiami Park in the early fall of 1988. “It was like the hundreds of thousands of other Cuban
family reunions we’ve seen in South Florida,” Anderson wrote, “and it was like no other.”51
Regardless of whether the Cuban American Heritage Foundation’s projects were
actually aimed at improving the lives of Cubans and Cuban Americans or they were meant to
serve a Cuban political future directed by Jorge Mas Canosa and the Foundation’s other
directors, the creation and growth of the organization established a powerful Cuban American
lobby with access to the corridors of power not only in Washington but in other world capitals.
The relationship between CANF and the Reagan administration served the purposes of both
groups and helped establish the legitimacy of the lobby. During this same time period, however,
other Cubans were also making significant inroads into politics at the local, state, and national
levels.

“Because of my father and what happened to him, politics had affected my life a great
deal,” said Xavier Suarez, the first Cuban-born mayor of Miami. “I was impelled by a desire for
change, and I decided to get into it.”52 Suarez was almost twelve years old at the time of the
Bay of Pigs Invasion when his family was placed under house arrest under suspicion of counterrevolutionary sympathies. His family was allowed to move to the United States in July of 1961
and settled in a suburb of Washington when his father, Manuel Suarez Carreno, found work as
an engineer to support his fourteen children.53 Suarez had grown up in the mid-Atlantic, was
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educated at Villanova University and at Harvard Law, and came to Miami in 1975 as an outsider
whose Spanish had practically vanished because he had not used it in years. Suarez came to the
city because it was “fertile ground politically” and because “subconsciously” he wanted to
reconnect with his roots.54 Suarez’s lack of political connections and anti-Castro bona fides
made him an unlikely candidate to become the first Cuban born politician to gain city-wide
office. As with other Cuban American politicians, however, Suarez would come to master a
balance between appealing to a wider audience than traditional exile politicians and embracing
his position as part of a transnational political landscape in which local officials needed to
comment or become embroiled in international policy.
Suarez conducted three unsuccessful campaigns between 1979 and 1983. When he ran
for city commissioner in 1979 he was defeated by Armando Lacasa, another Cuban who
campaigned on a platform strongly focused on anti-communism. He lost more narrowly during
his second campaign for commissioner in 1981, this time against Demetrio Pérez Jr. In 1983,
poised for another run at commissioner, he instead decided to challenge incumbent mayor
Maurice Ferré. Ferré, a Puerto Rican businessman of Cuban descent, had won five two-year
terms as mayor since 1973, and in the 1983 campaign he used Suarez’s Cuban identity as a
wedge issue with voters. Ferré addressed ran a series of radio ads aimed at Miami’s black
community which played on the old divisions between Miami’s Cubans and other ethnic groups.
A Suarez victory would bring about a “Cuban takeover of Miami,” which was a frightening
prospect as “the mayor should be the mayor of the total city, not just one ethnic group.” While
Suarez cried foul at Ferré for playing ethnic politics, his own campaigners were caught with
printed cards that read “Cubans vote Cuban” in Spanish. Suarez ultimately lost the 1983
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election by a margin of 36,417 to 30,056. He obtained 73% of the Hispanic vote and 47% of the
non-Latin white vote, but Ferré overtook him by carrying 96% of the black vote.55 Ferré’s tactics
against Suarez had borne fruit against the young Cuban upstart and delayed his election as the
first Cuban born mayor of Miami.
In November of 1985, Suarez once again faced Ferré in a crowded mayoral election that
also included Cuban American banker Raul Masvidal. This time, however, Suarez employed an
electoral strategy that centered on a victory in a runoff election. During the general election,
Suarez stepped back and allowed Masdival to weaken Ferré’s position with the African American
constituency by criticizing his firing of the African American City Manager, Howard Gary.
Masvidal’s attacks on Ferré were particularly effective and pushed the incumbent Mayor to
third place in the general election. Suarez had prepared for a runoff, but Masvidal did not have
a strategy for this eventuality.56 Suarez spent the week between the general election and the
runoff attacking Masvidal for lacking a substantial policy platform and for his ties to special
interests. On Tuesday, November 12, Suarez easily defeated Masvidal by obtaining significant
support from Miami’s Hispanic population and the majority of the votes cast by non-Hispanic
whites. In the first round, Suarez finished fourth among non-Hispanic whites, but in the
televised debate prior to the runoff he made strong appeals to the white community and he
obtained the endorsement of the non-Hispanic white organizations that had supported Mayor
Ferré. Suarez also broadened his base among African American voters by obtaining the votes
that had gone to sociologist Marvin Dunn and Mayor Ferré.57
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In his inaugural speech, Suarez made a promise to knock down the “dividing walls” that
plagued community relations in the city.58 In order to create unity, however, Suarez, the
political outsider, needed to reinforce his anti-communist credentials with the Cuban American
community. During the campaign leading up to the runoff election, City Commissioner Joe
Carollo accused Suarez of having socialist leanings and made suggestions that the candidate was
“friendly with a Castro agent.”59 Suarez quickly embraced a stringent anti-communism in his
public appearances as Mayor. The year following his election, Suarez was present at the site of
dueling rallies related to American aid to Nicaragua’s Contra rebels. The pro-Contra crowd,
composed mostly of Cuban Americans, turned against the anti-Contra crowd, launching eggs,
rocks, and glass bottles. While a police riot control squad was brought to contain the
confrontation, the situation still required that the 200 anti-Contra demonstrators be removed
from the area by bus. After this removal, some of the pro-Contra demonstrators moved into the
space previously controlled by the political opposition and burned their signs. Rather than
defusing tensions, Suarez made references to the “Marxist groups” in the anti-Contra rally and
inflamed the situation by remarking that “unfortunately,” they had the right to be on the other
side of the street.60
As his tenure as mayor continued, Suarez made important political strides in Miami.
Suarez consolidated his power over the Miami Commission by helping oust his former accuser
Joe Carollo and by pushing through a ballot measure that changed the Mayor’s term from two
years to four.61 Even as he strengthened his position in municipal politics, Suarez continued to
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engage issues of international politics. In 1988, he responded to an article by University of
Miami professor Enrique Baloyra regarding the contentious tone and accusations of communism
that arose when anyone deviated from a doctrine of absolute isolation regarding Castro’s Cuba.
In an opinion piece he conceded that while the Cuban American community needed to be more
tolerant and open to differing opinions on how to defeat Fidel Castro, but there was no room for
any sort of dialogue or engagement with Castro himself. “What is there to discuss with Castro,”
Suarez asked, “save for his disappearance from this planet?” Anyone who suggested a change in
strategy from the encirclement and isolation of Castro’s regime needed to be reminded that no
communist state ever experienced regime change through discussions or treaties. “History
shows that communists only understand strength; and it is up to us to teach our children this
historical reality,” Suarez concluded, “as it is to prepare them to discuss strategy with their
University of Miami professors.”62
In 1990, Nelson Mandela visited Miami to speak out against apartheid in South Africa.
Mandela had made statements of solidarity with Fidel Castro in the past and was met with
protests from the Cuban American community. Suarez, along with five other Cuban American
mayors of area cities, signed a declaration criticizing Mandela for not denouncing Cuban human
rights violations.63 Suarez and the Metro-Dade Commission refused to honor Mandela during
his visit because he would not retract his statements. Following these events, several African
American organizations planned to boycott Miami as a convention destination unless Suarez
issued an apology. Suarez’s office responded by stating that he would not issue a public
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apology.64 The economic boycott of Miami by African Americans throughout the nation started
on July 17 and lasted for 151 days. It cost the city an estimated $12,000,000 in tourist and
convention revenue. Suarez made a speech to try to end the boycott, but he did not apologize
in his speech. He explained that he regretted the backlash that had resulted from Mandela’s
snubbing. One supporter of the boycott judged Suarez’s statement a “non-apology.” He
declared that a true apology was still necessary to reconcile racial tensions in Dade County, but
he suspected that it would not be politically expedient for Suarez to apologize since the majority
of his constituents were Cuban.65
While Suarez and others were succeeding in local politics, others attained electoral
successes that projected the Cuban American community to the state and federal levels. In
1982, the Cuban American owner of a private school in Miami-Dade County, Ileana Ros, won an
election to represent a district in western Dade County that was increasingly Hispanic and
Republican in the Florida House of Representatives. While in Tallahassee, Ros met Dexter
Lehtinen, a Democratic state representative from Perrine, a heavily rural, Democratic stronghold
in Dade County. After a one-year courtship, Ros and Lehtinen got married and one year later
Lehtinen changed parties and joined his wife in the Republican Party. In 1986, Ros-Lehtinen and
her husband ran joint campaigns for State Senate and after twin victories joined a conservative
coalition that unseated liberal Democrat Ken Jenne from the Senate presidency and backed
conservative Democrat John Vogt. By helping unseat Jenne, Lehtinen and Ros-Lehtinen
obtained significant committee chairmanships and access to the Senate’s leadership. Using this
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access, Lehtinen obtained Governor Bob Martínez’s endorsement for the open seat of U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida.66
In May of 1989, former Senator and long-serving Democratic Congressman Claude
Pepper died suddenly in his sleep. A special election was held in August to fill Pepper’s seat.
Ros-Lehtinen ran a campaign to try to overcome the significant Democratic majority in Pepper’s
district. Her opponent, Democrat Gerald F. Richman obtained large margins among African
Americans and non-Hispanic whites in the election. Richman crafted a slogan that played on the
concerns of local non-Cubans worried about the increased power of the Cuban community.
“This,” he said of Pepper’s congressional vacancy, “is an American seat.” Ros-Lehtinen cancelled
all debates, stating that she would not dignify Richman’s “racist” campaign. Richman could not
overcome “a giant, unified Hispanic electorate determined to send one of their own to
Congress,” particularly a Hispanic candidate who benefited from fund-raising visits by President
George Bush and his Vice President Dan Quayle. Ros-Lehtinen overcame Richman 53% to 47%
and after having been the first Cuban woman in both chambers of the Florida Legislature she
achieved three further milestones, becoming the first Cuban American, first Republican, and
first woman in Congress from Dade County. On the night of her victory, Celia Cruz, the Cuban
queen of salsa, entertained the crowd of supporters waiting for the triumphant candidate. Cruz
joyfully exclaimed that the people had spoken and “everyone” had chosen Ileana Ros. As she
exited the stage, however, Cruz deemphasized the fact that “everyone” had chosen the
candidate by triumphantly shouting into the microphone, “The Cubans won!”67
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Within days of Ros-Lehtinen’s election, an opinion piece ran in El Nuevo Herald that
claimed that her electoral victory had made clear one fact: “every day it’s more difficult to be a
Cuban in Miami.” The author, Agustin Tamargo, stated that when the Cuban population was
small and “in order to survive we had to wash cars or pick tomatoes in the fields, we didn’t
bother anyone,” but in the opinion of several groups the community had moved too fast, gone
too far, and needed to be contained. These different groups each had their own perspectives
and needs, but they had the same objective: “that the Cuban be stopped in his race toward
positions that they believe belong to them because they are superior or because they were here
before us.” These groups, however, did not recognize the role that Miami’s Cuban community
had played in transforming the city into an economic juggernaut of increasing cultural
importance. “Miami has been declared another of the capitals of Latin America,” Tamargo
wrote, “Miami is an experiment, Miami is a miracle.” While this change had not been achieved
only by the city’s Cuban community, the Cubans had been “active and prime agents of Miami’s
revitalization, the magnet that with its language, its work ethic, and its entrepreneurial spirit”
had brought millions of tourists and massive revenue streams that would otherwise have gone
to Texas or California. Any way you looked at it, it was the Cuban presence that had changed
Miami, a reality that only someone who had never visited the city could deny. Others, be they
African American, Jewish, or Anglo, might resent the young Cuban politician who made it to the
U.S. House of Representatives. The resentment might be unwarranted, but in order to move
beyond it the Cuban community needed to stop crying “communist” every time someone had a
differing opinion. “Castrism and McCarthyism go hand in hand,” Tamargo warned.68
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Many expected that when Ros-Lehtinen arrived on Capitol Hill she would vote along
Republican Party lines. After she was elected, Ros-Lehtinen was described by the Miami Herald
as “a conservative party loyalist.”69 The new Congresswoman quickly made an impression. A
fellow freshman Republican told reporters that Ros-Lehtinen had made things on the Hill far
livelier. “She’s our spark,” said Representative Tom Paxton. Ros-Lehtinen fell in line with most
Republican positions in Congress, as when she supported President Bush’s veto on government
funding for abortions in the cases of rape and incest. There were other issues in which the
young Representative broke with her fellow Republicans. This was the case when a bill came
before Congress early in her first term that meant to grant temporary refuge to Nicaraguan,
Salvadoran, and Chinese refugees. Ros-Lehtinen believed that the Nicaraguan refugees
deserved asylum because they were flying the Marxist Sandinista regime but the Salvadorans
did not, stating that “there is democracy in El Salvador.” Ultimately, Ros-Lehtinen voted for the
Moakley-DeConcini Bill, mirroring the positive votes of many Democrats and in direct opposition
of the President who had helped get her elected, George Bush. She also broke ranks with a
group of Republicans who attacked a bill to pay $1,250,000,000 in compensation to 62,000
Japanese Americans interned during World War II because of its impact on the budget. RosLehtinen had one thought: “What if it happened to the Cubans?” After she voted for
compensation, she admitted she was “in the GOP doghouse a little bit.”70 Ros-Lehtinen was
able to balance a strong support for the Republican Party with a record for voting based on her
experiences as a Cuban American. She was reelected eleven times as the Representative of the
18th district, and in 2012 was elected to represent the newly created 27th district.
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Another Cuban American followed in Ros-Lehtinen’s footsteps and became a member of
the House of Representatives in this time period. Lincoln Díaz-Balart was a 35 year old lawyer
and member of the Florida House of Representatives when, in 1989, he resigned his post as a
Florida State Representative to run for the seat that Ros-Lehtinen’s election to Congress had
made available. Republican Díaz-Balart, the heavy favorite, defeated Gene Flinn by a margin of
five-to-one.71 Three years later, Díaz-Balart placed a bid to represent Florida’s newly created
21st district in the U.S. House of Representatives. Díaz-Balart easily defeated his opponent, State
Senator Javier Souto, when he obtained 69% of the vote in the election that made him the
second Cuban American to be elected to Congress. In advance of his arrival in Congress, DíazBalart made it clear that his loyalty was to his community before his party, stating that he was a
supporter of President George Bush, but not of all his policies. He stated that he would use his
newfound position to hasten the liberation of his homeland.72
The election of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart helped solidify an association
of the Cuban American community with the Republican Party at a local and national level. This
conflation was largely driven by the work of the Cuban American National Foundation, which
openly worked to maintain strong ties with Reagan and his successor George Bush. When the
Foundation sought Bush’s presence in one of their events, Deputy Director of Media Relations
for the Office of Presidential Communications, Barrie Tron, contacted the Republican National
Committee’s Hispanic Outreach Director who informed him that CANF was “an influential group
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that is very interested in the Republican Party.”73 The Cuban American National Foundation,
however, did not speak for all Cuban Americans and their interest did not lie exclusively with the
Republican Party. CANF made strategic alliances with members of both major political parties as
was politically expedient for their long term goals. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Reagan’s
single-minded anti-communism and the election of his Vice President presented an ideologically
convenient and politically powerful alliance for the Foundation.
Other factors contributed to the strong public association of the Cuban American
electorate with the GOP. The community’s rocky history with the Democratic Party had set the
stage for this public association. Reagan’s open antagonism of international communism set
him at a stark contrast with previous democratic administrations that members of the Cuban
American community had seen as weak. Even as Regan faced the most significant public
setback of his presidency, the Iran-Contra scandal, many Cuban Americans expressed their
strong support of the President. One 64-year-old exile fashioned and distributed flyers reading
“Support Reagan Against Betrayal,” and when asked about them by reporters he stated that it
hurt him to see the Democrats and the media “do this to the best president this country has
ever had.” In the midst of the scandal, thousands of Cuban Americans and Nicaraguan exiles
flocked to the Dade County auditorium to listen to White House communications director Pat
Buchanan defend the President, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, and Lt. Colonel Oliver North.
Supporters within the auditorium held signs that read “We follow you Reagan,” “We love
freedom, we fight Communism,” and “100 percent with Reagan.” As Buchanan blamed
Reagan’s political opponents for fanning the flames of the scandal, he told an excited crowd that
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Miami’s Cuban American community had “always been in the vanguard of the Reagan
revolution.”74
The link between the GOP and the Cuban American community in South Florida was
further solidified when Carlos Salmán assumed the presidency of the Republican Party in Dade
County. Salmán, a Cuban born banker, had three initial goals in taking over Dade’s GOP: to keep
the party united, to grow the party’s ranks in the area and increase Cuban American
participation in elections, and to obtain the necessary funds to keep the Party’s county offices
open. Salmán was particularly proud of the rapid growth of the GOP in Dade County in recent
years. He noted that between 1980 and 1984, 11,914 people had registered as Republicans in
the county, compared to the 87,620 registrations between January of 1984 and July of 1987.
While he felt that he had played a part in increasing registrations, Salmán credited “a little old
man named Ronald Reagan” who had boosted the Republican Party’s popularity throughout the
country and especially in Dade County among the Cuban community. While the Democratic
leadership and others had “tried to create a negative opinion with regards to the Reagan
administration,” this had not dampened the enthusiasm of Cuban American voters. Salmán had
reason to be confident about the Cuban support for the Republican Party. July of 1988 saw 905
voter registrations by Cuban Americans: 703 registered as Republicans, 102 registered as
Democrats, and 72 registered as independents. Of the 172,753 Hispanic registered voters in the
county, 117,169 were registered Republicans and 41,085 were registered Democrats.75
These new demographics were significantly changing the electoral landscape in Dade
County and in South Florida. Veteran Congressman Dante Fascell had long made a name for
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himself as an ally of the Cuban community. Fascell was seen as an ally by anti-communist
Cubans in the United States. In the campaign for the 1984 election, Jorge Mas Canosa wrote a
letter supporting Fascell’s candidacy, noting that the long-serving Democrat had opposed Castro
for two and a half decades. He called Fascell an enthusiastic proponent of the economic
embargo against Cuba and “the principal sponsor, in the House of Representatives, of Radio
Martí.” These reasons made Mas Canosa ask his fellow Cubans to support Fascell so he could
continue to fight for a Cuba free of Castro and of communism.76 The Free Cuba PAC also spent
thousands of dollars to place newspaper ads on behalf of Fascell in the Miami Herald and Diaro
Las Americas on the eve of the 1990 election.77 While Fascell had the support of several key
Cuban Americans, the Florida Democratic Party was concerned about the Cuban American
community’s perception of the Party. The State Party Chairman, Charles A. Whitehead, wrote a
letter to Democratic office holders outlining a program to attempt to “alter the misconception
within the Cuban community, which has been created by the Republican Party, that Democratic
officeholders do not represent their interests.”78
Even as support for the Republican Party in Dade was rising, the Cuban American
community’s rocky history with the Democratic Party continued at the local and state levels.
This was particularly significant in 1991 when the state’s Democratic Governor Lawton Chiles
was engaged in a very public feud with Charles Whitehead’s successor as State Chairman, Simon
Ferro. Ferro, a Cuban-born lawyer from Miami, ran into problems in Tallahassee when Chiles
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became dissatisfied with his handling of the party.79 The disagreements between the two men
led to a meeting in late June at which Chiles made it clear he wanted Ferro to resign before he
faced the embarrassment of being forced out. Ferro, however, did not want to resign and he
publically stated that Chiles did not have the votes to oust him from the Party’s leadership.
Some of the state’s Cuban American Democrats were angered by Chiles’s actions, which they
believed stemmed from concerns of a Cuban takeover of the state. “We don’t want to run the
state,” said Coalition of Cuban American Democrats of Florida president Osvaldo Soto, “we want
to help him.” Others simply stated that they were “outraged.”80 Political commentators in the
state warned that even if Chiles managed to oust Ferro, the political cost for Democrats in Dade
County would be enormous. “Unless the governor can supplant Ferro with another Hispanic,
the ouster will be interpreted in ethnic terms, rightly or wrongly,” wrote Herald Political Editor
Tom Fielder.81 The feud would drag on for months until Chiles’s Lieutenant Governor, Buddy
MacKay, told the press in December that the split between the two Democratic leaders had
been resolved.82 This came, however, after the months of conflict and after Chiles publicly
refused to attend the State Democratic Convention until the week before the event.83
Dade County’s political environment was changing. The increased presence of the
Cuban American community as part of the electorate and a strong identification with the
Republican Party were fundamentally altering the nature of what had been a solid Democratic
stronghold. While these changes brought challenges to the Democratic Party in Dade County
and in Florida, they did not take the party out of contention entirely. The support of the Cuban
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American lobby and increasingly powerful Cuban American electorate could be obtained by
embracing attractive policy positions. The power of the lobby, the electorate, and of Cuban
American politicians had limits. A series of events in the waning years of the Cold War would
show that maintaining influence in the American political system and serving the Cuban
American constituency simultaneously would not always be possible.

The sometimes opposing pulls on powerful Cuban Americans from their community and
from the United States government made it difficult to navigate the use of the power they had
accrued. This was particularly true when different sectors of the Cuban American community
had divergent aims and ideas of how to achieve those aims. One such divergence resulted in
the uprisings at the federal detention centers at Oakville, Louisiana and Atlanta, Georgia. The
problem for powerful Cubans Americans and the Cuban American lobby was that the general
reaction to the marielitos and the specific reaction to those Cubans who were arrested in the
United States made many ordinary Cuban Americans question whether the detainees were
worth fighting for or if they were even a part of their community. The growing power of the
Cuban American community had been built on economic achievement and on a positive view of
the Cuban exiles. After the public relations challenge of Mariel, an increasing concern with
optics made the idea of risking power, influence, and image for a group of exiles who had been
convicted of crimes in the United States seem like a losing proposition.
The bulk of the exiled Cubans who wound up detained in Oakdale and Atlanta had faced
the challenges of a post-Mariel Miami in which they had little or no support and in which crime
appeared to many to be the most viable option for survival. While some Cuban exiles who were
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arrested and convicted of crimes were violent offenders, many others were arrested because of
non-violent offenses including working as sometimes unwitting drug mules for the city’s thriving
drug trade. In the same way the arrival of the marielitos had overwhelmed the city’s economy
and resources, the thousands of arrests that stemmed from an economy of desperation
overwhelmed the legal system. Most of the Cuban defendants had no knowledge of the
American legal system and had no resources with which to secure legal representation. The
sheer number of arrests also served to overwhelm the public defender system in South Florida.
The State Attorney for Dade County, Janet Reno, sought to remove the blockages in the system
by offering these offenders plea bargains with reduced sentences for their crimes. For
defendants facing stiff penalties related to drug trafficking, the prospect of serving shortened
sentences of one, two, or three years was far more attractive. The defendants were not
advised, however, that upon completion of their sentences they would be immediately detained
by Immigration and Naturalization Services for having violated the terms of their status as
parolees.84
The exiles found themselves placed in indefinite detention at federal facilities run by the
Bureau of Prisons. Soon after the end of the boatlift, when federal authorities were attempting
to find placement for those Fort Chaffee residents who might not receive sponsorship, it was
suggested that 800 to 1000 “hostile and anti-social Cubans” with no criminal history be placed at
the Atlanta Penitentiary. There was already an established population of 1,761 convicted Cuban
entrants at the facility. The Atlanta Penitentiary was already overcrowded, having been
designed with a capacity of 1,500 and housing 2,069 inmates at the time of the suggestion. The
Bureau of Prisons also objected to this placement on legal grounds, noting that there was
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“questionable, if any, legal authority to hold those with anti-social personalities in a federal
prison, co-mingled with those who have been convicted.”85 Given the existing overcrowding,
the addition of almost one thousand more Cuban entrants on shaky legal grounds would be
extremely problematic. There were already those who objected to the existing Cuban
population in Atlanta. The Cuban American Bar Association, for example, called for the release
of any entrant not charged with a crime not only in Atlanta, but also at Fort Chaffee.86
The Catholic Church also advocated for the detainees, charging that many of those
already detained in Atlanta were put there by mistake during the Mariel screening process.
They decried the fact that the Attorney General of the United States had testified before
congress in July of 1981 and had “failed to differentiate among those being held in the Atlanta
Federal Penitentiary when he described them all as criminals.” Church volunteers had identified
some 400 of the detainees as mentally ill or intellectually challenged. These detainees would
remain wards of the U.S. government for the rest of their lives unless the Cuban government
could be persuaded to accept their return. After the removal of these 400, church workers
estimated that some 600 of those remaining would pose a threat to the community if released.
The remaining 800 detainees were “young men who are not guilty of anything that would merit
long term imprisonment in the United States.” To delay their release meant delaying the
incorporation of these men into society. “We cannot be indifferent to a serious violation of
basic human rights which, though it had its origins in the actions of the government of Cuba, has
too long been perpetuated by our own government,” concluded a statement issued by Edward
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McCarthy, the Archbishop of Miami, Auxiliary Bishop Agustin Roman, and Monsignor Bryan O.
Walsh.87
The Catholic Church continued to advocate for the release of the Cuban exiles who had
taken plea deals and found themselves in indefinite detention after serving their sentences.
Being considered excludable aliens by the federal government meant that the Cuban exiles were
to be returned to their country of origin. Violation of their parole made it so they were, legally
speaking, no longer in the country and no longer entitled to constitutional rights in the period in
which they waited repatriation. This was not easy. The Cuban government did not want to see
any of the Mariel boatlift exiles returned. In the years after the boatlift, several rounds of
negotiations led to potential agreements regarding the return of the detainees. A 1984
agreement resulted in a list of prisoners that the Cuban government would accept if repatriated.
As an advocate for the detainees pointed out, however, the list of those detainees to be
deported did not include violent offenders, which the Cuban government did not want to
receive. Instead it was the non-violent offenders who would be sent back to the country they
had fled. “We were deporting those who least deserved to be deported,” said Cuban American
attorney Rafael Peñalver. The agreement would not be implemented as expected because the
launch of Radio Martí caused the Cuban government to withdraw from the accord and it once
again made the detainees’ stay in federal facilities indefinite.88
As the detainees and their families awaited some definitive news regarding the final fate
of the men who had already served their sentences, the problem remained largely unknown
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even among the Cuban American community. Many of those Cuban Americans who were aware
of the detentions did not consider them a problem, as they were more concerned with the
impact of these men and their convictions on the image of Cuban Americans. Rafael Peñalver
was, in the mid-1980s, chairman of the Florida Commission of Hispanic Affairs. The Commission
had been created by the Florida State Legislature in 1978 to represent the interest of the
Hispanic community in the state. Each month, the Commission would meet in a different city in
Florida and hold public hearings where the state’s Hispanic residents could voice complaints
that the Commission, in turn, could convey to the Governor’s office. Peñalver’s involvement
with the detainees began after a group of families came to petition on behalf of their detained
relatives in Tallahassee. The families making the petition requested the Commission meet at the
prison in Tallahassee so the detainees could plead their case. Peñalver and the other
Commission members were skeptical, believing that the families were petitioning for the violent
offenders that Castro had included in the boatlift. Regardless, the Commission set a date for a
hearing in Tallahassee.89
Peñalver, as chairman of the Commission was obligated to go to the meetings, but when
he arrived in Tallahassee he learned that he was the only member of the commission that came
to the hearing. Once there the detainees and their families pleaded their case, explaining that
they had already served their sentences and had been held in indefinite detention for up to 3
years after the end of those sentences. Peñalver thought the detainees and their families
seemed to be decent people, not hardened criminals, but he could not believe that the
indefinite detention being described could actually be taking place. The detainees told Peñalver
that he could verify everything they were telling him and that he should speak to Bishop Roman
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in Miami, the one advocate that had come to their aid thus far. Peñalver had family friends put
him in touch with Roman, who verified what the detainees had told him. The two men then
forged a partnership to advocate for the detainees.90
Roman and Peñalver began a campaign on behalf of the detainees, arguing that
indefinite detention was both a violation of the U.S. Constitution and a violation of basic human
rights. Roman asked Peñalver to write a legal brief concerning the problem of indefinite
detention and in late 1986 he drafted pastoral letter on behalf of Roman and the two other
Cuban born Bishops, Eduardo Boza-Masvidal and Enrique San Pedro. The bishops were unable
to change the federal government’s policies, but their advocacy helped strengthen Roman’s
identity as an advocate with the detainees.91 In November of 1987, the U.S. government
announced it had reached a new immigration pact with Cuba that could result in the arrival of
between 23,000 and 25,000 Cuban immigrants to American shores each year. Part of the accord
included continued talks for the deportation of 3,700 ex-felons being detained by the INS and
3,500 serving prison sentences.92 The accords included a reinstatement of parts of the failed
1984 agreement, specifically the list of detainees that the Cuban government was willing to
accept if repatriated. Upon learning that extraditions to Cuba were imminent, the Cuban
detainees at the Federal Detention Center in Oakdale rioted and took hostages. Three days
later, the detainees at the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta followed suit.93
“They are saying they would rather die than go to Cuba,” relayed Maria Garcia, wife of
an Atlanta detainee, to other Cuban families. Garcia was listening to the police frequency on a
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walkie-talkie while standing outside the penitentiary. When rumors arose that the police might
take the Penitentiary by force, the families of the detainees sought out the aid of one of the few
individuals to have championed their cause: Georgia congressman and Civil Rights Movement
veteran John Lewis. Lewis, for his part, asked law enforcement officials to be allowed to enter
the penitentiary in order to negotiate an end to the standoff. Lewis’s request was denied,
declared too dangerous.94 Federal authorities attempted to conduct negotiations themselves,
but they were unable to come to terms with the rioters. Cuban American leaders grew
increasingly anxious as the standoffs dragged on, exclaiming that their potential as negotiators
was being ignored. Speaking at a press conference held by Facts About Cuban Exiles, banker
Carlos Arboleya complained that top officials in the Reagan administration were all but ignoring
the eager Cuban Americans who wanted to help end the hostage situations. Jorge Mas Canosa
stated that he was in touch with Attorney General Edwin Meese, but criticized the federal
government’s handling of the crisis and their hesitancy to allow for judicial reviews on a case-bycase basis as the detainees were demanding. Others were concerned about the impact on their
community as a whole. Antonio Varona, the head of the Junta Patriotica Cubana warned that
supporting the rioters was dangerous because of “public American opinion, which could fall
upon all of us.”95
Even as prominent Cuban Americans were growing increasingly impatient, the Reagan
administration had already reached out to Bishop Roman and Peñalver. The federal
government was eager to end the crisis, not just because of the potential for violence and loss
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of life, but because of an impending state visit by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.96 The day
after the Oakdale riot, the detainees had requested that Roman be the one to negotiate on their
behalf, so the bishop was essential to achieving this goal. The bishop had Peñalver negotiate
terms with the Justice Department before they would go anywhere near either facility. Roman
was ready to travel up to Atlanta the Monday after the riots, but the trip was postponed when
the Justice Department refused to provide written guarantees that the detainees would receive
individual reviews before the courts. The detainees and their advocates wanted to ensure each
man would get a hearing to determine if they would remain in the country instead of being
deported as a group. As phone negotiations between Peñalver and the Justice Department
continued, the refusal to allow for the requested review system kept Roman from becoming
involved. “I cannot trick the prisoners—or anyone,” said Bishop Roman.97
Peñalver and Roman, along with Carlos Arboleya, travelled to Washington, D.C. to
continue their negotiations with the federal government at a meeting with Attorney General
Meese. Peñalver sought to secure the process of individual review, to differentiate between
violent and non-violent offenders, and to stop the practice of indefinite detention. Meese
explained to the bishop and his lawyer that the detainees were not, legally speaking, in the
country. He used the metaphor of a chain-link fence being erected around the country and he
told the bishop to imagine that the detainees were on the other side; they had not entered the
country and therefore had no rights. “If they are not in the country,” Roman asked Meese,
“then how have they taken over two of your largest federal penitentiaries?” The pair’s
entrenched advocacy of the detainees enraged Meese, who asked how a man of the cloth could
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allow his lawyer to blackmail the federal government. Roman denied there was any blackmail
happening, but he would not allow himself or Peñalver to be used. “What you are suggesting,”
he told Meese, “is to use the Church and use an attorney to solve the problem that you
yourselves created.”98
The meeting in Washington did not yield an agreement between the federal
government and Bishop Roman. Roman and Peñalver continued to negotiate with a team from
the federal government who travelled down to Miami. The federal government agreed to the
concept of individual review and flew the bishop and his lawyer to England Air Force base in
Alexandria, LA to sort out the details of what they could offer the detainees. After a long
negotiation, Roman and Peñalver made their dramatic entrance at Oakdale, resolving the
situation.99 When they travelled to Atlanta, they were met with greater skepticism from the
detainees, noting that the Oakdale pact was unacceptable as a solution to the Atlanta
situation.100 The bishop managed to negotiate terms with the Atlanta detainees as well, ending
what the Miami Herald called “the longest prison uprising in American history” shortly after 1
a.m. on December 4, 1987. The crisis that once promised to end only in carnage ended instead
in a crowd of detainees crowding the roof of the penitentiary’s hospital, celebrating with music
and dancing as Bishop Roman entered the building.101 Roman and Peñalver remained involved
with the detainees for years to come. Peñalver created an organization named Due Process,
Inc., which had teams of volunteer lawyers and law students who travelled to the remote
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locations where the Cuban detainees had been dispersed to prevent another uprising. Despite a
slow case review process, nearly 80% of the detainees were eventually released.102
The bloodless end of the crisis brought a sense of relief to the streets of Little Havana
and, at least for a moment, a sense of unity. “Now we all feel proud when we see a marielito
waving a Cuban flag from the roof of the Atlanta prison,” said a Cuban American who had
worked for the detainees. Others, like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, doubted the harmony in the
community would last, but suggested it was comforting to know that when unity was needed it
could exist.103 Others suggested that this temporary union showed the Cuban American
community’s new maturity. Guillermo Martinez wrote an opinion piece in the Herald where he
stated that the resolution showed that the community had come of age. Martinez was
particularly complimentary of men like Peñalver and Arboleya who had supported Roman’s
effort to resolve the crisis. Arboleya’s FACE had gone beyond its original mission of improving
the Cuban American community’s image and had “played a crucial role in helping to prevent
that image from deteriorating.”104
According to Peñalver, the members of Facts About Cuban Exiles wanted the federal
government to make an agreement with Roman in order for the bishop to end the standoffs.
The actions of other members of the Cuban American community, however, did not show the
sense of unity that was so publicly celebrated following the resolution of the crisis. While
Roman and Peñalver negotiated with the federal government over the concept of individual
review, federal authorities brought pressure on the Cuban American community, which, in turn,
brought pressure on Roman and Peñalver to give the federal government the swift end to the
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crisis it wanted.105 Given the recalcitrance of the bishop and the attorney, the federal
government attempted to bring in other Cuban American negotiators including Jorge Mas
Canosa and Xavier Suarez. Before Roman brought an end to the Oakdale crisis, the FBI
attempted to conclude the Atlanta standoff by teaming an FBI negotiator with two former
political prisoners and Mas Canosa to negotiate with the prisoners. The detainees refused the
deal even after 15 high profile Cubans including Xavier Suarez, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln DiazBalart, Antonio de Varona, and Huber Matos attempted to visit the detainees to convince them
to release the hostages.106 While all parties wanted to conclude the hostage situations before
any fatalities occurred, some members of the Cuban American community were far more
interested in pleasing the federal government than in assuring the rights of the detainees.
Peñalver recalls that the detainees understood this well, leading to their distrust of the Cuban
American National Foundation. “They wanted to impress the American government that they
were able to deliver,” he says of CANF, “and by impressing the American government that they
were able to deliver, they lost their constituency.”107
Peñalver was far from the only voice in the Cuban community critical of the Cuban
American National Foundation and Jorge Mas Canosa. He was joined by many critics from
without. Mas Canosa held that many of his critics among those outside of the Cuban
community sought to create a false impression of the community at large. He believed that
“part of the Anglo culture,” both in Miami and throughout the country, wanted to create the
concept that the Cubans were “haters.”108 Just weeks before the detainees rioted in Oakdale
and Atlanta, the Cuban American National Foundation took aim at what would become one of
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Mas Canosa’s most frequent targets: the Miami Herald. The Foundation, dissatisfied with the
newspaper’s editorial positions, took out a full page advertisement in the pages of the Herald
that attacked the newspaper’s attitudes toward the Cuban American community. “The Miami
Herald is aggressive in its ignorance of our people,” declared the ad, “it refuses to understand
that Cuban Americans see the struggle between totalitarianism and democracy as a personal,
ever-present struggle.”109 The Herald was not simply an institution that failed to see eye-to-eye
with the Cuban American community, but it was purposefully hostile.
In early November, the Herald ran an opinion piece by Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, a Bay of
Pigs veteran and the director of the Division of Latino Studies at Florida International University,
which suggested that the confrontation between CANF and Miami’s largest newspaper was
necessary. The conflict needed to be understood “within the context of a steady deterioration
in the mutual perspectives of the single most-influential institution in this growing and
prosperous city, and the group most responsible for such growth and prosperity.” GonzalezPando admitted that the Herald needed to serve a larger, multicultural community and mission,
and that it was not at the service of the Cuban community alone. The Herald, however, had
failed the maturing Cuban community, and CANF had merely expressed the larger frustrations of
the community over the newspaper’s lack of sensitivity. The basis of this allegation could not be
disputed, but the Cuban community did not need to give itself over to paranoia. “It seems
difficult to conclude that The Herald’s failure is the result of a conscious conspiracy against
Cubans—as it is usually characterized in the Spanish media—rather than merely the
consequence of unfortunate errors of omission and a lack of real understanding,” GonzalezPando wrote. The Cuban academic sided with the Foundation and argued that the newspaper
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needed to catch up to the changing reality of the community. The Cuban American community,
in turn, was encouraged, in the vaguest of terms, to embrace the American tradition of
compromise. The conflict between CANF and the Herald had been necessary to create a new
relationship.110
The Herald attempted to engage Dade’s Hispanic community in a new way by
rebranding its Spanish edition, El Herald, as El Nuevo Herald that same month. Staff changes
and a greater editorial independence for El Nuevo Herald did not satisfy many Cubans, including
Mas Canosa. The CANF chairman’s conflicts with Miami’s largest newspaper continued as the
global Cold War came to an end and circumstances suggested that the Cuban exile would soon
follow suit. Many in Miami’s Cuban American community were convinced that the dissolution
of the Soviet Union meant that Fidel Castro and the revolutionary regime would soon be done
away with. In May of 1992, Jorge Mas Canosa made a prediction that Castro would fall within a
year or two.111 With Castro’s international support system disintegrating, CANF and its allies
sought to strengthen economic restrictions on Cuba, hastening the end of Cuba’s revolutionary
regime. A new bill, entitled the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, was introduced by New Jersey
Congressman Robert Torricelli. “The usually liberal congressman suddenly found himself
needing the support of north Jersey’s conservative Cuban-exile community,” reported Esquire,
and “suddenly he got the notion to tighten the embargo the U.S. had declared against Cuba
twenty-nine years ago.” The bill was meant to restrict trade with Cuba by the subsidiaries of
American corporations based abroad, to prevent American firms from obtaining tax deductions
for expenses related to subsidiary trade with Cuba, and to restrict foreign ships traveling to Cuba
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for trade from stopping at U.S. ports. Esquire was less than complimentary toward the Torricelli
bill, calling it “a near reduction ad absurdum of the United States’ historic big-stick-no-carrot
policy toward Cuba.” The Department of State was another strong opponent of the bill, calling
it “self-destructive” and noting the ban on subsidiary trade would provoke the allies of the
United States. In due course, the British and Canadian governments issued strong objections
and the European Economic Community formally stated that it would not accept “the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. jurisdiction” and that the bill went against international law. 112
During the discussion of the Torricelli Bill, Jorge Mas Canosa once again engaged in
battle with the Miami Herald. In January of 1992, the Herald ran an editorial opposing the bill.
The editorial admitted that Robert Torricelli had built a reputation as a leader on Latin American
issues, but it also reminded readers that President George Bush had vetoed similar legislation in
1990 because it would harm relations with trading partners like Canada. The newspaper called
for Congress to defeat the Torricelli bill. “Making the embargo air-tight will not promote
democracy or liberty in Cuba, but it could promote chaos and catastrophic violence,” a Herald
editorial cautioned. The editorial board warned that such a tightening could “conceivably
worsen the Cuban people's deteriorating living conditions while offering Mr. Castro rhetorical
ammunition for harsher repressive measures and for his denunciations of U.S. ‘conspiracies’
against his regime.” At best, the editorial board speculated, the bill would earn Torricelli the
support of the Cuban American community. The most sensible policy that Washington could
adopt toward Cuba was to simply leave things as they were. To exert additional pressure on the
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Cuban government ran the risk of making the United States’ Cuba policy completely
ineffective.113
Mas Canosa, in turn, denounced the Herald for “manipulating information like Granma.”
The CANF chairman took to Cuban radio to denounce the newspaper and its leadership. He
claimed that the Herald had conducted a continuous and systematic campaign against Cuban
Americans and he called on the newspaper’s leadership to resign.114 The same day the Herald
published the editorial against the Torricelli bill, El Nuevo Herald published a column by assistant
city editor Andres Reynaldo that criticized exile leaders who espoused violence against the
Castro regime but expected others to carry out the behaviors they advocated. Reynaldo singled
out Armando Perez-Roura, general manager and commentator for Radio Mambi, who was
leading a petition drive asking President Bush to grant the exile community the right to use force
against Castro’s Cuba. Mas Canosa took this as a combined assault on both the Cuban American
community’s allies and the community itself. “Just like The Miami Herald attacks Congressman
Robert Torricelli, a friend of the Cubans, it also attacks Cubans and institutions like Armando
Perez-Roura,” Mas Canosa charged. The Herald called the attacks on itself and its sister
publication “sad and painful and unfair.” Writers Alfonso Chardy and Cynthia Corzo reiterated
that the newspapers had “treated the news about Cuba and the Cuban-American community in
exile with respect and integrity and sensitivity.” They acknowledged that the Herald was not
perfect, but stated that when they had made mistakes they had been willing to correct them.
While the newspaper had sought diverse perspectives in its news columns, it had given regular
coverage to human rights violations and the situation on the island. “On the editorial pages of
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The Herald,” they went on, “where our own opinion appears, our position in support of a free
Cuba has been unequivocal.”115
Mas Canosa was not impressed. He enlisted the aid of the right-leaning Inter-American
Press Association, which published a negative report on the Herald’s practices. Mas Canosa and
other like-minded Cubans followed up on these attacks by purchasing advertising space on the
side of buses that read in English or in Spanish “I don’t believe in The Herald/Yo no creo en El
Herald.” 116 Mas Canosa acknowledged these actions, but denied having been part of the larger
campaign against the Herald and its staff which accompanied them. Letter writing campaigns to
advertisers were organized by incensed members of the community. The newspaper’s vending
machines were smeared with feces and staffers received death threats. During this campaign,
the Herald’s publisher David Lawrence began to fear he would be the victim of a bombing and
began using a remote control device to start his car each morning.117 In March, Lawrence wrote
a piece entitled “No, Mr. Mas, Intimidation Won’t Work.” He had worked for seven newspapers
throughout his career, but he had never seen anything like the situation he had experienced
over the previous two months. The Herald, however, would not surrender to Mas Canosa’s
“bullying.” “This is a guy hellbent on control,” Lawrence wrote. The newspaper would welcome
and convey Mas Canosa’s opinion, but never his opinion alone. “All the billboards in the
Americas, all the national TV that he can buy, all the analysts whom he can strong-arm, all the
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huffing and bluster, still won’t give him control of this newspaper. Ever,” Lawrence wrote
defiantly.118
The Torricelli Bill remained a point of contention throughout 1992 as the country
headed into a particularly contested presidential election. President Bush, following the
suggestions of the State Department, initially opposed the Torricelli Bill. In April, Arkansas
Governor Bill Clinton visited Miami and announced that he was backing the proposed
legislation. On that day, Clinton received more than $275,000 in campaign contributions from
Hispanic donors. The following month, on Cuban Independence Day, Clinton returned to Miami
and was given $100,000 by four Cuban American businessmen. In response to Clinton’s
endorsement of the bill, President Bush stated that he would use an executive order to
implement a new policy that would prohibit vessels that engaged in trade with Cuban from
coming into U.S. ports. The State Department remained quiet, but one official admitted off the
record that the Department was “bending over on this and taking it.” With the stated and
implicit support of both of the leading presidential candidates, the bill easily passed both the
Senate and the House.119
“It’s a bad day in Havana,” gushed Robert Torricelli after the passage of the Cuban
Democracy Act in the House and the Senate. The Herald, however, called attention to the fact
that “for some, the significance of the Cuban Democracy Act… was its testament to the ability
and clout of the Cuban American National Foundation.”120 The Cold War had ended with the fall
of the Soviet Union, but CANF had significant clout in American politics still. The Free Cuba PAC
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had donated more than $1,000,000 to congressional candidates in the previous decade and it
was understood that any vote against an anti-Castro policy carried with it the potential danger
of being painted as being soft on communism. “In a small corner of the Western Hemisphere,
the Cold War endures,” claimed another Herald story. At that moment, the political capital of
Mas Canosa and CANF was reaching a high water mark. Even a previous critic of Mas Canosa’s,
Wayne Smith, had to admit that the courtship of Bill Clinton had been “a masterful job.”121 The
Foundation’s relationship with Clinton would yield them a smooth transition from being
associated with the Republican Party to a significant relationship with the Democratic
contender. The contact between Clinton and CANF was not without its controversy among
many Cuban Americans. Republican loyalists in the community claimed that meetings between
Mas Canosa and Governor Clinton showed “a lack of principle, a lack of loyalty, a negative
image,” and that the CANF chairman wanted “to be with God and with the devil.” The
Foundation, however, valued continued influence over ideological purity or Party association.
“Your statements on Cuba have demonstrated to us here in Miami, as well as to the entire
Cuban-American community throughout the United States,” read a Foundation statement
following a meeting between the candidate and Mas Canosa, “that we need not fear a Bill
Clinton administration.”122
While George Bush still won the state of Florida, he did so by a much smaller margin
than when he faced Michael Dukakis in 1988. Clinton managed to make inroads into the Cuban
American community in 1992 and in 1996, when he gained as much as 40% of the community’s
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vote.123 Mas Canosa’s relationship with Clinton allowed the Cuban American National
Foundation continued access after the Republican Party lost the White House. Some critics of
the CANF chairman saw this relationship as detrimental to Clinton and to American policy. One
contentious magazine profile labelled the president Mas Canosa’s “indulgent patron,” and
suggested that as a candidate Clinton had entered in a “Faustian deal” in an effort to win the
state of Florida.124 Clinton’s embrace of harsher policy against Castro’s Cuba, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the end of subsidies to the island, the disappearance of Cuba’s Eastern European
trading partners, and the passage of the Torricelli bill made the goals of the Cuban American
National Foundation and like-minded Cuban Americans seem within reach. The period between
1991 and 1996, euphemistically called the período especial by Castro’s government, saw a
precipitous economic decline. In the first three years of this period, the Cuban economy
declined by 35% of GDP.125
This sharp economic decline exacerbated an immigration trend that began in the mid1980s. Starting in 1985, desperate Cubans began attempting the dangerous crossing of the
Florida Straits in balsas, makeshift rafts constructed of tires and other materials available to
them. The crossing was an incredibly dangerous endeavor during which the would-be refugees
risked drowning, starvation, dehydration, or being preyed upon by sharks. Between 1985 and
1993 some 6,000 balseros managed to safely reach the United States on these makeshift
vessels. The situation became all the more dire in the summer of 1994 as the Cuban economy
declined and Castro once again used this migration impulse as a pressure release valve on Cuban
society. Castro ordered the Cuban Coast Guard not to stop any balseros they found attempting
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to exit the island’s territorial waters. The new permissiveness of Castro’s government drove
34,000 rafters to leave Cuban shores that summer.126
The Clinton Administration was particularly concerned about these developments.
Clinton remembered the political damage that the Mariel boatlift had done to Jimmy Carter and
the problems that it had caused him as governor of Arkansas. Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet
Reno, had also had significant experience with the crime surge in South Florida following the
boatlift. Reno saw the balseros as a wave of illegal aliens trying to enter the United States. In
response, the U.S. Coast Guard blocked the progress of the rafters at sea and redirected them to
the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay.127 When he publicly announced that the rafters
would be sent to Guantanamo in an August press conference, Clinton called Castro’s actions “a
cold-blooded attempt to maintain the Castro grip on Cuba, and to divert attention from his
failed communist policies.” He accused Castro of attempting to export to the United States the
political and economic crises he had created in Cuba in defiance of a larger movement toward
democracy in the Americas. “The Cuban government will not succeed in any attempt to dictate
American immigration policy,” Clinton warned, “the United States will do everything within its
power to ensure that Cuban lives are saved and that current outflow of refugees is stopped.”128
When questioned about the embargo on Cuba and the increased economic burden on
the island as a cause of the refugee influx and whether it was time to negotiate a movement
toward democracy with the Cuban government, the President remained true to his previous
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commitment to restrictions on Cuba. “I support the embargo, and I support the Cuban
Democracy Act,” Clinton told reporters, “and I do not believe we should change our policy
there.” When asked why a policy of isolation toward Cuba had been adopted while he dealt
with authoritarian regimes in China and North Korea on a regular basis, Clinton gave a vague
answer about circumstances being different in those cases. The president made it clear,
however, that the Cuban Adjustment Act was still the law of the land and that any Cubans who
reached American shores would be detained for review and be treated in accordance with
immigration law, including the Act. When asked if intercepting the balseros and sending them
to Guantanamo Bay was immoral, Clinton stated that it was his belief that “the American people
and that the Cuban American people and the people of Florida –but the people of the entire
United States—do not want to see another Mariel boatlift.” 129
The specter of Mariel hung heavy over the Clinton Administration’s reaction to the
rafter crisis. “The Administration’s response protected southern coastal communities from the
turmoil of a mass migration episode such as the Mariel Cuban influx of 1980,” read The
President’s Report on Immigration for 1994. The report stated that the Mariel boatlift had done
damage to Florida communities, created significant federal and state costs, had dampened the
Nation’s support for legal immigration, and had violated “the fundamental principle of border
integrity that underlies our immigration system.” The report claimed that the federal
government’s actions had prevented a repeat of the Mariel incident, saved thousands of lives,
and maintained “essential humanitarian protections.”130 Clinton also found it politically
expedient, in the context of the increasing anti-immigrant sentiment of the mid-1990s, to
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publicly state that the United States did not want to see Cuba dictate its immigration policy as
they had during Mariel.131
Memories of Mariel also colored the way Cuban Americans viewed the rafter crisis. La
Voz de la Calle (The Voice of the Street), a Cuban American newspaper, ran a headline in late
August which read “Massive Exodus Continues; the Second Mariel Has Begun.”132 The Miami
Herald described how, as Clinton’s policy toward the rafters evolved, the initial reaction of
ambivalence or perplexity by the Cuban American community grew into anguish and discord.
Cuban American lawyer and former chairman of the state Democratic Party Alfredo Duran
described a situation of “extreme confusion” in the community. The images of the rafters
standing behind barbed wire in Guantanamo or at the Krome detention center evoked another
ghost of Mariel: indefinite detention. This time, however, indefinite detention was to be the
fate of all Cuban refugees, not only those suspected or convicted of crimes. “It has changed
status and privileges Cubans had for past 34 years,” Duran told the newspaper.133
The feeling that the ground had suddenly shifted beneath their feet was widespread
throughout the Cuban American community. Historian Félix Masud-Piloto began revising his
1988 history of the Cuban diaspora in the United States, With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to
the United States. When he published a new edition in 1996, Masud-Piloto added a new
chapter on the rafter crisis and changed the title of the book to From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal
Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995. Masud-Piloto felt that this new titled
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more accurately reflected “the evolution of and contradictions of U.S. policy.”134 American
policy toward the balseros changed long-standing realities for Cuban exiles, but it also changed
so rapidly that the shock forced many outside the community to adopt new positions. On
August 20th, the Herald urged support for the Clinton-Reno policy, despite the pain that
indefinite detention caused. It explained that the detention of the rafters hurt exiles, but it
would also hurt Castro and might even topple him.135 Less than a week later, the Herald
denounced what it called “a dizzying, unfair change.” The newspaper reiterated that indefinite
detention was necessary, but the new policy changes that would deny them the right to apply
for political asylum would be “unfair and unwise” and it would undercut support for American
policy.136
The Cuban American lobby, having had time to grow in power, needed to negotiate a
complicated political landscape in dealing with the rafter crisis. Some journalists portrayed the
lobby’s influence as absolute. Ann Louise Bardach reported that at an August 19 meeting at the
White House saw Jorge Mas Canosa dictating U.S. Cuba policy to President Clinton. According to
Bardach, Clinton had left his own birthday party to meet with Mas-Canosa, Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles, and other Miami Cubans. There, Mas-Canosa “thumped and slapped the table as
he spoke, demanding the president punish Fidel Castro for the refugee crisis.”137 The situation
became all the more difficult, however, as the crisis dragged on into 1995 and the Clinton
Administration made another policy change that solidified a new status for the Cuban American
and exile communities. In early May, Janet Reno announced that most of the Cuban refugees
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detained in Guantanamo would be allowed to come to the United States. Any new balseros
found at sea, however, would be sent back to Cuba.138 The new policy sprang from a desire to
ensure that, in the words of Governor Chiles, “Florida does not face another Mariel.”139 The
Herald regarded the altered policy as difficult, but opined that it adopted “the ‘least worst’ of a
set of options containing no wholly satisfying choices.” While no one relished the idea of
returning Cuban rafters to the island on American vessels, the new agreement between the
Cuban and U.S. governments expanded the number of legal visas to leave Cuba. It was
important, the Herald warned, that the federal government fully observe its pledge to heed
rafters who claim reason for political asylum.140
Some greeted the news of this policy announcement with delight. Two groups in the
state of Florida, the Save Our State Committee and Floridians for Immigration Control, had been
preparing to present voters with measures cutting off aid to undocumented immigrants in the
state. Modelled after California’s controversial Proposition 187, the measures would propose
constitutional amendments in the 1996 state-wide ballot. The Clinton Administration’s decision
to allow Cubans detained in Guantanamo to enter the United States would be “fuel to the fire,”
explained the supporters of these ballot measures in a tone described as “almost gleeful.”
Clinton’s policy decision, said sociologist Lisandro Perez, was a balancing act that offended both
those who were against the arrival of the Cuban rafters as well as the “Cubans offended by the
notion of a deal with Fidel Castro.”141 This was particularly true of the Cuban American National
Foundation and its allies, who immediately took to Cuban radio to denounce the deal. The
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Foundation pledged to lobby the U.S. Congress to subtract all funds spent to interdict the Cuban
balseros from the military services budget. More problematic was CANF’s announcement that it
would withdraw as a voluntary sponsor of Cuban immigrants. “By this gesture, the CANF puts its
narrower political agenda above the broader and infinitely more important imperative to help
these Cubans—these human beings—to being life anew in the United States,” admonished the
Herald.142
The problem for CANF and other groups, the newspaper would report some days later,
was “a crisis in clout.” The Foundation had bitterly broken its ties to the Clinton Administration
over the issue of repatriation. This was not without consequences. “After years of wielding
effective veto power over U.S. policies toward Cuba,” reported Christopher Marquis, “the
conservative Cuban-American lobby suddenly finds itself in a radically altered landscape that is
much less sympathetic to its agenda.” Even as CANF and other Cuban Americans denounced the
Clinton Administration, they found less than ideal support from the Republican Party. Fiscal
hawks in the House Budge Committed were calling for the elimination of government funding to
Radio and TV Martí for the fiscal year to follow. Following the election of 1994 and the so-called
“Republican Revolution,” the desire for budget cuts and the anti-immigrant sentiment in
Congress left CANF standing on unstable ground. Some, including State Department officials,
predicted that there would be a shift in the Cuban community. The time was “ripe for a
Democratic Mas Canosa.” The change in Cuban immigration policy, however, had left Cuban
American Democrats feeling “neutered” and too stunned or dismayed to step into the void.143
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Marquis and other observers were heralding the decline of the Cuban American
National Foundation and similar groups too hastily, but they were correctly identifying the
frustration felt by the Cuban American lobby regarding the limits of their power. For decades,
the Cuban American community had built on the federal largesse granted to the early waves of
exiles and on its drive and background to grow its economic and political power in South Florida.
The Cuban American community came of age as it solidified its place in Miami. In doing so, it
came to wield the clout necessary to influence American foreign policy. The community sought
to have a voice in determining its own destiny. The most effective lobbying organization in the
Cuban community, the Cuban American National Foundation, was formed to exercise this power
and to protect the image of the Cuban American community. In order to retain this power, the
Foundation and other groups often sought to aid the federal government in attaining its goals at
the expense of what some of its constituency saw as the community’s best interest. As the
balsero crisis threatened another Mariel, however, the political juggernaut of the Cuban
American lobby encountered the immovable object of American politics and discovered the
limits of its power; power preserved and retained, but power with restrictions. In 1995 the Cold
War came to an end in Miami, not because the exile community had given up the desire to fight,
but because the federal government that had been by turns its patron and its tool, yet had
never shared its devotion, had moved on.
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EPILOGUE—“OUR CAUSE IS NOT UNDERSTOOD”: CUBAN AMERICAN IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND
THE END OF EXILE
“If living outside one’s homeland is painful, it must be even more painful to die on
foreign soil,” wrote Diairo Las Americas columnist Uva de Aragón in the introduction to her 2006
book Morir de Exilio (Death by Exile). “To die in exile is not to have a land of one’s own to even
rest one’s bones in,” she explained.1 In several decades of writing for the largest Spanish
language newspaper in Miami, de Aragón had publised many pieces inspired by the death of
writers, painters, musicians, political activists, and public figures who had been her friends.
Morir de Exilio was a collection of “pages of mourning.” It also celebrated the prolific lives that
had left a significant mark. In her moving prose she recounted how banishment was used as a
punishment in antiquity, remarking that this was “not strange, for forcibly living outside one’s
homeland is the equivalent of a spiritual death sentence.” For an exile, banishment means
always looking backward, longingly, with a desperate clinging to memories and dreams of
return. The exile’s vision of his homeland is frozen in a moment that was, the moment they
were forced to leave. They long to return home, as if they could find their city, their
neighborhood, their home just as they left it.2 While the men and women de Aragón was
writing about would never return to her homeland, their books, records, and pictures were
returning to Cuba. “With this volume it might be possible to do that which death prevented: to
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repatriate these exiles, to return them to the country, to the culture from which they came and
for which they bore fruit,” de Aragón hoped.3
After the Clinton Administration changed long-standing policies regarding the entry of
Cuban refugees into the United States, the hope for any return to Cuba, much less a swift return
for exiles that had been waiting for decades, seemed further than ever before. As de Aragón
wrote, more than ten years after the change, many of the exiles had died throughout the years
waiting for what was once expected to be a swift return. The often heard statement from the
early days of the exile, “we’ll be back in Cuba in six months,” had long since become a bitter
reminder of the dashed hopes of the early refugee waves.4 For many of these exiles, a return to
Cuba would only come posthumously or symbolically as their ideas and works returned to their
homeland when they could not. Many others had simply moved on from the idea that they
were exiles at all. A survey conducted in late 1995 found that most of Miami’s Cubans preferred
to call themselves Cuban Americans rather than exiles. Only 17% of those who responded to
the survey said they would permanently return to Cuba after the fall of Fidel Castro’s regime.
“Although their hearts and memories are in Cuba, their bank accounts, children and
grandchildren are here,” explained one of the men who oversaw the survey of Cuban
Americans.5
This did not mean that Cuban Americans had given up the fight against Castro or had
stopped trying to influence U.S. policy regarding Cuba. Following Clinton’s policy change, large
swaths of the Cuban American community protested the new policy through mass
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demonstrations on the streets of Miami. A week of traffic blockades followed the
announcement of the new policy until exiles called for countrywide general strike. They sought
to make the Clinton administration listen to its Cuban America constituents. “Either the
administration hears us, or they ignore us and choose to cooperate with the Castro regime,”
said Ramon Saul Sanchez.6 The Clinton administration did not change its policies, so Cuban
American groups like Hermanos al Rescate (Brothers to the Rescue) redoubled their efforts to
seek out those Cubans seeking to leave the island for the United States and rescue them. The
group had also organized non-violent protest flights over Cuban airspace, challenging the Cuban
government. On February 24, 1996 two of their aircraft were shot down by MIG fighter jets
belonging to the Cuban Air Force.7 The Cuban government responded to international criticism
by stating it had begged the United States government to stop the flights, which they had
refused to do, allowing Hermanos al Rescate to continue provoking the Castro regime.8 While
the incident caused President Bill Clinton to back new measures against investment in Cuba, the
United States was unable to gain sufficient support for strong action against Cuba by the United
Nations.9
Militant members of the Cuban community faced other challenges even as the United
States government lost the urgency to oppose Castro’s government. After a piece in The New
Republic had described Cuban American National Foundation Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa as
“mobster and megalomaniac,” Mas Canosa sued both the magazine and the piece’s author Ann
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Louise Bardach.10 Mas Canosa believed that he had been defamed by the article. He declared
that it was filled with lies, taking particular objection to being called a mobster.11 While the suit
was eventually settled out of court and the magazine issued an apology, the extensive
depositions of Mas Canosa became a matter of public record and exposed the CANF executive
to scrutiny. After what the Miami Herald called “a grueling exploration of his life” the
depositions exposed “a complicated portrait of one of Miami’s most prominent men.” It also
revealed that despite his anti-communist bluster, Mas Canosa’s business ventures had led to an
attempt by his son, Jorge Mas Santos, to acquire a machinery conglomerate in the People’s
Republic of China. The depositions also brought to light Mas Canosa’s shady business practices
and brushes with legal authorities.12 For a lobbyist whose power was derived not only from his
wealth and that of his associates, but from his connections to the politically powerful, this type
of public dissection was inconvenient, if not outright damaging.
Mas Canosa died in late 1997. His son, Jorge Mas Santos became vice chairman of the
Foundation in 1998 and, following a unanimous vote the following year, became the new CANF
chairman.13 As Chairman, Mas Santos would experience a crisis of identity in the wake of the
maritime rescue of a five year old refugee named Elian Gonzalez. The boat on which Gonzalez
and his mother were attempting to cross the Florida Straits sank, killing seven people, leaving
three missing and causing two survivors to wash ashore on Key Biscayne. On Thanksgiving Day,
1999, a group of fishermen rescued the young boy and delivered him to American authorities
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who declared that the three survivors would not be deported to Cuba.14 Elian was quickly
released to the custody of his uncle Lazaro Gonzalez in Miami. Within days, the boy was at the
center of an international controversy as the Cuban government declared that Elian’s father,
who was divorced from his late mother, wanted him returned to Cuba. Juan Miguel Gonzalez
appeared on a broadcast from Cuba stating that if the United States was “such a country of
human rights, they should return my child.”15 The Cuban American National Foundation,
meanwhile, circulated an image of the boy with a heading that read “Another Child Victim of
Fidel Castro.”16 The boy’s uncle was also adamant about the fact that he wanted the boy to
remain in the United States. “His mother was bringing him to freedom,” said Lazaro Gonzalez,
“and we don’t want him to go back to a Communist system.”17
While surviving parents were normally awarded custody in cases like Elian’s, the
tensions between Cuba, the United States, and the Cuban American community complicated the
situation. Castro countered the Cuban American community’s rhetoric with his own talk of
freedom for Elian. “There will be millions of people in the streets demanding the boy’s
freedom,” Castro said of his own people, accusing the United States government of kidnapping
the child. The Cuban leader also blamed deaths, like those of Elian’s mother and the other
victims of the sinking, on the American government. “The United States is the only one
responsible for the tragedies produced by illegal departures,” he charged. While American
officials stated that a Florida state court would decide whether Elian would remain in the United
States or be returned to his father and grandparents in Cuba, Cuban authorities rejected the
idea that the “corrupt judges” of a state where their political opponents held sway could be fair.
14
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The court would have to weigh the conflict between the surviving parent’s claim and the Cuban
Adjustment Act, which stated that any Cuban who reached American soil had the right to stay.
In the meantime, Castro expressed anger about media portrayals of the boy surrounded by toys
and wearing a Cuban American National Foundation t-shirt.18
Elian’s case dragged on for months as different parties fought over the fate of the boy.
The battle over the boy’s custody came to a head in March of 2000 when judge K. Michael Moor
of the United States District Court dismissed a lawsuit requesting a political asylum hearing for
Elian, concluding that a drawn out legal battle was not in the child’s best interest.19 In the wake
of this decision, much of the Cuban American community closed ranks around Lazaro Gonzalez,
with some fifty people holding a vigil around his home at all times. After federal authorities
ordered Gonzalez to hand over Elian, Cuban Americans expressed outrage at the decision. “This
is a battle between good and evil, and right now America is evil,” a retired exile schoolteacher
told reporters.20 Local authorities dragged their feet in cooperating with federal officials to
secure the return of the boy, until, almost a month later and following 44 hours of constant
negotiation, federal authorities raided Lazaro Gonzalez’s home. The raid, conducted in the early
hours of the morning of April 22, 2000, lasted only 154 seconds in which eight federal agents
entered the house, overpowered the security provided for the Gonzalez family by the Cuban
American National Foundation, and removed Elian. Within four hours the child was reunited
with his father. In the hours that followed, angry Cuban Americans draped black ribbons over a
large American flag flying over Lazaro Gonzalez’s door. They were followed by a group of elderly
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men who delivered a funeral wreath of white and blue carnations adorned with a ribbon that
read “R.I.P. Democracia.”21
An image of Elian being removed from his uncle’s home by armed federal agents spread
through national and international media outlets. The raid and the images that documented it
caused rage among the Cuban American community. Octavio Del Rio, a former Cuban political
prisoner, stated that his former belief that the people were respected in the United States had
left him. “The general impression among Cubans here is that we are alone,” Del Rio stated,
“Our cause is not understood.” Others stated feelings of general disgust. The reaction to the
raid was not universal, however, and different perspectives often came along ethnic lines. One
white non-Hispanic resident stated to the Herald that Janet Reno was “a hero” and that the raid
should have been conducted much earlier. “I believe the Cuban-American people do not act by
U.S. law,” she told reporters.22 Cuban Americans were appalled at the way they were being
portrayed by the media and how they were viewed by those outside their community. “I’m a
liberal Democrat, a card-carrying member of the ACLU… And now I’ve been hearing all kinds of
things, that we’re punks, thugs, murderers, Mafia,” said Juan Carlos Espinosa of the Institute for
Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. “They’re saying this about the
community we grew up in,” Espinosa despaired. Rafael Peñalver put it even more succinctly
when he stated that he had been “appalled by the hatred, the bigotry.”23
“This is a defining moment in the Cuban exile experience,” said Cuban American
sociologist Ruben Rumbaut, “It is as big as the Bay of Pigs, as big as Mariel.” Many of the
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younger members of the community who had long identified with more moderate positions
than their parents found themselves facing a sort of identity crisis.24 As Jorge Mas Santos
travelled the country during the Elian Gonzalez affair and in its aftermath, he realized that
Cubans throughout the United States had come to understand something about themselves.
“I’m Cuban,” they realized, “I’m different.”25 The nature of the conflict showed many Cuban
Americans, long seen as the most successfully assimilated Hispanic community that despite their
political and economic successes, their Cubanidad set them aside from other groups in the
United States. In Miami, this led to multiple demonstrations and to a general work stoppage on
April 25, 2000. “We declare Miami a ‘dead city’ on Tuesday,” read a joint statement by 21 exile
organizations.26 The community’s anger did not dissipate overnight and neither did that of the
city’s non-Cuban citizens. This led to elected Cuban Americans having to walk “a careful line” as
they both expressed outrage over the federal raid and urged protesters to remain calm.27
The conflict left many in Miami attempting to walk their own careful lines as they sought
to maintain the city’s economy and reputation while still expressing pride in the Cuban
community and its accomplishments. Civic and political leaders, including Jorge Mas Santos,
sought to bring the 2001 Latin Grammy Awards to Miami in an effort to improve the
community’s image following Elian’s removal and its aftermath. These leaders successfully
courted the awards, but the threat of protests by Cuban American organizations led the

24

Ibid.
Jorge Mas Santos, interview by Julio Estorino, August 4, 2011, Cuban Heritage Collection Luis J. Botifoll
Oral History Project, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida.
26
Alfonso Chardry, “One-Day Strike, Peaceful Protests Urged,” Miami Herald, April 23, 2000.
27
Don Finefrock and Karen Branch, “Leaders Express Ire, Call for Calm in Dade,” Miami Herald, April 23,
2000.
25

333
organizers to move the ceremony to Los Angeles.28 Despite the failure to secure the Latin
Grammys for Miami, Cuban Americans would have their own gala in 2001 to celebrate the
restoration of one of the most important symbols of the Cuban exile and their time in the
United States: the Freedom Tower. In September of 1997, the Jorge Mas Canosa and his family
had purchased the former site of the Cuban Refugee Center for $4,200,000 with the intention of
creating a permanent museum there. The once majestic building had fallen on hard times
following the closing of the center in 1974.29 Several failed ventures had seen the tower used as
a venue for wedding parties and galas and proposed as office space for multiple entities.
Following these failures the building had become “a home to vagrants who spent nights there
and scribbled graffiti on its crumbling walls.”30
“For Cuban exiles, the tower represents something similar to Ellis Island—it’s a symbol
of Freedom,” stated Jorge Mas Santos, “We wanted to leave a permanent structure that would
speak to our history and be a symbol for people fleeing a totalitarian regime. It is also a
testament to the greatness of this country and its willingness to welcome us with open arms.”
The Cuban American National Foundation took the lead in repairing and restoring the tower, a
$40,000,000 project.31 In order to fund the project, more than 10,000 people gathered in the
show of the tower to raise the millions of dollars needed to complete the restoration. The event
featured an exclusive $500 a person fundraiser within the building and a public block party
including a mass and a concert headlined by musicians like Wily Chirino, Jon Secada, Gloria
Estefan, and Celia Cruz. “After 40 years of exile, of struggle, of pain, of blood spilled, this shows
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that we are a people who have succeeded and who will not give up our dream of a free Cuba,”
Mas Santos told the assembled crowds before the start of a fireworks show. “This building is
our gift back to this community,” he went on, “which welcomed us with open arms.”32
As many in Miami sought to heal the wounds left by the Elian Gonzalez affair, many also
sought to obtain retribution for the actions of the Clinton Administration. Going into the
election of 2000, Clinton’s Vice President, Al Gore, was trailing by almost 20 points in the state
of Florida. The Cuban American community was still seething with anger over the Elian
Gonzalez affair and Gore’s attempts to distance himself from Clinton and Reno’s actions was
seen by many as pandering.33 While the Vice President carried the heavily Cuban Dade County
on Election Day, the inroads Clinton had made into the Cuban American community were almost
entirely reversed in 2000. In a contested state where the vote differential came down to a few
hundred votes, the Cuban American community cast a quarter of a million more votes for Bush
than they did for Gore.34 “Who can dispute that the Cuban vote elected President Bush?” asked
Miami City Commissioner Tomás Regalado.35 As the Bush and Gore campaigns entered a legal
battle over a recount in the state of Florida, the influence of the Cuban community in halting the
hand recount of votes in Miami-Dade County was questioned. The New York Times speculated
that Miami-Dade County mayor Alex Penelas had been “working both sides of the political fight
after the election, and especially in the days surrounding last week’s cancelled recount.”
Republican lawmakers and lawyers had been in touch with Penelas and two Democratic county
judges, Lawrence King and Myriam Lehr, who were members of the canvassing board. While
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both judges claimed not to be under pressure to halt the recount, the Times speculated that
halting the recount might have been an act of political self-preservation. “It is not possible to
judge how much their actions might have been influence by the realpolitik of Miami, where nonHispanic white politicians cannot discount the sentiments of Miami-Dade County’s largely
Republican Cuban-American voting base,” suggested the Times.36
George W. Bush ultimately took the office of the president and he maintained a
relationship with the anti-Castro elements in the Cuban community. During a celebration of the
99th anniversary of Cuban independence at the White House in 2001, President Bush indicated
he wanted to continue the embargo against Cuba as “a moral statement.”37 By 2004, however,
many Cuban Americans had grown disappointed with Bush as he had not extended a warmer
welcome to Cuban refugees or taken a harder line with Castro than his predecessor. Others
were unhappy at the lengths the Bush Administration had gone to remove Saddam Hussein
from power in Iraq while Castro remained in Cuba undisturbed. A poll conducted by Univision in
early 2004 showed that more than one third of Latino voters disapproved of the job President
Bush had done in “promoting democracy and regime change” in Cuba.38 Once again, the Cuban
community’s hope for regime change in Cuba resulting from the election of an American
political candidate to the presidency had proven fruitless.
The failures of the Bush administration would be enumerated by Jorge Mas Santos in an
opinion piece entitled “How to Win the Cuban American Vote.” He charged that American
policy had failed to empower “independent civil society” in Cuba and that Bush’s policies had
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harmed those sectors of Cuban society most likely to destabilize the Castro regime. “As a direct
result of President Bush’s strategic blunder in 2004 restricting contact with the island,” Mas
Santos wrote, “Cuban dissidents have experienced a significant reduction in material and
humanitarian assistance.” The Bush administration had also been caught off guard when Fidel
Castro left office and transferred power over to his brother Raúl. Mas Santos declared that the
next president of the United States had to end America’s spectator approach. CANF had
presented the campaigns of John McCain and Barack Obama with “simple recommendations
based on two basic premises: (a) the status quo is unacceptable; and (b) change needs to come
from within Cuba.” Specifically, Mas Santos and CANF made suggestions that included that the
restriction of cash aid to dissidents be lifted, that the 2004 restrictions on travel and remittances
by Cuban Americans be eliminated so the community could become active participants in the
development of Cuban civil society, and that the United States engage democratic and reformist
forces in Cuba. Mas Santos understood that both candidates wanted to help the Cuban people,
but Barack Obama’s “forward-looking and proactive approach toward empowering the Cuban
people is more in line with these proposals than John McCain’s vow to continue the Bush
administration’s policy.” More of the same would not bring about freedom in Cuba; it was time
for a change in policy.39
Many Cuban Americans were upset at Mas Santos’s recommendation. There were
already some who were upset with the Cuban American National Foundation’s new direction.
In 2001, some CANF members including former spokesperson Ninoska Pérez Castellón left the
organization because they felt it was moving toward the political center.40 In a response to Mas
Santos’s endorsement of Senator Obama, Cuban American blogger Manuel Tellechea
39
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characterized the schism in the Foundation as a purge. Furthermore, he found Mas Santos
wanting in relation to his father, referring to him as “our Fidelito” and noting that Mas Canosa
had been “bigger than his creation.” Without CANF, Mas Santos’s opinions “would matter as
much to the Washington Post as any other Cuban exile’s, and it is doubtful whether it would
even have reported his endorsement of a presidential candidate.” While Tellechea did not
disagree that the Bush administration’s policies toward Cuba were static and counterproductive,
he found inaction better than a scenario in which United States policy went in the wrong
direction. “The resumption of diplomatic relations with Communist Cuba, which Obama's
disposition to placate the tyrant will ensure,” he wrote, “would be the greatest victory ever
obtained by the Revolution at the expense of the United States since the Missile Crisis.”41
Obama was unable to gain the majority of the Cuban American vote in the 2008 election, but he
gained a significant portion of the community’s vote. In 2012, he improved on his 2008 results,
narrowly losing the Cuban American majority to Mitt Romney 52-48%.42
President Obama’s election brought about a rise in a new conservative movement, the
anti-establishment “Tea Party.” This new movement helped bring about a significant defeat for
the new president in the 2010 midterm election as the Democratic Party lost its majority in the
House of Representatives. One of the most visible politicians to rise to prominence in 2010 was
a South Florida Cuban American Republican that would be dubbed the “crown prince” of the
Tea Party movement, Senator Marco Rubio. The charismatic young Cuban American had been
active in Florida politics for a decade and a half, having served as a county chairman for Robert
41
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Dole’s presidential campaign in 1996. In 1999 he won a seat to the Florida House of
Representatives. Three years later he became majority leader of that body, and within seven
years of his election he became Speaker of the House. Rubio defeated former governor Charlie
Crist to gain his seat and in 2012 was mentioned as a possible vice presidential candidate for the
Romney campaign. In 2013, Rubio was selected to deliver the first bilingual rebuttal to the State
of the Union Address in the history of the United States.43 Rubio’s conservative politics, his
youth, and his Cuban American identity made him a sought after commodity within the
Republican Party and the most high profile Cuban American politician to date.
Within two years of his election to the Senate, Rubio was joined by another Cuban
American Senator; Rafael Edward “Ted” Cruz of Texas. Cruz, the former Solicitor General of
Texas, was the first Hispanic or Cuban American to serve as a United States Senator from his
state. Cruz, son of a firebrand evangelical minister who shared the views of some of the more
conspiratorial elements of the conservative movement, soon became a guardian of the
Republican Party’s ideological purity. “It is amazing that the wisdom of the chattering class to
the Republicans is always, always, always ‘Surrender your principles and agree with the
Democrats,’” Cruz told the New Yorker in 2014. In the eyes of many, Cruz became a central
figure in the split within the Republican Party and the conflict between its moderate and
conservative wings. Many within the former group came to consider Cruz a liability after his
opposition to the Affordable Care Act significantly contributed to the shutdown of the federal
government in 2013. While establishment Republicans determined that the shutdown was “not
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a productive enterprise,” Cruz “hardened his positions, delighting the base of his party but
moving father from the position of most Americans on most issues.”44
In March of 2015, Cruz announced that he would be taking his brand of conservative
politics to the national stage as a candidate for President of the United States. Cruz made the
announcement at Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia. Standing on stage at the evangelical
institution, Cruz faced a clamoring crowd of Liberty students and announced his bid, becoming
the first major presidential contender to formally declare himself a candidate for the 2016
election. “It is the time for truth,” Cruz told his audience, “It is the time for liberty. It is the time
to reclaim the Constitution of the United States.”45 Within less than a month of Cruz’s
announcement, Marco Rubio announced his own candidacy for President. “Tonight, grounded
by the lessons of our history, but inspired by the promise of our future, I announce my
candidacy for president of the United States,” Rubio told his supporters.46 Rubio being
“grounded in the lessons of our history” could be taken in more than one way, given that he
made his announcement at a reception in the Freedom Tower. While he appealed to a broader
base by alluding to the nation’s history, he was also making a direct reference to his origins and
to the shared experience of the Cuban diaspora. As the Miami New Times noted, however, it
was also to Rubio’s advantage that the Tower was “a photogenic locale with a GOP-friendly
name like the ‘Freedom Tower.’”47 The story of the Cuban exile flight from a communist state
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toward the United States and the successes of the Cuban American community made for an
appealing narrative from which to launch a bid for the presidency.
While both Rubio and Cruz had long harbored larger political ambitions, their
candidacies were likely also propelled by a change in U.S.-Cuba relations which was announced
in December of 2014. After eighteen months of secret talks conducted with the aid of the
Vatican and Pope Francis, the United States and Cuba moved to end decades of tension.
President Obama ordered the restoration of full diplomatic relations with Cuba and that a new
embassy be opened in Havana. “We will end an outdated approach that for decades has failed
to advance our interests, and instead we will begin to normalize relations between our two
countries,” Obama declared in a nationally televised statement from the White House. This
announcement caused an immediate reaction from Republican lawmakers who would be taking
control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate the following month, who vowed
that they would resist the lifting of the trade embargo against Cuba. “This entire policy shift
announced today is based on an illusion, on a lie, the lie and the illusion that more commerce
and access to money and goods will translate to political freedom for the Cuban people,”
declared Marco Rubio.48 President Obama also drew criticism from Cuban American Democratic
Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey for executive action that would weaken the embargo.
The changes to be made by the President were “clearly intended to circumvent the intent and
spirit of U.S. law and the U.S. Congress.”49
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It was not only politicians who expressed displeasure with President Obama’s actions
regarding Cuba. “Horrible. Horrible. What he did was repulsive,” declared 70 year-old exile Ana
María Lamar the day after the President’s announcement, “Obama said Castro was no longer a
terrorist! Come on!” Others observed that the reaction was not as drastic as it might have
been. Speaking of a protest held outside the famous Versailles restaurant in Little Havana, Jorge
Mas Santos noted that it was not as large as it might have been. “Look at the reaction two days
ago—20 people there, protesting,” said Mas Santos, “Hialeah, there were celebrations. Our
community has changed. I never say it is divided. It has just changed.” Many in the community
had had a different life experience than that of his parents’ generation. While Mas and CANF
were against legitimizing the Castro regime, they did note there would be some positive
changes. Changes in telecommunications policies would provide greater access to the internet
to Cubans on the island. This would allow for new approaches to CANF’s mission, which they
sought to convey to those distraught Cuban Americans who contacted the Foundation. “Our
tactics have to change, but the game doesn’t change,” Mas Santos stated, “ultimately, what I tell
all of them is that we will prevail. We will soon be witnessing a free and democratic Cuba.
Ultimately, freedom prevails over oppression.”50
Scholars and experts declared that the diplomatic moves by the United States and Cuba
suggested that the transition on the island would be conventional and peaceful. José
Gabilondo, professor of law at Florida International University, explained that this would not
mean a return to the Cuba that existed before the revolution. “You can’t put the toothpaste
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back in the tube,” Gabilondo warned.51 The Cuba the older exiles longed for no longer existed, if
it ever truly did, and regime change on the island would not bring it back. The younger exiles
and Cuban Americans could understand the deeply held convictions of their parents and
grandparents, but their experiences were different. Change would have to come with time, as
the older generations experienced death by exile and their children and grandchildren
embraced life in the United States under a complicated identity both Cuban and American. “The
way to have a new Cuba is biological,” said Miami Mayor Tomás Regalado, “At least two or three
generations have to disappear before everything is forgotten. Until nobody cares what
happened in Cuba.”
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